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This is a study of the theological aesthetics of Jonathan Edwards. Previous studies of 
Edwards’ aesthetics tend to pass over doctrinal issues and address Edwards mostly 
within a philosophical context. In this treatment, the aesthetics of Edwards is 
examined within an explicitly theological framework. 
 
The definitions of beauty offered by several Enlightenment philosophers known to 
Edwards (Shaftesbury, Addison, Hutcheson) are explored. Edwards creatively 
integrates from these writers the Neoplatonic tradition (the objective side) and 
empirical tradition (the subjective side) in his conception of beauty. 
  
Edwards uses the concepts of sensibility and beauty to construct his theocentric 
worldview. In Edwards’ conception, the material world exists for the purpose of 
serving as a giant metaphor for spiritual reality. Edwards adopts Lockean vocabulary 
to distinguish between a rational understanding and a sensible perception of spiritual 
reality. This sensible perception in the saints is the work of the Spirit according to his 
own nature. The Holy Spirit is God’s own perception of his beauty. Thus the 
perception of divine beauty by the saints is an extension of the inter-Trinitarian life 
of God. 
 
For Edwards, humility is the beauty of the human nature of Christ. This is a 
creaturely beauty not available to the pre-incarnate Son. Conversely, immensity is 
the unique and incommunicable glory of God. Both the Trinitarian beauty and 
awesome beauty of the immensity of God will reach their climax in the 
eschatological states of heaven and hell. Hell is especially a demonstration of the 
awesome glory of God’s immensity. 
 
Edwards’ aesthetics brings out the tension between the relatedness and the freedom 
of God. Both belong to the beauty of God, yet they cannot be harmonized in a closed 
system. Soon after Edwards’ death, the Reformed tradition in America quickly forgot 
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1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Jonathan Edwards is often regarded as the most important American theologian 
prior to the Civil War.1 He has generated considerable attention in recent scholarship. 
Born in 1703, Edwards lived through a time of transition. The Puritan heritage still 
seemed vibrant at his birth. By the time of his death at 1758, the Puritan religion had 
lost significant ground to the ‘enlightened’ Christianity in American culture. This 
‘enlightened’ Christianity rejected the complex dogmatic system of Reformed 
scholasticism and preferred the simplicity of Christian ethics.2 His importance lies in 
his creative attempt to hold together old and new elements of his time. On the one 
hand, he is a staunch defender of the Reformed and Puritan heritage. His Freedom of 
the Will is famous (or notorious) as a formidable defense of the Reformed doctrine of 
predestination. On the other hand, he is remarkably familiar (as a pastor in New 
England) with contemporaneous British theologians and philosophers. Edwards 
made conscious efforts to get acquainted with the avant-garde thinking of his time. In 
both published works and private notes, Edwards wrote polemic works to defend 
Calvinism against liberal thinkers of his day. However, he is much more than just a 
defender of old traditions. Mostly in his private notes, he mused on the implications 
of Newtonian physics and Lockean epistemology. In this synthesis of the old and the 
new, Edwards’ theology is almost unique among American theologians. It combines 
bold metaphysical speculations with strict adherence to traditional doctrines. It is this 
combination of the old and the new that makes Edwards so interesting to scholars. Is 
                                                 
1 ‘By many estimates, he was the most acute early American philosopher and the most brilliant of all 
American theologians.’ Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: a Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), 1. Ours is a theological study, and history is a peripheral concern. For historical concern, 
Marsden’s Jonathan Edwards provides a comprehensive and excellent biography. We organize 
Edwards’ material thematically rather than chronologically. The evolution of his theology over 
Edwards’ lifetime is not our main concern. Partly this is due to the need to limit our research, partly to 
our belief that there is no major reversal or paradigm shift throughout his life. For a chronological 
study of Edwards’ aesthetics, see Ronald Edwin Strader, The Chronological Development of the 
Spiritual-Aesthetic in the Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards and its Relationship to 
Seventeen and Eighteenth Century British Philosophy, Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate 
University, 1981. Strader thinks that Edwards’ aesthetics is developed in three phrases in response to 
different needs. Early in his life, Edwards uses theological aesthetics to explicate his mystical 
encounter with God. In the middle period, aesthetics is used to defend the revival movement. In the 
later period, he uses aesthetics to engage in a dialogue with the Enlightenment (particularly Francis 
Hutcheson.) We shall address all three concerns in the dissertation, though not in a strict chronological 
order 
2 See Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1972), 350-9.  
2 
the new or the old that is the heart of Edwards’ theology?3 Is he the last Puritan or 
the first modern (or postmodern) American theologian? 
It has long been recognized by scholars that aesthetics occupies a central place 
in Edwards’ thinking. Delattre’s Beauty and Sensibility has often been quoted in 
academic literature.4 It is often regarded as the standard work on this topic. Yet, 
Beauty and Sensibility hardly mentions anything about Reformed doctrines. In 
Delattre’s study, Edwards is primarily the pioneer of new metaphysics and new 
theology. Is the Reformed heritage really tangential to Edwards’ thinking, so that 
Delattre is justified in ignoring doctrines? Or, has Delattre missed something 
important about Edwards’ thinking on aesthetics? In this study, we shall study the 
aesthetics from an old and yet new perspective. It is old in the sense that we employ 
traditional theological topics such as doctrine of God and doctrine of Christ as 
organizing themes. It is new in the sense that no one yet has approached Edwards’ 
aesthetics through this angle.5 We hope to integrate Edwards the speculative 
philosopher with Edwards the Reformed theologian. Only with this integration can 
we see the true significance of the theological aesthetics of Edwards. 
First, we need to explain the division between Edwards the philosopher and 
Edwards the theologian among scholars. As we shall see in the next section, 
aesthetics is at the center of this story. Before we can explain more about the 
uniqueness of our approach, we need to look at previous scholarship on Edwards’ 
aesthetics. This is the topic of our next section. 
 
1.2. Theological Aesthetics and Edwards – a Survey 
It has long been recognized that aesthetics occupies a central place in Edwards’ 
thinking. Delattre’s work on this topic in the 1960s has often been quoted in 
academic literature.6 In this section, we survey past studies of Edwards’ theological 
                                                 
3 As the survey below will indicate, Perry Miller is the prime advocate of the new thinking in 
Edwards. Gerstner, John H., The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 3 vols. (Orlando : 
Ligonier Ministries, 1991), is a prime example of a scholarly work focusing on old doctrines in 
Edwards. 
4 Roland André Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards: An Essay in 
Aesthetics and Theological Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
5 Robert W. Jenson recognizes the importance of the Christian doctrine of God in Edwards’ aesthetics. 
‘The first: the God into whose beauty Edwards is led by the beauty of nature is no nature-God or God 
of natural theology, but from the very first and essentially the triune God.’ (America’s Theologian: A 
Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18). However, his 
book offers only scattered remarks on this theme. One can view our study as a systematic 
development of Jenson’s remark. 
6 Roland André Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards: An Essay in 
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aesthetics and offer motives for our new study. 
The question of aesthetics, like so many academic questions about Edwards, 
begins with Perry Miller. Almost sixty years after its publication, Miller’s intellectual 
biography of Edwards remains today unmatched in its wealth of provocative ideas 
and graceful prose. Its provocative power comes partly from Miller’s attempt to 
separate the real Edwards from the superficial Edwards. In the introduction to his 
seminal work, he writes that ‘the student of Edward must seek to ascertain not so 
much the peculiar doctrines in which he expressed his meaning as the meaning 
itself.’7 For Miller, the Calvinistic doctrines expounded by Edwards are obsolete and 
boring. These doctrines are merely the husk that hides an original and brilliant kernel. 
According to Miller, Edwards’ kernel is that: 
 
As a Protestant, he protested against the tyranny of all formalism, especially of that 
which masquerades as sweet reasonableness. He preached a universe in which the 
nature of things will permit no interest to become vested.8 
 
It is a startling conclusion because one can hardly find any explicit protest 
against formalism or human tyranny in Edwards’ writings. On the surface at least, 
most of Edwards’ publications and sermons are defenses of traditional Calvinism. 
They are not writings on general philosophy, even less about political philosophy. 
The way that Miller comes to such a startling conclusion is a long and winding road. 
We need to retrace this road briefly in order to understand the currents of 
contemporary Edwardsian scholarship. Moreover, aesthetics plays a central part in 
Miller’s reinterpretation of Edwards. 
We begin with the reading strategy of Miller. Miller gives a privileged status to 
the early writings of Edwards. In introducing Edwards’ 1933 sermon A Divine and 
Supernatural Light (when Edwards was thirty years old), Miller claims that ‘it is no 
exaggeration to say that the whole of Edwards’ system is contained in miniature 
within some ten or twelve of the pages in this work.’9 He believes that Edwards’ 
works are ‘statement and restatement of an essentially static conception, worked over 
and over, as upon a photographic plate, to bring out more detail or force from it 
clearer prints.’10 Miller often appeals to Edwards’ early private notes in his creative 
                                                                                                                                          
Aesthetics and Theological Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
7 Jonathan Edwards (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949), xiii. 
8 Ibid., xiv. 
9 Ibid., 44. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
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interpretation of Edwards’ later works.11 For example, he claims that in Edwards’ 
late work, Freedom of the Will, the question of the free will is really a masquerade 
for a deeper concern. ‘The Freedom of the Will is an immense cipher. Intellectually, 
the hidden meaning is “Excellency.”’12 We shall come shortly to the meaning of 
excellency. The issue here is that Miller believes that Edwards’ doctrinal concerns 
should be deciphered for its deeper meaning. The key to decipherment lies in 
Edwards’ early notes. These notes are the most speculative and explicitly 
philosophical among Edwards’ works. This allows Miller to claim that Edwards’ real 
concern is really philosophical rather than doctrinal. This interpretive strategy will 
cast a long shadow over subsequent scholarship.13  
What are the central themes of these early notes (and in Miller’s story, of all of 
Edwards’ works)? The theme is the reconciliation of the Christian religion with the 
advancement of science: 
 
Locke is, after all, the father of modern psychology, and Newton is the fountainhead 
of our physics; their American student, aided by remoteness, by technological 
innocence, and undoubtedly by his arrogance, asked in all cogency why, if the 
human organism is a protoplasm molded by environment, and if its environment is a 
system of unalterable operations, need mankind any longer agonize, as they had for 
seventeen hundred years, over the burden of sin?14 
 
According to Miller, Edwards learns from reading Locke that the old 
metaphysics no longer works. Locke claims that the only knowable objects in the 
human mind are ideas. And ideas are not the things themselves. ‘Locke amputated 
consciousness from things.’15 If we cannot know things-in-themselves, then we can 
verify one idea only with other ideas. It is not a denial of the reality of the external 
world, since ideas are generated and conditioned by contact with the external world. 
But we cannot verify ideas by examining things unmediated. Therefore, ‘truth is a 
consistent supposition of relations among ideas, not because truth is separable from 
                                                 
11 Many of these notes are published in Scientific and Philosophical Writings, ed. Wallace E. 
Anderson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), the sixth volume of the Yale edition of The 
Works of Jonathan Edwards. Hereafter when we cite the Yale edition, we write Works followed by 
volume and page number. Occasionally, when we cite the Banner of Truth Trust’s two-volume edition 
of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, we shall write Works (BT) followed by volume and page number.  
12 Jonathan Edwards, 26. 
13 There is another smaller stream of Edwardsian scholarship (e.g. Iain Murray) which interprets 
Edwards mainly as a revivalist preacher. It ignores Miller and assigns Edwards’ philosophical writings 
to a peripheral role. Scholars in this tradition seldom address the questions of aesthetics explicitly, and 
they will not be our dialogue partners in this study. 
14 Ibid., 72-3. 
15 Ibid., 189. 
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empirical test, but because only by a consistency of ideas can the mind participate in 
order and law.’16 If we know things only through ideas, and ideas come only from 
sensation, then how do we perceive bodiless objects such as God? If consciousness is 
amputated from things, then how is our mind related to the mechanical world of 
Newton? 
According to Miller, Edwards learns from Newton that the universe is a gigantic 
web of cause and effect. The four causes of Aristotelian physics are reduced to one 
efficient cause. The Arminians deceive themselves in believing in human autonomy. 
‘The notion that a man can cause whatever results he happens to prefer was not only 
bad theology, it was perverted physics.’17 Edwards recognizes that there is no such 
thing as substance; atoms are merely forces of resistance in this web of cause and 
effort. Seemingly, according to Miller, Edwards wants us to face the reality that our 
actions are also gears in the gigantic web of cause and effort. The Arminians clung to 
an outmoded metaphysics that has been refuted by Newtonian physics. ‘To Edwards’ 
mind, the lesson of popular Arminianism was central: the modern era was 
committing itself to the delusion that experience is a congeries of ill-matched piece, 
of disjointed frames and discontinuous moments.’18 If autonomy is an illusion, then 
what is sin? 
Miller claims that Edwards recognizes the profound implications of Locke and 
Newton for Christian religion before anyone in the New World (and arguably in the 
Old World too.) For Miller, Edwards gives a brave new interpretation of the 
Christian faith as a total embrace of the Newtonian world mediated through Lockean 
psychology: 
 
Because the source of ideas is external, and yet every idea is a self’s manner of 
conceiving, there must come a time when the redeemed self realizes that a sensation 
cannot be clutched to his bosom as a private luxury, but belongs to a system of 
impressions that has a logic deeper and more beautiful than any incidental 
advantages (or disadvantages) that accrue to him. 
 
… it is the love of the order, of divine things for their beauty and sweetness, arising 
out of perception of their “moral excellency.” Not the perception of excellency 
within the soul, or of the idea of excellency suspended before philosophical 
contemplation, but of the excellency of the cosmic method, which contains cholera, 
burning tigers, the evil deeds of men, and death.19 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 261. 
17 Ibid., 122. 
18 Ibid., 123. 
19 Ibid., 191-2. 
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Newton teaches us that the world is a web of cause and effect indifferent to our 
private wishes. Thus we must understand that reality has a logic deeper than our 
petty concerns. Locke tells us that we receive the world through subjective 
interpretations in the form of ideas. According to Miller, Edwards puts the two 
together and comes to the conclusion that the Christian faith is really a subjective 
appreciation of the gigantic web of cause and effect as beautiful. Cholera and death 
may not look pretty, especially when they happen around us. But this kind of 
perception comes from putting my existence or human existence as the center of the 
universe. This self-centered perspective is the essence of sin. Redemption requires us 
to adopt the right perspective: 
 
… it has meaning only when it also sees that all things are beautiful.… The sense of 
the heart enables the sight; without the sight, the universe remains the same universe, 
but “unless this is seen, nothing is seen that is worth the seeing; for there is no other 
true excellency or beauty.”20 
 
According to Miller, this allows Edwards to be thoroughly materialistic (in the 
sense that the material world is a closed universe) while allowing for a subjective 
redemption.21 Redemption is ‘a flash of experience’ in which we perceive the simple 
idea that the totality of reality is good and beautiful.22 Yet this subjective perception 
has important social implications. Edwards’ vision is a denunciation of all 
justification of vested interest in the name of reasonableness. When dressed in 
millennial language, this vision challenges the complacency of the rising middle 
class of New England. 
Francis Hutcheson had paved the way for Edwards by locating beauty within 
perception rather than in the things themselves. He also anticipated Edwards by 
claiming that we perceive morality in ways similar to our perception of beauty. 
However, according to Miller, Edwards regards the inner sense of Hutcheson as only 
another form of animal instinct: 
 
So Hutcheson was correct when he identified morality with aesthetics.… But 
Hutcheson, and all utilitarians and humanitarians after him, failed to proceed from 
beauties to the beautiful, and so set up for perceiving beings a criterion applicable 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 192. The words in double quotation are supposedly quotation from Edwards. Miller, to the 
chagrin of all subsequent scholars, did all his reference only in an annotated copy of his book 
deposited in the Harvard College Library.   
21 Ibid., 188. 
22 Ibid., 154. 
7 
only to stones and planets. True virtue, therefore, is no law of inanimate things, but 
“is that, belonging to the heart of an intelligent Being, that is beautiful by a general 
beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view as it is in itself, and as related to every 
thing that it stands in connection with.” The familiar process of perception still 
furnishes the distinction that a [sic.] Hutcheson blurs: what sensation receives as the 
instigator of a reflex act is also received as a perception predetermined by the 
disposition of the agent, and according to the conception, not according to the thing, 
the motive compels the will.23 
 
In other words, Hutcheson only explains why this flower or this house is 
beautiful. He never rises to the Edwardsian vision of the beauty of the total reality. 
Moreover, Hutcheson makes the sense of beauty a kind of reflex act. For Edwards, 
the vision of the totality is motivated by the will. It is a leap of faith, not a reflex 
action. 
We have given a lengthy summary of Miller. In our opinion, Miller has given 
the most compelling (yet seriously flawed) vision of Edwards’ aesthetics yet.24 
Miller reinterprets the whole corpus of Edwards’ works through his thesis, putting 
aesthetics as the heart and soul of Edwards’ thinking. He opens up questions that 
subsequent Edwardsian scholarship must wrestle with. Since Miller, the metaphysics 
and epistemology of beauty in Edwards have become central issues. No longer can 
scholars regard Edwards merely as a revivalist preacher. Edwards is henceforth 
regarded as engaging in a profound dialogue with Locke and Newton. These are all 
abiding contributions of Miller, and our work builds upon the path opened up by 
Miller.  
On the other hand, Miller’s slight treatment of doctrinal issues is controversial, 
to say the least. In Miller’s portrait, Edwards is a modern philosopher dressed in the 
language of theology. Edwards becomes a new Eriugena disguised as a Puritan. The 
beatific vision of God is essentially a vision of the totality of reality.25 This God is 
totally immanent within the web of cause and effect. It is so different from the God 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 290. 
24 Our dissertation will draw out some of his flaws. As one example of his flaws that we will not go 
into any further, Miller refuses to take Edwards’ concern for history with any seriousness (ibid., 
313-30). For better or worse, Miller’s direct influence tends to wear off after Delattre’s work. For 
example, a recent doctoral dissertation on Edwards’ aesthetics from Harvard (where Miller was a 
professor) mentions Miller twice only, on issues other than aesthetics (Mitchell in footnote 82). One of 
the consequences is that Edwards’ relationship to British aesthetics of his time usually gets dropped 
out from the purview of Edwardsian scholarship. 
25 ‘Yet this beauty is not a Platonic idea, … It arises by discoverable processes out of motion and 
perception. Critics like Chauncy Whittelsey never understood Edwards, but their instinct was not far 
wrong when they accused him of atheism – except that they would not conceive an atheism more 
profoundly conscious of God than they could experience.’ Ibid. 292. 
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of Reformed and Puritan tradition that one wonders why Edwards continued to 
preach Reformed doctrines at all. Either he is a master of deception (as Miller 
believes) or he suffers some form of intellectual schizophrenia. What would happen 
if his doctrinal concerns are not merely the husk, but they are the central issues of his 
aesthetics? What would happen if we try to put Edwards’ philosophical musings 
about excellency in an explicit doctrinal framework? Should we not allow his later 
doctrinal writings to have philosophical implications beyond his early private 
musings? We shall explore these questions rejected by Miller. 
Having discussed the pioneer in details, we shall be more succinct with 
subsequent developments. Following Miller, Elwood claims that the Edwardsian 
vision is the sensibility of the divine immanence in the world: 
 
In mature years Edwards found increasing satisfaction in the view that God is known 
most surely and most convincingly by an immediate awareness of His creative 
beauty in and through all the things He has made.… For those who have the inner 
eyes to see, God may be found as present in the mystery of the familiar in our daily 
world of experience. 
 
The “otherness” of God is not to be interpreted as “otherworldliness,” for the 
transcendent is not an otherworldly realm of being independent of this world, but a 
dimension of reality that underlies and penetrates all other dimensions.26 
 
This vision is a mystical vision in the sense that it cannot be explicated or 
defended through ratiocination. We simply see (or fail to see) divine beauty 
permeating all creatures. God and the world are not separable, as they are two 
dimensions of the one reality. Like Miller, Elwood interprets Edwards as a 
philosopher of intuition while pushing doctrinal issues to the side. He thinks that 
Edwards’ vision is similar to that of Whitehead and Schelling.27 According to 
Elwood, they are great philosopher-theologians because they pursue to the limit of 
human language the ineffable divine dimension of reality.28 
 Following a similar approach, Delattre has given the fullest exposition of 
Edwards’ aesthetics to date.29 Delattre addresses the relation between beauty and 
                                                 
26 Elwood, Douglas, J., Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960), 16, 18-9. 
27 Ibid., 9, 17. 
28 ‘Doubtless Jonathan Edwards’ chief fault lay in trying to express, without a poet’s imagination, 
ideas so profound that they can be expressed adequately only in the language of poetry.’ (Ibid. 159). If 
Elwood is right, then perhaps the song Colors of the Wind from the Disney movie Pocahontas 
expounds a better theology than Edwards. 
29 Beauty and Sensibility, full reference in fn. 44. Delattre explicitly expresses his debt to Miller and 
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other important concepts such as being, goodness, God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
While Miller paints with a broad brush, Delattre gives a detailed account of how 
beauty is related to various important philosophical and theological topics in 
Edwards. The result is an impressive digest of the then unpublished notes of Edwards, 
but also a rather diffuse discussion of various topics.30 Delattre differs from Miller in 
emphasizing the objectivity of beauty. Beauty is not just a certain inner sight; it is the 
structure of reality itself. Delattre claims that Edwards ‘finds that beauty provides the 
first and fullest and most adequate way of filling in the right-hand side of the 
equation “being is x ” or “being consists in x .”’31 While Miller separates use (the 
physical world) from pleasure (our perception), Delattre separates pleasures from 
objective relations: 
 
Beauty is objective in that it is constituted by objective relations of consent and 
dissent among beings, relations into which the subject (or beholder) may enter and 
participate but the beauty of which is defined by conformity to God (consent to 
being-in-general) rather than by degree of subjective pleasure.32 
 
However, the focus on objectivity is not meant to be a denial of the importance 
of perception. Delattre emphasizes that perception and existence of beings are two 
sides of the same coin. Being is manifested as existence and encountered as beauty.33 
Consent and dissent are the operation of the will. Thus it is objective in the sense that 
the operation of the will is real in some metaphysical sense. Yet it is subjective also 
in the sense that it is the operations of a subject.34 Perhaps Delattre is portraying 
Edwards as having a philosophical system similar to the natural philosophy of the 
early Schelling, where thinking subjects and perceived objects are two sides of one 
reality of being.35 Beauty is not determined by our private perception, but it is 
determined by the structure of reality.  
We shall return to Delattre at various points of our dissertation. Here we may 
summarize Delattre’s work as an attempt to develop a metaphysics of being in which 
                                                                                                                                          
Elwood on p.4. 
30 My frustration with Delattre is perhaps shared by Farley, who says that ‘if his work has a simple 
thesis, it is probably that Edwards has an objective notion of beauty.’ (Edward Farley, Faith and 
Beauty: A Theological Aesthetic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 49-50).  
31 Beauty and Sensibility, 28. 
32 Ibid., 22. 
33 Ibid., 31. 
34 Farley, Faith and Beauty, 49-50, points out this ambiguity of Delattre. 
35 Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 
1993), ch. 2. 
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beauty is the primary transcendental quality of being.36 Thus half of Beauty and 
Sensibility is devoted to metaphysical problems, where he lays out the relationship 
between beauty and other transcendental qualities (existence, oneness and goodness 
etc.). When Delattre comes to theology, the first half of that section is devoted to 
so-called natural theology. When he finally comes to Christian doctrines such as the 
Trinity and redemption, the treatment is much too brief. In Delattre’s interpretation, 
Edwards is primarily an expert metaphysician with little interest in Puritan doctrines. 
One is again left to wonder why Edwards continued to preach the old doctrines. Is 
Edwards’ theology primarily a philosophy of being? Does Edwards use beauty 
mainly to explain the nature of being? Is Edwards a Puritan version of 
Pseudo-Dionysius? We suspect that Delattre is reading into Edwards an alien agenda.  
The latest major contribution along the tradition of Miller is Sung Hyun Lee.37 
While Miller paints in bold and broad strokes the relationship between the 
Enlightenment and Edwards, Lee is meticulous and focused. Lee believes that 
Newton has delivered a daunting challenge to traditional metaphysics. According to 
Lee, Edwards’ answer is a new depositional metaphysics. Edwards denies that there 
is something called substance underlying the interactions between an object and the 
world. The interactions, taken as a whole, constitute the object itself. The laws of 
nature are not the accidents of physical objects; they are the essence of the object. 
Therefore, if the harmonious working of the universe is defined as beauty, to 
perceive the beauty of the universe is to perceive the essence of the universe.38  
From Locke, Lee focuses on the question: What is the role of the mind’s own 
activity in the cognitive process? According to Lee, this question is crucial to the 
epistemology of Locke, yet Locke never provides a satisfactory answer. Edwards 
advances beyond Locke in identifying habit as the active principle of cognition. By 
means of the habits in the mind, we join sensible data into a coherent whole in our 
mind. Thus the visual data of a rectangular white object becomes the idea of a door. 
Therefore, ‘the mind’s sensation of beauty then is in its essence an active exerting of 
the mind’s habit.’39 For example, the mind habitually associates an act of kindness 
with beauty and act of cruelty with ugliness. Instead of the mystic vision of Miller or 
                                                 
36 ‘Edwards’ philosophy is a philosophy of being. Nothing, not even God, is beyond being, … The 
concept of beauty is the one with which Edwards makes the first decisive move; it is the concept he 
joins to that of being for the development of his philosophy of being.’ Beauty and Sensibility, 104. 
37 Lee, Sang Hyun, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). 
38 Ibid., 81-2. 
39 Ibid., 150. 
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the metaphysical doctrine of Delattre, Lee helps us to understand aesthetic sensibility 
of Edwards in the vocabulary of Lockean psychology. In our opinion, Lee’s 
interpretation represents a real advance in scholarship.  
Along the line of philosophical appropriation of Edwards, Stephen Daniel 
provides an original and idiosyncratic reading of Edwards. Like Miller, Daniel 
believes that Edwards is opening up some bold new understanding of deity. Instead 
of accentuating the importance of Locke and the Enlightenment, he thinks that 
Edwards develops a metaphysics of divine semiotics based on Ramist and 
Renaissance logic. Enlightenment philosophy focuses on the subject who interprets 
reality. Daniel interprets Edwards’ philosophy as a postmodern metaphysics, where 
the message or the communication process is reality itself. We become reconciled 
with this ontology through our aesthetic vision. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
the definition Edwards gives to beauty is the consent of being to being. According to 
Daniel, ‘consent to being is the acknowledgment that being consists in the activity of 
substitution or displacement of individuality with some other.’40 This aesthetic 
vision ‘recognizes that the intelligibility of individual existence consists in being 
related to others in virtue of a divinely established harmony.’41 It recognizes that to 
be is the same as to be intelligible. To be intelligible is to be related to a web of 
meaning. The essence of language is that it is a system of mutual references. The 
epistemology of Locke is the epistemology of fallen, sinful humanity, because it 
assumes a dichotomy between the sign and the signified.42 Edwards claims 
(according to Daniel) that we need a ‘sense of the heart’ where we recognize that 
signs and suppositions are the essence of reality. To be is to defer oneself to others. 
That is true both for a person and for God. The interpreting subject of the 
Enlightenment is an illusion. 
Daniel represents the most radical reinterpretation of Edwards since Miller’s 
work. If Daniel is right, then most scholars have missed the heart of Edwards’ 
philosophy completely. In this case, we think that the majority is not mistaken. We 
differ from Daniel in many points of interpretation. For example, we believe that the 
interpreting subject is an important element in the theology of Edwards. His doctrine 
of Trinity, his Christology and his eschatology all rely on the concept of a knowing 
                                                 
40, Stephen H. Daniel, The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in Divine Semiotics 
(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1994), 179. 
41 Ibid., 184.  
42 Ibid., 186. 
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and willing subject. We think that Daniel has mistakenly applied Edwards’ 
understanding of the material world to spiritual reality as well. He ends up with an 
Edwards who is completely foreign to seventeenth century New England.43 
Mitchell has taken an alternative approach to Edwards’ aesthetics by 
concentrating on the manifestation of beauty in Edwards.44 Mitchell is interested in a 
comprehensive summary of Edwards’ employment of aesthetic vocabulary. Building 
upon the works of John Smith and Lee, Mitchell regards aesthetic experience as a 
specifically religious experience. Mitchell’s conclusion is that aesthetic vocabulary 
underlies much of Edwards’ writings, such as narratives of the Great Awakening, his 
spiritual biographies and autobiography, and his theology of sanctification. While 
Mitchell opens us to the variety of ways in which Edwards applies aesthetic 
vocabulary, he does not break new ground in our theological or philosophical 
understanding of Edwards. 
Scholars in Miller’s tradition study Edwards mainly for his innovative 
development of Enlightenment philosophy. They tend to dismiss or ignore the 
Calvinist doctrines in Edwards. In recent years, there is a renewed interest in 
Edwards the theologian. For example, McClymond situates Edwards’ dialogue with 
the Enlightenment within the context of a defense of Reformed theology.45 Instead 
of dressing up Enlightenment metaphysics in Christian jargon, McClymond shows 
that Edwards ingeniously diffuses the challenges of the Enlightenment to the Puritan 
vision. Holmes has provided an excellent summary of Edwards’ theology, paying 
close attention to Edwards’ continuity with and innovations in the Reformed 
tradition.46 These works have shown us that Edwards the theologian is neither a bore 
nor a great pretender. There are also specialized studies on his doctrine of Trinity, 
Christology, and pneumatology, which we shall encounter later in our study. It is time 
to build on these studies and to re-examine Edwards’ aesthetics systematically as a 
theological enterprise. 
Not many Protestant theologians have made beauty a central theme of their 
theology. Naturally, recent writers on Christian theological aesthetics have turned to 
                                                 
43 Just to give one example, can a Puritan like Edwards really believe that ‘sin is the loss of this sense 
of immanent meaning within discourse’ (ibid. 22)? 
44 Louis J. Mitchell, The Experience of Beauty in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards, Studies in 
Reformed Theology and History, NS. 9 (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2003). 
45 Michael J McClymond, Encounters with God: an Approach to the Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
46 Stephen Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000). 
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Edwards as a valuable resource from the Protestant tradition. They tend to stand apart 
from the influence of Miller. Edward Farley emphasizes self-transcendence as the 
central theme of Edwardsian aesthetics. Beauty is the perception of the global good, 
in contrast to our private good. For Farley, the main significance of Edwards’ 
aesthetics is that it points to the affective side of ethics. Ethics is not just a matter of 
rules; it is also an affective delight in the beauty of our actions.47 
Much closer to our concern is the discussion of Sherry. Sherry points to the 
central significance of the doctrine of Trinity in Edwards’ aesthetics.48 He points out 
that Edwards follows the western tradition in his doctrine of Trinity. In this tradition, 
the Spirit is regarded as the bond between the Father and the Son. This bond creates 
harmony within the Trinity, and it is also the role of the Spirit to create harmony in 
the universe: 
 
Edwards derives the Holy Spirit’s mission as beautifier from his role within the 
Trinity (and also the Son’s, as image of beauty, likewise), and he explains that both 
the role and the mission in terms of harmony, consent and agreement, in that the 
Holy Spirit, being the harmony and beauty of the Godhead, has the particular 
function of communicating beauty and harmony in the world.49 
 
Sherry recognizes that divine beauty in Edwards is a doctrinal issue. It should 
not be reduced to general philosophical concepts. However, Sherry does not grasp 
fully the complexity of Edwards’ thought. Sherry thinks that Edwards never 
addresses why the Spirit should be uniquely associated with beauty:  
 
… we may ask why the harmonies found in the world should be taken to derive from 
the harmony of the Trinity itself; for a weaker position is available to us here, 
namely that there is an analogy between the Holy Spirit as the harmony of the 
Trinity and beauty as the harmony of the world, but that the former plays no special 
causal role with regard to the latter.50 
 
Actually Edwards has a profound answer for Sherry’s question: the Holy Spirit 
bestows his own beauty upon the saints, which enables the saints to perceive the 
beauty of the world. The other major criticism of Sherry is that Edwards fails to 
                                                 
47 Edward Farley, Faith and Beauty: A Theological Aesthetic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). See 
especially ch.3 and ch. 7. 
48 Delattre discusses beauty in the Holy Spirit and Jesus in Beauty and Sensibility, ch. 7 and p. 171-3. 
But he interprets these metaphysically and does not address the issue of the immanent Trinity. 
49 Spirit and Beauty, 93. 
50 Ibid., 96. 
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explain why beauty should be limited to the concept of harmony.51 Sherry takes no 
account of the tradition of Miller, which emphasizes harmony as the essence of 
reality.  
Dyrness also shares our agenda in trying to locate Edwards’ aesthetics within 
the Reformed heritage.52 He considers Edwards as the culmination of Puritan 
thinking on the imagination. Dyrness thinks that Edwards’ main contribution to 
Reformed aesthetics is his claim that after sensing the glory of God in their hearts, 
the saints will have a new sense of the beauty of the world. For Dyrness, the main 
weakness of Edwards’ aesthetics is that there is a dichotomy between the sensibilities 
of the saints and non-Christians. Consequently, it cannot serve as a mandate for 
culture in general. Dyrness’ criticism raises the question of the purpose of a Christian 
theological aesthetics, a question which we shall return to in our conclusion.  
 
1.3. Our Agenda 
It is time to summarize our survey and lay out the agenda of our study. We have 
indicated that there are three different approaches to Edwards’ theological aesthetics. 
One focuses on Edwards’ relationship to the Enlightenment; another approaches 
Edwards through the heritage of Reformed theology; and the third addresses 
Edwards within the context of a search for a Christian theological aesthetics. We 
hope to integrate these three approaches in our study. In the next chapter we shall 
follow Miller’s agenda by comparing the definition of beauty proposed by several 
English Enlightenment thinkers and by Edwards. Then we shall depart from Miller 
by arguing that Edwards’ theological aesthetics is inseparable from his Christian 
doctrine. We allow his theological writings and sermons to have equal weight to his 
early philosophical musings. In the third chapter, we look at how the concept of 
beauty serves as the cord that binds God, human beings and the material world 
together. This chapter will answer Sherry’s criticism of Edwards. It will also argue 
that Edwards is building on Puritan spiritual theology. Miller, Delattre and Daniel 
have interpreted Edwards as a bold metaphysician with a bold new concept of 
divinity. Chapter four will look specifically at divine beauty. We claim that the 
doctrine of the Trinity and the attribute of infinity play central roles in Edwards’ 
doctrine of God and aesthetics. In the fifth chapter, we point out that Jesus Christ 
exhibits a uniquely human beauty inapplicable to the pre-incarnate Son. This human 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 95. 
52 Reformed Theology, 274-287. 
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beauty of Christ points to a kind of beauty different from the Trinitarian beauty. We 
shall see how both kinds of beauty are consummated in the eschaton in chapter six. 
Then we conclude our study with some remarks regarding Edwards’ relationship to 
his theological heritage, to the aesthetics of the Enlightenment and to the project of 
theological aesthetics today. Throughout the discussion, we attempt to examine the 
philosophical implications or presuppositions of his doctrines, without overwhelming 
his doctrines with philosophical speculations. 
We hope to show that theological concern is central to the Edwards’ aesthetics. 
Edwards is not constructing metaphysics for its own sake, but he is laying out 
aesthetics as a channel for the perception of and communion with a personal God. 
The material world is not merely a giant web of impersonal cause and effect. It is 
rather a metaphor for spiritual reality beyond this material. The beauty of this world 
is intended to induce us into divine life. The intra-Trinitarian life of God is the 
archetype of beauty. We participate in divine life when God reveals this beauty to us 
in sensible form. The world may speak the metaphor of divine beauty, but only the 
Holy Spirit can enable one to be sensible of divine beauty. This sense of the heart is 
neither the mystical vision of Elwood nor the leap of faith of Miller. Thus Edwards’ 
aesthetics is an extension of the spiritual theology of the Puritans. On the other hand, 
Edwards develops the Reformed vision of the majesty of God into a specifically 
aesthetic vision. The perception of this aesthetic vision will be infinite joy for the 
saints and infinite pain for the damned. The tension between the Trinitarian beauty 
and the majestic beauty of God brings out the inherent tension and richness of the 
Christian theology. Edwards’ ideas find their counterparts in the distinction between 
beauty and sublimity in philosophical aesthetics. Thus both theological aesthetics and 
philosophical aesthetics indicate the importance of the sensible perception of 
nonconceptual knowledge of supersensible reality. The analysis of such sensible 
perception of divine reality is the task of theological aesthetics that Edwards 
bequeaths to us. 
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Chapter Two: Definitions of Beauty 
In this chapter, we intend to set our study within the history of western 
theological aesthetics. We begin by looking at the history of theological aesthetics 
before the Enlightenment in a rapid fashion. It shows us what kind of questions 
theologians and philosophers have raised about the nature of beauty. It will serve as a 
general background to our study. We shall return to some of these issues in our 
concluding chapters.  
As we have seen in the last chapter, much of Edwardsian scholarship has 
focused on Edwards’ relationship to the Enlightenment.1 Our second section will 
take a detour from the history of aesthetics, and we shall examine the major themes 
in the English Enlightenment that are crucial to understanding the aesthetics of 
Edwards. Miller has already suggested the science of Newton and the philosophy of 
Locke. We like to suggest the twin themes of reason and empirical observations. 
These themes are championed as foundation of scientific knowledge of the physical 
world and the mental world. Edwards, along with many Puritans, embrace these 
themes as their own. In the first section, we shall give a brief introduction of these 
themes in old England and in New England.  
Following that, we shall return to aesthetics and examine the concept of beauty 
in three English Enlightenment thinkers: Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Joseph Addison 
(1672-1719) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746).2 The importance of Hutcheson for 
Edwards’ aesthetics has long been recognized and debated.3 However, Hutcheson 
represents only one view of beauty in the English Enlightenment. We need the other 
two to give a more complete picture of the aesthetics of the time. All three writers are 
                                                 
1 For Edwards’ engagement with the Enlightenment beyond the theme of aesthetics, see McClymond, 
Encounters with God, Leon Chai, Jonathan Edwards and the Limits of Enlightenment Philosophy. 
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1998) and, Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of 
History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003) 
2 A succinct treatment of the importance of these three philosophers for the origin of modern 
aesthetics is in Paul Guyer, Value of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 8-28. Our focus is different from Guyer because he treat these philisophers as 
percusors to Kant. The development of English aesthetics in the seventeen and eighteenth century is 
laid out in Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of Grace: Locke and the Aesthetics of 
Romanticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).  
3 See especially Paul Ramsey, ‘Appendix II: Jonathan Edwards on Moral Sense, and the 
Sentimentalists’ Works 8:689-705 and A Owen Aldridge, ‘Edwards and Hutcheson,’ Harvard 
Theological Review, Jan 51, 35-54. Ramsey and Aldridge come to opposite conclusion regarding 
Hutcheson’s influence on Edwards. We are close to Ramsey in believing that the direct influence of 
Hutcheson is minimal. 
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explicitly referred to in Edwards’ Catalogue.4 While we cannot know for certain 
how each might have contributed to Edwards’ thought, together they form the 
‘modern opinions’ that Edwards was eager to enter into a dialogue with.5  
After discussing these philosophers, we shall give a preliminary definition of 
beauty according to Edwards. Lastly, we shall offer some comparisons. 
       	   
               	     
           	   
               	     
           	   
               	     
           	   
               	     
     
Viladesau suggests that there are three inter-related but distinctive meanings of 
the word aesthetics: 
 
1. The general study of sensation and imagination and/or “feeling” in the wider sense 
of nonconceptual or nondiscursive (but nevertheless “intellectual”) knowledge 
2. The study of beauty and/or “taste.” 
3. The study of art in general and/or of the fine arts in particular.6 
 
In modern philosophical discussion of aesthetics, the focus is usually on the 
third meaning of the term.7 Perhaps it reflects the gradual decline in confidence in 
defining beauty with philosophical rigor.8 However, Puritan New England is not 
known for its cultivation of fine arts, and Edwards shows little interest in aesthetics 
in the third sense. Moreover, the concept of fine arts developed gradually only in the 
eighteenth century. Literature, paintings and other art forms have always been 
present, but they are not gathered together in philosophical discourse until the 
Enlightenment.9 Edwards may not even know the modern concept of fine arts.10 We 
shall return to the question of the fine arts briefly only in our conclusion. 
Aesthetics, in the sense of the study of beauty, has a much longer history in 
philosophy and theology. Sometimes, if beauty is understood as nonconceptual in 
                                                 
4 MSS 151, box 15, folder 1202, in Beinecke Library, Yale University. The Catalogue is a small 
manuscript containing an annotated list of books that Edwards was interested in. Edwards might not 
have read all the works in the list. This manuscript has not been published yet. 
5 Edwards mentions the fashionable and erroneous ‘modern opinions’ of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and 
Turnbull on the nature of virtue in Letter 222, Works 16:696 
6 Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 7. 
7 For example, the majority of essays in two recent handbooks of aesthetics deal with different 
aspects of the fine arts: Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to 
Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005) and Peter Kivy, ed., Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
8 See Jerome Stolnitz, “Beauty: Some Stages in the History of an Idea,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr., 1961), 185-204. 
9 This story is told in Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History 
of Aesthetics,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 12(1951) 496-527, 13(1952) 17-46. 
10 As practitioners of fine arts, both Edwards and his wife Sarah enjoyed singing. Cf. Marsden, 
Jonathan Edwards, 106. 
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that particular theory, the study of the theory of beauty will lead to epistemological 
questions of non-conceptual knowledge. Edwards conceives beauty as part of the 
essence of God. To become a Christian is to become sensible of and to partake in 
divine beauty. In this study, we shall take aesthetics both in the first and second sense. 
A brief historical survey of the theological aesthetics will help us to understand 
Edwards in a broad perspective. 
 We begin our story with Plato. Plato is famous for his advice to banish poets. 
His main objection is that poets invoke in us behavior that we would disdain in real 
life: 
 
I think that you know that the very best of us when we hear Homer or some other of 
the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes in grief, and is delivering a long 
tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure, and 
abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, 
and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way. 
 
But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we 
plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the 
belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theater that 
of a woman.11 
 
Why do we enjoy being ‘womanish’ in theater and recommend being ‘manly’ in 
real life? In real life, we recognize that we must face calamities rationally. Emotions 
merely interfere our thinking process and they should be suppressed. Our suppressed 
emotions hunger for release in a good cry, when we can sympathize with sufferers 
from the safe position of an observer. The problem is that ‘after feeding fat the 
emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings.’12  
For Plato, real beauty is eternal and impassionate. In the dialogue Symposium, 
Plato discusses how a person should progress from enjoying the beauty of a 
particular human to human bodies in general, then to the beauty of laws and 
institutions, then to the beauty of knowledge in general. Finally, 
 
… turning his eyes toward the open sea of beauty, he will find in such contemplation 
the seed of the most fruitful discourse and the loftiest thought, and reap a golden 
harvest of philosophy, until, confirmed and strengthened, he will come upon one 
                                                 
11 Republic 605c-d. All quotations of Plato from Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns, eds., The 
Completed Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
Our discussion is based on Christopher Janaway, ‘Plato,’ in Routledge Companion, 3-14 and, Monroe 
C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History (University, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 1975, repr. of 1966 ed.), ch. 2. 
12 Republic 606b. 
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single form of knowledge, the knowledge of the beauty …13 
 
This single form of beauty ‘is neither words, nor knowledge, nor something that 
exists in something else, … but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal 
oneness.’14 True beauty is imageless, since beauty is the same as goodness, and 
goodness has no image: 
 
… it is only when he discerns beauty itself through what makes it visible that a man 
will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue – for it is virtue’s self 
that quickens him, not virtue’ semblance.15 
 
The problem with poetry is that it necessarily remains at the level of dealing 
with imagery. It is the job of philosophy to train people to reach this vision of the 
eternal beauty and the ultimate goal of human life. ‘If a man’s life is ever worth 
living, it is when he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty.’16  
Having answered the nature of beauty, we are still left with the question of 
criteria. For example, how do we distinguish a beautiful body from an ugly one? 
Plato has much less to say on this question. He does tell us that the qualities of 
measure and proportion invariably constitute beauty and excellence.17 
This short summary of Plato already shows that Plato has laid out the agenda of 
much subsequent philosophical and theological aesthetics. What is the role of 
emotions in our appreciation of true beauty?18 Does true beauty reside in the rational 
and universal, or the sensible and particular? If beauty is ultimately one, how is 
Beauty related to particular manifestations of beauty? How does a person go from 
particular beauties to Beauty itself? Are beauty and goodness merely two 
descriptions of one reality? In theological terms, what is the relationship between 
divine beauty and creaturely beauties? How can we rise from particular beauties to 
the appreciation of divine beauty? Plato’s theory of proportion also becomes the 
theory of beauty with which later aestheticians had to wrestle.19 Plato’s theory is 
                                                 
13 Symposium 210d. 
14 Ibid. 211a-b. 
15 Ibid. 212. 
16 Ibid. 211d. 
17 Philebus 64e. 
18 We note in passing that Aristotle deliberately refutes Plato in Poetics by claiming that tragedy helps 
to purify our emotions. Rather than suppressing our emotions, we should train them to take delight in 
what is good and to be repelled by what is bad. (See Nickolas Pappas, ‘Aristotle’, in Routledge 
Companion, 15-27) Though Aristotle has a colossal influence on medieval theology, Poetics has made 
little impact on medieval theological aesthetics. 
19 Plato may have been influenced by the Pythagoras school. On some texts on the beauty of numbers 
in the Pythagorean school, see Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, tran. Hugh Bredin 
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further developed into Neoplatonism in the writings of Plotinus and others. It is 
Neoplatonism that is most important for the medieval concept of beauty. 
From Plato we shall go to the Church Fathers. The Fathers do not give 
systematic treatment to the beauty of God. There is no major controversy about 
divine beauty in the early church; so there is no need for the Fathers to reach 
maximal clarity. Nonetheless, there are some common themes. First, they think that 
the best kind of creaturely beauty is the spiritual beauty of the saints. Second, they 
believe that Christ is the manifestation of the beauty of the Father. Third, they believe 
that the beauty of this world is created by God. God is the source of all beauty and 
God is most beautiful. Fourth, the Holy Spirit is the mediator of the knowledge of 
divine beauty to the saints and the beautifier of the souls of the saints. The Spirit also 
mediates the divine ability of creativity to the servants of the Lord.20 
Augustine, the most important Church Father for the western church, has given 
only scattered remarks about the nature of beauty. He subscribes to the view that the 
beauties of particular things are informed by the indivisible Beauty of God. Beauty is 
manifested by unity, proportion and order.21 Far more important than his occasional 
remarks on beauty is the question that he bequeaths to subsequent theologians: 
 
If I were to ask first whether things are beautiful because they give pleasure, or give 
pleasure because they are beautiful, I have no doubt that I will be given the answer 
that they give pleasure because they are beautiful.22 
 
In modern vocabulary, Augustine is asking whether beauty is an objective 
reality or a subjective reality. Augustine assumes that beauty is obviously objective. 
For others, the answer turns out to be much more complicated. 
Within the early church, Pseudo-Dionysius provides the most important and 
systematic exposition of the Neoplatonic theory of beauty. On addressing the 
relationship between Beauty and beautiful objects, Dionysius writes: 
 
But the beautiful which is beyond individual being is called ‘beauty’ because of that 
beauty bestowed by it on all things, each in accordance with what it is. It is given 
this name because it is the cause of the harmony and splendor in everything… and 
                                                                                                                                          
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 72-4. For Greek and medieval fascination with the 
aesthetics of numbers, see Umberto Eco, ed., On Beauty: A History of a Western Idea, tran. Alastair 
McEwen (London: Secker & Warburg, 2004), ch. 3. 
20 See Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (London: 
SCM Press, 2002), 4-7. 
21 See Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece, 92-8; Joseph Margolis, ‘Medieval aesthetics,’ in 
Routledge Companion, 29-40. 
22 Augustine, De Vera Religione, cited in Eco, Aesthetics of Aquinas, 49. 
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gathers everything into itself. 
 
From this beauty comes the existence of everything, each being exhibiting its own 
way of beauty. For beauty is the cause of harmony, of sympathy, of community. 
Beauty unites all things and is the source of all things.… And there it is ahead of all 
as Goal, as the Beloved, as the Cause toward which all things move, since it is the 
longing for beauty which actually brings them into being. 
 
The Beautiful is therefore the same as the Good, for everything looks to the 
Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is nothing in the world 
without a share of the Beautiful and the Good.23 
 
In Dionysius, beauty is portrayed as the mechanism in which all beings are 
engaged in a journey of process and return. God is the super-perceptible and 
ineffable Cause of everything, and God is the eternal and one Beauty. Insofar as all 
things proceed from God, they partake in the beauty of God. God bestows being 
along with goodness and beauty to all things. In other words, beauty is a 
transcendental property of beings. If Beauty is the origin of all things, it is also the 
goal of all things. It is a form of metaphysical striving, in which both conscious and 
inanimate beings are constantly returning to God at the same time as they proceed 
from God.  
Like Plato, Dionysius adopts harmony as the criterion for discerning beauty. 
However, this is given a distinctly metaphysical interpretation. All things must be 
harmonious because they come from a single Cause. There is an innate togetherness 
of everything because the Cause is not divided or confused. In emanation, the Cause 
creates all diversity and gives each being its appropriate rank and movement. All 
beings return in a harmonious way back to the one Cause. 
The Neoplatonic account of beauty is not the only theory of beauty in the 
medieval age, but it is the most prominent one. One particular development is that of 
John Scotus Eriugena. Eriugena interprets the beauty of the universe as a web of 
signs: 
 
Eriugena taught the Middle Ages to look upon things with a penetrating eye, to read 
the universe, to read nature, as if it were a vast store of symbols. For him, the 
relations between God and things were not solely causal, but were also like the 
relations between sign and signified.… It is a theophanic vision which is openly 
                                                 
23 The Divine Names 4.7, 701c-704b. All quotations of Dionysius from Pseudo-Dionysius: The 
Complete Works, tran. Colm Luibheid (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987). We give the chapter and 
sections number, and the column and line numbers in the Migne edition of Dionysius (given on the 




Eco calls this kind of vision pankalia, the beauty of all things. It projects an 
optimistic universe in which the reality of evil becomes problematic. 
In the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the Neoplatonic theory of beauty comes to 
its most systematic treatment.25 However, his Neoplatonism is heavily modified by 
Aristotelianism. One particular passage in Aquinas becomes the standard definition 
of beauty in the high medieval period: 
 
For beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” or “perfection,” since those things 
which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and 
lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called beautiful which have a 
bright color.26 
 
Eco has shown us the complexity of Aquinas’ definition.27 Out of the three 
criteria, proportion is the most basic and important. For Aquinas, proportion is not 
merely or primarily a matter of quantitative ratio. It means all kinds of fitness or 
harmony found in reality. Eco lists seven kinds of proportion in Aquinas: matter and 
form; essence and existence; sensible and quantitative ratio (e.g. in music); rational 
coherence in our intellect; an object and its function; the totality of reality and its 
individual parts; sense organs and their corresponding objective quality (e.g. between 
eye and light). In each case, the seemingly different domains (e.g. form and matter) 
in fact cohere together in a harmonious whole. These are important examples of 
harmony, but they are not an exhaustive list. Eco explains: 
 
The fact is rather that proportion, because it is constitutive of beauty and thus 
coextensive with it, has its own transcendental character. Proportion therefore has an 
infinity of analogues. Every existent, beautiful in that it possesses existence, can 
present us with new and unsuspected types of proportion.28 
 
In other words, since proportion is the content of beauty, and beauty is a 
transcendental character of being, proportion is also a transcendental property of 
being. To call it a transcendental property means that beauty is a property of all 
beings. Truth, goodness and beauty are commonly regarded as the transcendental 
                                                 
24 Eco, Aesthetics of Aquinas, 24. 
25 Dionysius’ influence on Aquinas is shown by Aquinas’ important commentary on The Divine 
Names of Dionysius, in which he developed his ideas on beauty and other metaphysical concepts. 
26 ST I.39.8. All quotations of Summa Theologica come from the translation by the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province. 
27 See Aesthetics of Aquinas, 64-121, on which we base our exposition of Aquinas. 
28 Ibid., 97. 
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properties. Since proportion is a transcendental property, every existent has 
proportions unique to itself. Therefore the types of proportion are potentially infinite. 
Medieval metaphysics is sometimes regarded as a static metaphysics of 
substance. It is important that we understand proportion in a dynamic sense: 
 
… [proportion] does not signify something static and crystallized in a motionless 
perfection, but rather a dynamic unity. It is a dynamic unity because it involves a 
combining of living forces which do not annul or rigidify themselves when they 
combine; rather, they confer life upon a type of activity whose value derives from 
their several vigorous and operative energies.29 
 
For example, the harmony between objective quality and sense organs happens when 
some operations of the physical world interact with a particular living organ (e.g. 
red color reflecting from a piece of paper hitting our eyes). The universe consists 
of constant interactions of different activities. It is the harmonious coherence of 
this web of activities that constitutes beauty. 
The meaning of integrity is indicated by Aquinas’ understanding of perfection: 
 
The ‘first’ perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and 
this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having 
its parts complete.30 
 
An object has the perfection of integrity when it corresponds to the form of the object 
as a whole. For example, a handicapped person does not have bodily integrity of a 
human being because she has some limbs missing. In Aquinas’ theology, beauty is 
based on the metaphysics of form. But form is not some kind of productive force, 
as (maybe) in the case of Plato. The form of an object is the idea of it that preexists 
in the mind of God. 
The most ambiguous term in Aquinas’ three criteria for beauty is clarity. The 
two terms proportion and clarity reflect two different traditions in the understanding 
of beauty. While proportion derives from the conception of a harmonious universe, 
clarity derives from the imagery of light.31 Light is almost universally regarded as 
beautiful, yet it is most simple and does not seem to contain any mixture or 
proportion. Medieval aesthetic theories are put to test in their attempt to reconcile the 
two traditions. Aquinas’ solution is to subsume clarity under form. ‘Clarity is the 
fundamental communicability of form, which is made actual in relation to someone’s 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 95. 
30 ST I.73.1. 
31 On medieval aesthetic appreciation of light, see Eco, On Beauty, ch. 4.  
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looking at or seeing of the object.’32 Proportion refers to the objective orderliness of 
form; clarity refers to the perception of the form by a human subject. An object 
achieves clarity for a human subject when she sees beyond the physicality into the 
form of the object, the ontological and divine ground of that object. What then is the 
beauty of physical light? Aquinas regards light as the form of the sun and other 
celestial bodies. Hence light is subsumed under a particular kind of form, even when 
it is the form of some exalted objects. 
If Aquinas builds his aesthetics on form, does he have an objective theory of 
beauty? The answer is not simple. Aquinas provides an indirect answer when he 
distinguishes beauty from goodness: 
 
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good 
is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion 
of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. 
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, 
viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and 
beautiful sounds.33 
 
Both goodness and beauty are transcendental property of beings. They differ in 
their relation to the knowing subject. Goodness is the desirability of the object and it 
is related to our appetitive faculty. Beauty is the form of the object and it is related to 
our cognitive faculty. Therefore beauty is based on the objective property of objects, 
but it is inseparable from the human perception of it.34 Beauty, for Aquinas, is 
essentially a cognitive perception of the super-sensual form that subsides in 
particular objects. While Pseudo-Dionysius identifies beauty as a metaphysical 
process, Aquinas grounds beauty on the cognitive power of the human subject. Thus 
Aquinas can be seen as moving one step towards a modern theory of beauty. On the 
other hand, his emphasis on the cognitive nature of beauty runs contrary to the 
Enlightenment.  
The cognitive aspect of Aquinas’ theory contains a fatal inconsistency. If I want 
to appreciate the form of an object in all its integrity, I have to know its relationship 
with everything else in the universe. Therefore I must start with knowledge of the 
whole universe in order to know a particular object. However, I can learn about the 
                                                 
32 Eco, Aesthetics of Aquinas, 119. 
33 ST IIa.27.1.ad.3. 
34 According to Eco (Aesthetics of Aquinas, 118), this is the major difference between Aquinas and his 
teacher Albert the Great. Albert thinks that beauty resides in the form irrespective of any knowing 
subject. 
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universe only by studying particular objects. There seems to be no humanly possible 
mechanism for me to appreciate the beauty of any particular object.35 While 
Edwards also regards beauty as knowledge, he arrives at a different epistemology 
which circumvents this inconsistency. 
We have spent considerable time on Aquinas because he presents perhaps the 
most sophisticated philosophical aesthetics in the west until the rise of modern 
aesthetics. It serves as a good reference point for comparison with the theological 
aesthetics of Edwards. We have one last question for Aquinas: in what sense is 
Aquinas’ aesthetics a theological aesthetics? To answer this question, we must 
remember that the passage on the three criteria of beauty actually occurs in a 
question about the nature of the Trinity. The question is what attributes we should 
appropriate to the three persons of the Trinity. Aquinas answers: 
 
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in 
His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which 
“eternity” is appropriated to the Father, “species” to the Son, “use” to the Holy 
Ghost. For “eternity” as meaning a “being” without a principle, has a likeness to the 
property of the Father, Who is “a principle without a principle.” Species or beauty 
has a likeness to the property of the Son.36 
 
Immediately following the above quotation, Aquinas gives the definition of 
beauty as proportion, integrity and clarity. Then he argues that the Son, being the 
image of the Father, is the archetype of beauty. In other words, beauty should be 
understood first of all as an attribute of the eternal Son. The Son has both integrity 
and proportion, because he is the perfect express image of the Father. ‘The Son, as 
the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect,’37 is the archetype of 
clarity. As the Son is the Word and the intellect of the Father, he is the originator of 
all the forms of reality.38 All things are beautiful only because they participate in the 
life of the Son. To appreciate the beauty of any particular object is to see it grounded 
in the source of its existence – God.  
We do not have space for other theories of beauty in the medieval age or the 
demise of the Thomistic synthesis in the hands of Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham. Similarly, we have to pass over the Renaissance with a few remarks. One 
                                                 
35 Eco points out this aporia in ibid. 203. 
36 ST I.39.8. 
37 ST I.39.8. 
38 On the relationship between forms and God in Aquinas and its historical background, see Vivian 
Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the 
history of Christian thought, 69 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996). 
26 
excuse is that ‘there was no great philosopher to turn his mind to the problem of 
aesthetics, and no single thinker made systematic contributions to its progress.’39 In 
general, as the Renaissance scholars go back to classical Greek and Roman thought 
for inspiration, a Neoplatonic understanding of beauty prevails in philosophical 
discourses. Humanists such as Marsilio Ficino contrast the real beauty of the forms 
with the superficial beauty of physical appearance. On the other hand, the theoretical 
practitioners of that time open the door for future development. Painters such as 
Lenonardo da Vinci emphasize that we learn to create beauty in art by careful 
observation of real life objects. If we want to paint beautiful portraits, we start by 
looking at people around us. We do not begin with philosophical theory about the 
essence of humanity. We should especially observe their emotional expression so that 
our portraits will be filled with the emotions of living people. 
More relevant for our study is the place of beauty in Reformation theology. 
Unlike the medieval theologians, Reformers like Luther and Calvin had neither the 
time nor the intention to develop a comprehensive account of reality. They do not 
have an explicit theology of beauty. Nonetheless, they do give some indications of 
their perspective. 
Luther believes that all created things are really masks of God (larvae Dei).40 
They are media through which God can speak to us. He has no objection to the use of 
images per se. For Luther, the crucial dichotomy is between faith and works, not the 
physical and the spiritual. As long as the images proclaim the centrality of the Word, 
Luther allowed the use of images in worship. Zwingli, owing to his fear of 
superstition, banned the use of images from worship. However, he also allowed 
simple images in his printed works for illustration of the gospel. In both Luther and 
Zwingli, the pursuit of artistic beauty is not denied. However, beauty should not 
become a focus in and of itself. Its only purpose is to serve the gospel. Since neither 
regards the category of beauty as important to the gospel story, they do not develop 
any theory about divine beauty and its relation to earthly beauty. 
Calvin regards nature as a most beautiful theatre of God’s work.41 God makes 
the world beautiful so that we can enjoy it.42 In describing the world as beautiful, 
Calvin adopts a common sense usage of the word without giving an exact theory of 
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the nature of beauty. The important theme for Calvin is that the orderliness of nature 
shows us the wisdom and the goodness of God.43 If we accept that the world is 
created, then natural beauty exhibits the glory of Creator. Unlike Aquinas, there is no 
ontological link between natural beauty and divine beauty. The manifestation of 
divine glory is not the product of metaphysical reasoning. It is the result of seeing the 
beauty of the world within the Christian narrative of creation and redemption. 
Non-Christian and Christian can both appreciate natural beauty. The non-Christian 
does not see the glory of the Lord in natural beauty because they do not look at the 
world with the right spectacles – the perspective of the Bible.44 In other words, they 
do not read the world within the gospel narrative.  
For Calvin, the primary image of divine glory is our ethical life. The material 
world does not hold the sacramental function of the medieval worldview. As Dyrness 
puts it: 
 
In serving our neighbor, wife, child, friend, we are serving God and creating a 
world – making images – which in some way can reflect the splendor that belongs to 
God. The world then is given a new, and radically different importance. Our work 
can point to God; but it is not enchanted with God’s presence.45 
 
In other words, God’s presence is not engraved in the essence of being. God’s 
glory is manifested in our stewardship of the material world and our lives. 
From Calvin we move to the immediate context of Edwards – the Puritans. Like 
the Reformers, the Puritans seldom reflect on beauty explicitly. Yet they all agree that 
the joy of the Christian is to behold the glory of God. Yet how do we perceive the 
glory of God? According to Dyrness, Puritans tend to answer along two different 
traditions: intellectualist and affective.46 
William Perkins and William Ames are prominent theologians in the 
intellectualist tradition. Following the Reformation hostility to icons, they emphasize 
that the visible cannot be grasped by the invisible. They advise against the use of 
both physical images and mental images. Moreover, they have an intellectualist 
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understanding of the natural world as the theatre of God’s glory. To appreciate the 
beauty of the world, they advocate organizing knowledge of the world according to 
some rational schemes. One of the most important works in this tradition is Ames’ 
Technometry. In this treatise, Ames arranges the content of the arts curriculum 
(which is another name for the totality of human knowledge at that time) according 
to a Ramist bifurcation method. His theology textbook, The Marrow of Divinity, 
exhibits a similar Ramist organization. For Ames, grasping the structure of the 
knowledge correctly is to appreciate the glory of God’s wisdom. 
Richard Sibbes and John Cotton are representative theologians of the affective 
tradition. These theologians emphasize the taming of imagery in our mind rather 
than avoidance: 
 
Imaginations, however, though it is a “windy thing,” does have real effects. It stirs 
up affections, which move spirits and humours and thus the whole person. The 
remedy is to bring these risings of our souls under the obedience of God’s truth and 
spirit, rather than led by appearance.47 
 
For these theologians, the danger is not in imagery per se, but in failing to 
perceive the spiritual truth behind the images. The image of gold is idolatrous if it 
leads to the worship of gold. It is not idolatrous if it is understood as a metaphor for 
the glory of heaven. They use various imageries in their sermons to depict the grace 
of God. The most famous example of such imaging of grace is probably Bunyan’s 
Pilgrim’s Progress. The purpose of these imageries is to invoke holy affections. 
These theologians employ imagery of earthly things in order to purge our devotions 
to earthly objects. Thus gold may be used to illustrate heaven so that we may learn to 
love heaven instead of gold. For these theologians, the glory of God is beheld more 
by affections than by reasoning. 
The two traditions should not be considered as contradictory to one another. 
Perkins and Ames do not denounce the use of all imagery in sermons, and Sibbes and 
Cotton do not deny the importance of doctrines. It is a difference in focus. One may 
even attempt to combine both perspectives. John Owen, for example, writes about 
our affections for God in the form of scholastic theology.48 As we shall show in this 
study, Owen proves to be an interesting dialogue partner in assessing the significance 
of Edwards’ theology. We may approach Edwards’ theological aesthetics as engaging 
both traditions by giving a theological and reasonable account of the religious 
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affections. Moreover, both traditions emphasize the subjective act of interpretation. 
In the intellectualist tradition, human beings recognize the wisdom of God through 
its organization of the knowledge of earthly realities. In the affective tradition, 
earthly things are interpreted as imageries of divine things. Edwards will follow this 
focus on the interpretative act of the subject in his appreciation of beauty. 
Edwards works out his aesthetics through the concepts developed in the 
Enlightenment. The aesthetics of the Enlightenment should be the next topic in our 
survey. We shall turn to this topic in our next chapter, allowing us to go at a slower 
pace. For our purpose, we have given a sufficient historical background for Edwards 
in the area of theological aesthetics. We can summarize the story and bring out the 
significant issues faced by Edwards. Plato identifies beauty as form and gives beauty 
an intellectualist interpretation. He adopts harmony and proportion as criteria for 
beauty. The Church Fathers regard God as the source of all beauty without giving a 
rigorous theory of beauty. Pseudo-Dionysius gives a Neoplatonic account of 
emanation in which beauty is a metaphysical principle of generation. This beauty is 
objective and human being can grasp its principle through the use of reason. Aquinas 
develops this tradition into a systematic account of beauty as one of the 
transcendental properties of being. He also modifies this tradition by emphasizing the 
inseparability of beauty from human cognition. He gives a theological account for 
identifying the Son as the archetype of beauty. The Reformation disavows any 
attempt to correlate God and the world in some form of natural theology. The beauty 
of the world declares the beauty of the Lord only in the context of the gospel 
narrative. Orderliness is still considered beauty, but it is a sign of divine beauty only 
from the perspective of a Christian doctrine of creation. Following this tradition, 
Puritans emphasize that the beauty of the world needs to be interpreted through holy 
affections or orthodox doctrines. Otherwise it may lead to idolatry. Yet the Puritans 
have not developed any rigorous theory to explain their perspective. For example, 
how are holy affections related to knowledge? Is beauty a description of emotion or a 
form of knowledge? How does one integrate the doctrine of creation with the use of 
earthly things as spiritual images? In what sense is God beautiful? Is God beautiful 
only in the sense that he is the Creator of earthly beauty, or is there some analogous 
relationship between divine beauty and earthly beauty (as in the case of Aquinas)? In 
what sense can we attribute proportion and harmony to the Godhead? Edwards’ 
theology will provide answers to some of these unresolved questions of the Puritan 
heritage.  
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While we began our survey with Plato and went through the medieval age to the 
Puritans, we are not suggesting that Edwards writes his aesthetics in conscious 
dialogue with this whole heritage. Edwards probably has very limited first-hand 
knowledge about Greek philosophy as well as the early and medieval church. His 
acquaintance with the early and medieval church comes through reading the 
Reformed schoolmen such as Mastricht and Turretin. He is acquainted with 
Neoplatonism through reading the works of the Cambridge Platonists and, perhaps, 
Malebranche. Edwards develops his theology mainly in dialogue with his 
contemporaries. In our exposition of Edwards, we shall concentrate on his 
relationship with the Reformed heritage and the Enlightenment. However, we need a 
wider context to access the significance of Edwards’ aesthetics. We shall return to 
this wider context in our chapter seven. There we shall explore in a preliminary way 
how Edwards may contribute to theological aesthetics today. 
 
2.2. The Enlightenment and New England  
Before we can address the significance of aesthetics in the Enlightenment period, 
we need to understand the questions posed by the Enlightenment. Before we ask the 
relationship of Edwards’ aesthetics to the Enlightenment, we need to ask how the 
Enlightenment was perceived by New England in Edwards’ time. This section 
provides brief answers to these questions. We begin this section with a brief remarks 
on empiricism. For people of the seventeenth century, the astronomical laws of 
Kepler and the gravitational laws of Newton ushered human knowledge into a new 
era. These laws were considered the product of exact reflections based on careful 
empirical observations. They are not deductions based on a priori principles. While 
the progressive European philosophers of the seventeenth century are not unified in 
their paradigms, they are unified in their hostility towards Aristotelianism.49 For 
them, Aristotelianism represents vain speculations based on useless first principles. 
Only by careful observations can we arrive at true knowledge. In the words of 
Newton, the analysis of difficult subjects should ‘consist in making experiments and 
observations, and in drawing conclusions from them by induction, and admitting of 
no objections against conclusions, but such as taken from experiments, or other 
certain truths.’50 For Newton, general induction from phenomena produces 
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knowledge that is almost certain.51 In the analysis of the human mind, the 
philosophers of the English Enlightenment intended to be ‘the Newton of moral 
science.’52 They would use induction method to study scientifically the human 
psyche. In the article on moral philosophy in the first edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica (1771), the author calls moral philosophy ‘a science, as it deduces those 
rules from the principles and connexions of our nature, and proves that the 
observance of them in production of our happiness.’53 The article then draws on 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler for a discussion on moral senses and other 
principles of realities. 
In this new science of the mind, John Locke (1632-1704) is the most important 
thinker in setting the agenda. Locke rejects the existence of innate ideas, and 
emphasizes that all knowledge comes from experiences. These experiences begin 
with ideas that external objects imprint in our mind. Knowledge is now defined as 
‘the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of 
any of our Ideas.’54 Locke pushes aside metaphysical principles, which supposedly 
are self-evident axioms independent of experiences, as unproductive speculations. 
The science of the mind is the study of how our ideas function together. 
Progressive thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Addison and Hutcheson are eager to 
develop the empirical studies of the mind. These studies begin with the analysis of 
our experiences. Unlike physical events, outside observers cannot have direct 
experimental observations of psychic events. In other words, I cannot directly 
observe what your mind is thinking about. I can only observe your behaviors, or 
listen to what you tell me about your thoughts. Though they seldom ponder the 
question directly, these philosophers would probably hesitate to conduct experiments 
on human beings as if the people were chemical compounds. Mental introspection, 
analysis of the testimonies of others, and historical researches are three primary ways 
to conduct empirical research on the human soul.55 While David Hume (1711-1776) 
prefers the historical method, Shaftesbury and others often appeal to our 
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introspection. Whatever the preference, they are participants in a common project 
creating the science of morals.  
On the other hand, Edwards is a pioneer in his milieu. Seventeenth century New 
England did not lack a tradition in empirical science. The Puritans believe that the 
creation is the embodiment of divine art. In studying nature, we are also studying the 
divine mind. Therefore the creation is a form of divine discourse. They employed the 
dialectic method of Ramus to study the divine discourse. ‘Detailed empirical 
observation of nature now became a duty; new discoveries were sought and prized as 
revelations of the divine wisdom.’56 Technologia were produced as encyclopedia of 
knowledge.57 Jonathan Edwards’ father, Timothy Edwards, contributed some 
observations of a peculiar prolific pumpkin vine that evolved into a paper published 
in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society in old England.58 Cotton 
Mather (1663-1728), the leading minister and spokesman for New England of his 
generation, was elected member of the Royal Society in 1713 based on his writings 
in natural history and medicine.59  
As the eighteenth century arrived, New England aspired more and more to the 
learning of old England. On religious purity, the New Englanders still prided 
themselves. On the other hand, ‘for New England elites, England supplied the 
standards of urbanity, sophistication, and broad-mindedness to be emulated for both 
intellectual and social reasons.’60 Philosophical Transactions was a coveted sign of 
recognition. Cotton Mather popularized the teachings of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica in his work The Christian Philosophy, published in 1721. However, 
Mather had neither the mathematical skills nor the patience to learn the equations in 
Principia. The important point for Mather is that that the laws of motion demonstrate 
empirically the wisdom of God by which God directs the creation towards its decreed 
ends.61  
The scientific interests of the New Englanders were mostly observations of 
nature, not construction of theoretical systems. ‘Edwards appears to be nearly unique 
among colonial scientists in the early eighteenth century, in that while their 
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contributions were overwhelmingly in the fields of natural history, agriculture, and 
medicine, his primary interests and efforts were directed to the problems in 
physics.’62 Following the example of Newton, Edwards approaches physics as a 
series of theoretical constructions based on observable phenomena. As a student of 
Yale at in 1716-1722, Edwards was educated mainly in scholastic science.63 Yet 
Edwards dug into the writings of Newton in the Yale Library. For example, Edwards’ 
paper ‘Of the Rainbow’64, probably written in 1722, reflects his effort to build upon 
the foundation of Newton’s Optics. In the paper, citing the work of Newton on 
‘different reflexibility and refrangibility of the rays of light’, Edwards tries to explain 
the convex shape of the rainbow. Like his fellow scientists in New England, Edwards 
is interested in empirical observations, as indicated by his ‘Spider’ letter.65 However, 
observation is just the starting point for Edwards. Edwards also wants to explore the 
structure of reality that makes the observations possible. Unlike Mather, he 
recognizes that the new physics requires a new metaphysics. On the question of 
beauty, he will push into theoretical constructions far more complex than any of his 
predecessors in either the English Enlightenment or among the Puritans. 
In the new science of the human mind, Edwards is a pioneer in New England 
too. The Puritans have built a complex psychological theory of faith;66 they do not 
have a common paradigm on the theory of the mind. What constitutes knowledge? 
How does the mind acquire knowledge? The New Englanders did not entangle 
themselves with this kind of speculations. When Locke published his Essay in 1689, 
it created no ripples in New England. The Yale Library possessed the first known 
copy of Locke’s Essay in New England.67 Edwards probably studied Locke 
intensively during the years when he was a tutor at Yale in 1724.68 According to 
Hopkins, Edwards ‘was as much engaged, and had more satisfaction and pleasure in 
studying it [Essay], than the most greedy miser in gathering up handsful of silver and 
gold from some new discover’d treasure.’69 He was set onto the road of defending 
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the orthodox theology of the Puritans with the new science of Locke. Like the 
English philosophers, Edwards adopted partially to the agenda of Locke. Their 
aesthetics all builds on Locke, yet each develops it in a different and creative way. 
We shall now address briefly on the role of reason in relation to faith in the 
English Enlightenment and New England. Unlike the French Enlightenment, the 
English Enlightenment was not anti-clerical. The English spokesmen for the new 
sciences – Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle – distinguished between reason and faith. 
They placed characteristic Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, as ‘truths above 
reason.’70 These advocates of using reason as arbitrator in matter of faith are often 
clergymen themselves. The clergymen of the Anglican Church employed reason to 
defend themselves against the Puritan radicals and the Popish church.71 Richard 
Hooker (1554-1600), for example, used natural laws as argument for the Elizabeth 
settlement against the biblicism of the separatist Puritans.72 In other words, reason 
was seen as a tool of stabilization in the post-Reformation war of religions. 
Gradually in the seventeenth century, the use of reason shifted from defending 
the via media to defending the essential goodness of human beings.73 Benjamin 
Whichcote (1609-83), father of the Cambridge Platonism, believes that ‘where the 
demonstration of the spirit is, there is the highest purest reason; so as to satisfie, 
convince, command, the mind.’74 The Cambridge Platonists reject the dualism 
between reason and ‘truths above reason’. Reason contains not just the antidote to 
extremism, but it is also the judge of truthfulness in religious issues. In particular, 
reason gives us a better guide to salvation than the introspection of conversion 
experience. Through reason we grasp the eternal moral rules that even God must 
abide by in the final judgment.75 However, the Cambridge Platonists were not 
against their Protestant tradition. Rather, they saw reason as the best means of 
defending Protestantism against atheism and papism.76  
Shaftesbury and Addison share in this confidence in the harmony between faith 
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and reason. As we shall see in the next section, Shaftesbury develops his aesthetics as 
a defense of the essential goodness of human nature and the power of reason in 
leading to goodness. For him, enthusiasm, or blind devotion to obscure doctrines, is 
the primary enemy of true religion. Similarly, Addison paints a Puritan as someone 
with a morbid obsession with death. For him too, reason clearly shows us the 
existence of a reasonable God.77 In particular, beauty is one of the evidences of the 
goodness of God. 
The Scottish Enlightenment follows the pattern of the English Enlightenment in 
its endorsement by the clergymen. Though the Scottish church was staunchly 
Calvinistic in theology in the seventeenth century, it was not opposed to science or 
the right use of reason. Hutcheson studied theology at the University of Glasgow. 
Hutcheson and other liberal and learned clergymen of his generation (Patrick 
Cumming, George Turnbull) used reason to retard the growth of fanaticism in the 
first half of the eighteenth century. Hutcheson represents the transition generation 
between the seventeenth century orthodoxy of the church, and the moderate and 
urbane Presbyterian ministers of the mid eighteenth century who defended infidel 
philosophers such as Hume and Kames.78 Hutcheson shares the ethos of his time in 
believing in the harmony of the reason and faith. Hutcheson believes that his 
aesthetic theory is the delivery of reason, and significantly it also confirms the 
reasonableness of the theistic worldview. Even if Hutcheson had not in fact hindered 
Hume from obtaining the chair of moral philosophy at University of Edinburgh, he 
would not approve of the agnosticism of Hume. 
New England is no stranger to the use of reason either. For Cotton Mather, 
reason ‘was the faculty for apprehending truth as truth exists in objects, it was master 
of the passions.’79 Reason is considered by Mather and other New England 
preachers as tools to strengthen true religions against the passions and foolishness of 
humankind. Mather thinks that the progress of reason will make those ‘pitiful Cries 
of Priestcraft’ no longer credible. He welcomed ‘the importation into New England 
of books by Scottish moralists, by Ferguson, Buchanan, and above all by Hutcheson, 
“who has taught us how to gather the Delicious things that grow on the Tree of 
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Life”’.80  
The New England divines are aware of the dangers of reason too. In A Man of 
Reason, Mather argues against the foolish opinion that all right and wrong are 
arbitrary conventions of human society. We know innately what is right or wrong. 
Mather insists that, in matter of morality, ‘the Voice of Reason, is the Voice of 
God’.81 Indirectly Mather is arguing against the empiricism of Locke. The divines 
are also aware of the threat of deism, though deism never gained much popularity in 
the seventeen and eighteenth century New England. To counter the threat of deism, 
the divines assert the Bible as divine testimonies. Mysteries of faith have to be 
accepted based on the authority of the Bible.82  
Edwards follows his peers in trusting in both the authority of Scripture and the 
reasonableness of faith. During the 1730s and 1740s, Edwards worked from time to 
time on the ‘Outline of “A Rational Account of the Main Doctrines of the Christian 
Religion Attempted”’.83 This is one among many evidences of Edwards’ interest in 
the rational defense of the Christian faith. While Hutcheson proposes his aesthetic 
theory as a defense of the goodness of human nature, Edwards constructs his 
aesthetic theory as a rational defense of Calvinism and a meditation on the glory of 
God. For Edwards, ‘holiness is a most beautiful and lovely thing’.84 In joining his 
aesthetics to the glory of God, he follows the example of other New England divines 
in joining the discovery of science with the wisdom of God. On the other hand, 
Edwards does it in a sophisticated and metaphysical system that has no parallel 
among the other divines. 
Having laid out the larger agenda of the aesthetic theories in the seventeenth 
century, we now turn to an exposition of those theories. 
 
2.3. Shaftesbury  
The importance of Shaftesbury for modern aesthetics is a debatable issue.85 The 
influence of Locke on him is also debatable.86 He is important for our story because 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 426. 
81 Ibid., 427. 
82 Ibid., 422. 
83 Works 6:394-7. 
84 Works 13:163. 
85 See Jerome Stolnitz, ‘On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory,’ 
Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1961):97-113. 
86 See Tuveson, Imagination as a Mean of Grace and Dabney Townsend, ‘Lockean Aesthetics,’ The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49/4 (1991), 349-361 for Locke’s influence on Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson and others. 
37 
Edwards seems to be familiar with his thinking and his aesthetics bears striking 
similarities to Edwards’.  
In 1711, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, published his 
only major work – Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times.87 This 
clumsy title reflects the untidy content of the book, which includes texts of different 
genre written over a period of time. There are two open letters, a soliloquy, a short 
treatise on virtue, a Socratic dialogue on morality, and commentaries on the previous 
treatises in the book. Given the way Shaftesbury develops his ideas, we have to piece 
his aesthetics together from scattered remarks throughout the book.  
Shaftesbury was partly responding to the perceived negativism of Locke: 
 
’Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the 
world, and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) 
unnatural, and without foundation in our minds. Innate is a word he poorly plays 
upon; the right word, though less used, is connatural.88 
 
For Shaftesbury, Locke has asked the wrong question. The real question is not 
whether people are born with concepts of right and wrong. The important question is 
whether people are by nature meant to develop certain order and virtue in their mind. 
The fact that we are not born with the ideas of order in our mind does not imply that 
there is proper order inherent to human nature. The fact that we are not born with 
concept of right and wrong should not lead us to the conclusion that morality is 
arbitrary. 
In a nutshell, this natural order of our mind is the real beauty of the world. Thus 
Shaftesbury concludes his Characteristics with these words: 
 
It has been the main scope and principal end of these volumes to assert the reality of 
a beauty and charm in moral as well as natural subjects, and to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of a proportionate taste and determinate choice in life and 
manners.89 
 
Our exposition will unpack this summary phrase by phrase. Let us start with the 
distinction between natural and moral subjects. For Shaftesbury, both the existence of 
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natural beauty (i.e. beauty of physical objects) and spiritual beauty are self-evident: 
 
The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects as in the ordinary bodies or 
common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colours and proportions of these 
latter being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity, 
according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several 
parts. So in behaviour and action, when presented to our understanding, there must 
be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or 
irregularity of the subjects.90 
 
Following the Platonic tradition, Shaftesbury believes that beauty is a judgment 
of reason. When reason comes across visible objects, it will naturally judge the 
beauty of those objects according to the arrangement of shapes and colors in those 
objects. Similarly, reason will judge actions and behavior according to their 
conformity to the regularity of reason.  
Not only do we reflect on our actions, we also reflect on our affections. This 
ability of reflection is what makes us a rational being: 
 
In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward 
beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the 
very actions themselves and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude and their 
contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by 
means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those 
very affections themselves, which have been already felt and have now become the 
subject of a new liking or dislike.91 
 
As we perceive physical objects by external senses, we perceive our affections 
in our reflection. We are rational creatures who can form ‘general notions of things.’ 
Therefore we can reflect notionally on our affections. If our affections accord with 
the ordering of reason, if we like and hate the things we should like and hate, then we 
possess inward beauty.92  
Shaftesbury writes his aesthetics not as a detached observer. He regards inward 
beauty much superior to outward beauty: 
 
Who can admire the outward beauties and not recur instantly to the inward, which 
are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting and of the highest 
pleasure as well as profit and advantage?93 
                                                 
90 ‘An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit,’ (hereafter just ‘Inquiry’) Bk 1 Pt. 2 Sec. 3, 172. 
91 Ibid., Bk 1, Pt 2, Sec 3, 172. 
92 This makes Shaftesbury closer to Aristotle than to Plato. See Chapter 1.1 of our study. 
93 ‘Miscellany III,’ ch. 2, 416 
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Shaftesbury believes that we can modify and cultivate our taste for beauty by 
studying philosophy – ‘the study of inward numbers and proportions.’94 His writings 
are meant to encourage the readers to cultivate this inward beauty: 
 
It is we ourselves create and form our taste. If we resolve to have it just, it is in our 
power. We may esteem and resolve, approve and disapprove, as we would wish.95 
 
Why should we cultivate this inward beauty? The reason is that this beauty is 
‘of the highest pleasure as well as profit and advantage.’ This inward beauty is 
nothing more than the manifestation of true human nature. If we live according to our 
true nature, we will naturally find life pleasurable and fulfilling.  
For Shaftesbury, beauty lies in living according to the natural function of the 
object. Truth, beauty and utility are variations of the same reality: 
 
… the truth or the beauty of every figure or statue is measured from the perfection of 
nature in her just adapting of every limb and proportion to the … life and vigour of 
the particular species or animal designed. Thus beauty and truth are plainly joined 
with the notion of utility and convenience,…96 
 
Thus to live truly as a human being is to live beautifully and to function fully as 
a rational being. This inward beauty is obligatory because this is our true destiny. 
Therefore, beauty and goodness are ‘one and the same.’97 Truth, beauty and 
goodness all refer to living out the true nature of human beings.98 The other side of 
the coin is that ‘to be wicked or vicious is to be miserable and unhappy.’99 One 
cannot be truly happy if one goes against its nature. 
How do we know the human beings have a common true nature? Shaftesbury 
suggests that a moment of reflection will convince us of this truth is acknowledged 
universally: 
 
The standard of this kind and the noted character of moral truth appear so firmly 
established in nature itself, and so widely displayed through the intelligent world, 
that there is no genius, mind or thinking principle which, if I may say so, is not 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 416. 
95 Ibid., 417. 
96 Ibid., 415 
97 ‘The Moralists,’ Pt. 3, Sec. 2, 320. 
98 Are the three terms the same? It seems that Shaftesbury, similarly to Aquinas, makes beauty refers 
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99 ‘Inquiry,’ Conclusion, 229. 
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really conscious of the case.100 
 
How can we discern that we are acting according to nature? Shaftesbury 
suggests, in a cryptic way, that we all have a sense of right and wrong. We can do 
wrong habitually only if we take away our ‘natural and just sense of right and 
wrong,’ substitute it with a wrong sense, or are carried away by ‘contrary 
affections.’101 How is this sense different from reason? Is this sense just a special 
case of our reasoning power? Shaftesbury gives us few clues to these questions. 
How does this sense of beauty manifest itself? Shaftesbury spends more time 
arguing for the existence of such sense than in describing the content of it. The main 
feature of such taste seems to be disinterestedness. For example, when we truly 
appreciate the beauty of the ocean or the hills and woods, we will not fantasize about 
owning it or mastering it. We simply engage in a ‘rational and refined contemplation 
of beauty.’102 Similarly, when we act beautifully, we do not act for any reward we 
may reap from such actions: 
 
If the inclination be right, it is a perverting of it to apply it solely to the reward and 
make us conceive such wonders of the grace and favour, which is to attend virtue, 
when there is so little shown of the intrinsic worth or value or the thing itself.103 
 
Therefore, we have developed a sense of inward beauty when we learn to 
appreciate virtues for its own sake, instead of any rewards brought by acting 
virtuously. Similarly, a virtuous person learns to seek the common good rather than 
private good. He is not satisfied with finding beauty in individuals. He will seek 
beauty in the society, rising to the good of mankind, and finally to the supreme 
beauty.104 A primary obstacle in developing our sense of true beauty is the lure of 
selfish gains.105 
How is earthly beauty related to the supreme beauty – God? In one of his most 
Platonic passage, Shaftesbury differentiates three kinds of beauty: 
 
… first, the dead forms, as you properly have called them, which bear a fashion and 
are formed, whether by man or nature, but have no forming power, no action or 
intelligence. 
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…the second kind, the forms which form, that is, which have intelligence, action, 
and operation. 
… that third order of beauty, which forms not only such as we call mere forms but 
even the forms which form.106  
 
In other word, Shaftesbury differentiates between material beauty, spiritual 
beauty and divine beauty. Material beauty is only passive; inanimate objects cannot 
create or perceive beauty. Spiritual beings can create beauty as well as be beautiful. 
For Shaftesbury, forms are proportions in an object. Since human beings can design 
and make objects according to proportions, they can form forms. These forms are not 
eternal Platonic forms. The highest beauty is the One who can form spiritual beings.  
Shaftesbury claims that all material beauty is a shadow of spiritual and divine 
beauty: 
 
For if we may trust to what our reasoning has taught us, whatever in nature is 
beautiful or charming is only the faint shadow of that first beauty.107 
 
How does reason teach us that beauty of nature is a shadow of divine beauty? 
Shaftesbury claims that material beauty lies not in the material itself, but on its form. 
For example, the beauty of an alabaster statue lies not in the stone, but in the design 
and the sculpturing. A piece of alabaster lying on the ground is not beautiful at all. 
He concludes that ‘the beautiful, the fair, the comely, were never in the matter but in 
the art and design, never in body itself but in the form or forming power.’108 Though 
he never explicitly claims it, he probably assumes that greater forming power is 
equivalent to greater beauty. Human beings can only form forms, but God can form 
the forms which form other forms. So God is the supreme beauty. Natural beauty is a 
shadow of divine beauty in that it indicates a power that can form forms. In other 
words, nature is a shadow of the divine in a teleological sense. 
We shall now briefly indicate the importance of Shaftesbury for our study. 
Shaftesbury is both a pioneering and a transitory figure in modern aesthetics. His 
focus on reason and forms as foundation of aesthetic experience will be rejected by 
subsequent aestheticians as well as Edwards. His gradation of beauties will be 
rejected by other aestheticians but embraced by Edwards. Unlike Neoplatonism, God, 
human beings and nature stay as three separate entities in Shaftesbury. His aversion 
to speculations means that he avoids constructing a metaphysical system that unites 
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God, spiritual beings and material things. Edwards will go where Shaftesbury 
hesitates. While Shaftesbury takes nature as a shadow of the divine in a teleological 
sense, Edwards takes it in a metaphysical sense. Other themes in Shaftesbury will be 
picked up by both British aestheticians and Edwards. Shaftesbury brings out the 
importance of affections in aesthetic experience for both Hutcheson and Edwards. 
Edwards, however, will react strongly against the optimism of Shaftesbury in our 
power to shape our affections. Disinterestedness will also become a major theme.109 
While Hutcheson will emphasize the part about not motivated by private gain, 
Edwards will emphasize the part about rising to the beauty of the whole. As an 
alternative to Hutcheson, Shaftesbury provides interesting parallels to Edwards. 
While we do not claim that Edwards consciously built on Shaftesbury, undoubtedly 
Shaftesbury was part of the milieu from which Edwards developed his aesthetics. 
 
2.4. Addison 
Joseph Addison wrote a series of remarkable essays on the ‘pleasures of the 
imagination’ in The Spectator in June and July of 1712. Just before Addison began 
his series, there is an article in the Spectator in which the author argues for the 
balance of passions and reason: 
 
for as nothing is produced without a cause, so by observing the nature and course of 
the passions, we shall be able to trace every action from its first conception to its 
death.… for the actions of men follow their passions as naturally as light does heat, 
or as any other effect flows from its cause; reason must be employed in adjusting the 
passions, but they must ever remain the principles of action.110 
 
According to the article, reason is too lazy and needs the drive of passions. 
Passions are easily corrupted and need the guidance of reason.  
The articles on beauty can be approached as an exercise in ‘passions seeking 
understanding.’ The starting point of Addison is that people have some natural 
pleasures of imagination. The articles seek to explain how these pleasures function. 
Addison defines the pleasures of imagination as those pleasure that ‘arise from 
visible objects, either when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up 
                                                 
109 This is Shaftesbury’s main contribution to modern aesthetics, according to Stolnitz, ‘Significance 
of Lord Shaftesbury.’ We think that disinterestedness is not so uniquely central to modern aesthetics as 
claimed by Stolnitz, and Shaftesbury’s contribution is more multifaceted.  
110 No. 408, 45. For this section, we give the article number in The Spectator and the page number in 
The Spectator, ed. G. Gregory Smith (London: J.M. Dent, 1898), vol. 4). No. 408 is signed ‘T.B.’ 
Whether the article is penned by Addison or not, it represents the opinion of Addison. 
43 
their ideas into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions or any the like 
occasion.’111 Addison conceives of imagination in terms of imageries. The pleasures 
of the imagination apply primarily to visible objects. They are applied to other kinds 
of objects only by metaphorical use. For Addison, these pleasures ‘are not so gross as 
those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding.’112 Refinement in the 
taste for these pleasures is easier to acquire than those pleasures of the understanding, 
and they are good for our health. We discern here that Addison’s positive evaluation 
of the pleasures of the passions is mixed with a certain elitist pride in the intellect.  
For those pleasures that arise from real objects actually present with us, Addison 
classifies them into greatness, newness and beauty. Natural scenery is offered as an 
example of greatness. The pleasure of greatness is to our imagination ‘as the 
speculations of eternity or infinitude are to the understanding.’113 There is a natural 
tendency in our psyche that disdains confinement, whether in imagination or in 
understanding. Newness creates pleasure because it gratifies our curiosity. 
For beauty, Addison does not provide a uniform answer. A beautiful object is 
that which ‘immediately diffuses a secret satisfaction and complacency through the 
imagination.’ He believes that ‘there is not perhaps any real beauty or deformity 
more in one piece of matter than another, because we might have been so made, that 
whatsoever now appears loathsome to us, might have shewn it self agreeable.’114 In 
other words, beauty is whatever pleases our imagination. There is no absolute 
standard for beauty. Instead of an objective standard, Addison gives the two common 
classes of beautiful objects. The first is the opposite sex of our own specie. The 
second class contains objects with a certain pleasant look. ‘This [pleasant look] 
consists either in the gaiety or variety of colours, in the symmetry and proportion of 
parts, in the arrangement and disposition of bodies, or in a just mixture and 
concurrence of all together.’115 Addison is probably aware of the long tradition of 
joining proportion and beauty together. However, he does not regard proportion as 
holding the unique key for beauty. It is just one among many possibilities. An 
equilateral triangle may be beautiful, but so may a young girl to most men. Addison 
is not interested in giving a unified theory to explain why such different objects may 
all be beautiful. 
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Addison believes that fine arts are in general inferior to nature in these primary 
pleasures of the imagination. Yet the superiority is not absolute. Nature appears more 
beautiful when it resembles works of arts in some way (e.g. a meadow in which the 
flowers of different colors are seemingly coordinated in a certain geometric pattern.) 
On the other hand, works of arts are more beauty when they can copy the beauty of 
nature.116 
Fine arts can provide us with the secondary pleasure of imagination by arousing 
in our mind the imagery of the original objects.117 Thus a painting of my wife gives 
me pleasure when I notice the striking similarities between the painting and the 
image of my wife in my mind. It will be particularly pleasurable if such 
representations are accompanied by strong feelings.118 A picture of any of my 
acquaintance may give me pleasure, but a picture of my wife will be especially 
pleasurable.  
Why do human beings enjoy such pleasures of imagination? Addison attributes 
these to the wisdom of the Creator. These pleasures are indicators of divine truth. Our 
pleasure for greatness reminds us that everything in this world is too small for our 
heart. ‘The Supreme Author of our being has so formed the soul of man, that nothing 
but himself can be its last, adequate, and proper happiness.’119 Our pleasure in 
newness encourages searching into the wonders of God’s creation. Our pleasure in 
beauty renders the whole creation delightful. It is a sign of the goodness of the 
Creator. Addison appeals to Locke to support his theological interpretation. 
According to him, Locke has shown that colors and light are only ideas in our mind. 
They are not objective properties of things themselves. Why should God set up the 
rules so that things in this world will arouse such pleasing imageries in our mind? 
For Addison, these pleasing imageries serve ‘imaginary glories of heaven.’120  
Why then does God give us the secondary pleasure of imagination? The reason 
is that God wants to encourage us in searching after truth: 
 
The final cause, probably of annexing pleasure to this operation of the mind, was to 
quicken and encourage us in our searches after truth, since the distinguishing one 
thing from another, and the right discerning betwixt our ideas, depends wholly upon 
our comparing them together, and observing the congruity or disagreement that 
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appears among the several works of nature.121 
 
Following Locke, Addison regards truth as the agreement of ideas. The search 
after truth involves careful comparison of ideas. Secondary pleasure comes from 
comparing the ideas aroused from the object immediately in front of me (the painting 
of my wife) and the ideas already stored in my mind (my mental image of my wife). 
Since such comparison induces pleasure in me, it will encourage me to be more 
diligent in comparing of ideas in general.  
Let us summarize our exposition of Addison and compare him to Shaftesbury. 
While Shaftesbury has an objective and intellectualist understanding of beauty, 
Addison builds a subjective and emotional theory of beauty. By locating beauty in 
our mind alone, Addison is a crucial figure in the development of modern aesthetic 
theory.122 Beauty ceases to be some grand principle of reality. It is just one of three 
pleasures of imagination. The strength of Addison’s position is that he can address a 
variety of aesthetic experiences. In particular, greatness, or sublimity, would soon 
become an important theme in aesthetics.123 Addison has declared the independence 
of aesthetic experience metaphysical and moral theories. Our pleasure is the 
yardstick of beauty.  
The main weakness of Addison is that his shrewd observations are not backed 
by a vigorous theoretical framework. His classification of the three pleasures of the 
imagination seems rather arbitrary. Nothing in his framework will hinder us from 
giving more examples of the pleasures of imagination. How do we know that 
greatness, newness and beauty are the only, or even the most important, of the 
pleasures of the imagination? His definition of beauty seems to be a potpourri of 
items. Why should the attraction of opposite sex, the gaiety of colors, and 
proportions all put under the category of beauty? Can these be listed as separate 
pleasures, just like greatness and newness? Is there any coherence to these pleasures 
beyond mere coincidence? 
Addison blazes another new trail by distinguishing between the pleasures of the 
imagination from the pleasures of the senses and the pleasures of the understanding. 
It occupies a kind of middle ground between mere sensations and reasoning. These 
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pleasures appeal to passions. They engage the mind without engaging in a reasoning 
process. Yet Addison is vague on the nature of this middle. For example, does not the 
comparison of ideas involve understanding? How does Addison differentiate between 
a non-conceptual pleasure of proper proportions in object and an intellectual pleasure 
in understanding such proportions? Moreover, by limiting his theory to visual objects, 
Addison has severely limited the applicability of his aesthetic theory. His theory, rich 
in suggestions, cries out for more vigorous formulation and extension to non-visual 
beauty. Hutcheson’s theory provides the next stage of such developments. 
 
2.5. Hutcheson 
Hutcheson is almost contemporaneous with Edwards. He gives the most 
sophisticated British aesthetic theory that Edwards can respond to. His major work in 
aesthetics is An Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.124 This is the 
first English work on philosophical aesthetics. He builds upon the works of 
Shaftesbury and Addison.125  
The starting point of Hutcheson’s aesthetic theory is empirical observation. By 
carefully analyzing how people use beautiful and similar words, Hutcheson believes 
that he can discover the essence of the concept of beauty. His first main thesis is that 
beauty is an inner sense. The definition of the word ‘beauty is taken for the idea 
raised in us, and a sense of beauty for our power of receiving this idea.’126 So what 
is ‘sense’ or ‘sensation’? ‘Those ideas which are raised in the mind upon the presence 
of external objects, and their acting upon our bodies, are called sensations.’127 
Hutcheson does not explain further the meaning of an idea. The vocabulary of ‘ideas’ 
and the focus on sensation are both Lockean. However, Hutcheson has extended 
Locke’s framework by including internal sensation as a source of idea.128  
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Hutcheson’s definition reflects his psychological interest. He wants to know 
how ideas operate in our mind, rather than how external objects cause ideas in our 
mind. It is assumed that certain ideas inevitably arise in our mind when coming into 
contact with external objects. The agent is passive, as these ideas arise involuntarily. 
For example, someone has made a candy incredibly like a piece of bread. Yet when I 
put the candy in my mouth, the idea of sweetness immediately arises in my mind. I 
do not need to anticipate it beforehand, nor do I need to engage in any discursive 
thinking. Similarly, when presented with a beautiful object, the idea of beauty 
(according to Hutcheson) will spontaneously arise in our mind. 
Hutcheson calls the sense of beauty internal sense.129 External senses like sight 
and hearing are tied to a specific bodily organ. Internal senses can be aroused by 
more than one of the external senses. For example, there is beautiful sight as well as 
beautiful music. Hutcheson regards his internal sense as the same as Addison’s 
‘pleasure of the imagination’.130 These internal senses can be aroused just by the 
imagination of certain objects, without that object physically present to our external 
senses. How many internal senses are there? In Beauty, he lists the senses of beauty, 
regularity, and harmony.131 In later writings, he lists beauty, imitation, harmony, 
design, grandeur, and novelty.132 Hutcheson probably has no rigorous classification 
of the internal senses. Moreover, Hutcheson believes that there are more than two 
senses: external sense, internal sense, public sense (‘our determination to be pleased 
with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery’), moral sense, sense of 
honor.133 He claims that ‘decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature in certain 
actins and circumstances’ and others may also be distinctive classes of perception.134 
Common to all these senses is the fact that they are all natural powers in the human 
mind. For Hutcheson, the perception of beauty, moral goodness, honor and other 
qualities are all spontaneous actions of the mind. If I see a pretty picture, I 
spontaneously enjoy the sense of beauty. If I see a murder scene, I spontaneously feel 
the evilness of the act. By this proliferation of senses, Hutcheson emphasizes that 
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human beings are by nature disposed to certain standards. Beauty, morality, honor 
and other standards do not arise arbitrarily; they are connatural to us. 
However, will there be too many kinds of senses? If I see my child, there is also 
a spontaneous joy in me. Does that mean that there is also a parental sense too? 
Likewise, is there a humorous sense too? In that case, does sense become just 
synonymous with feelings? In defending that beauty is really a sense, Hutcheson 
gives us some clues for the demarcation of a sense.135 First, the pleasure of beauty 
does not involve knowledge. One does not need to study musicology before she can 
appreciate a beautiful piece of music. Second, beauty is a necessary idea. When I 
listen to Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, there inevitably arises the idea of beauty in my 
mind. You may bribe me to lie about my true feelings, but I cannot force myself to 
feel terrible about the music. Third, beauty is an immediate idea. We feel that 
something is beautiful without first calculating whether such feeling is advantageous 
to us. ‘Nay, do not we often see convenience and use neglected to obtain beauty, 
without any other prospect of advantage in the beautiful form than the suggesting the 
pleasant ideas of beauty?’136 Our enjoyment of beauty is disinterested. The pleasure 
comes from beauty alone, not depending on or for the sake of something else. 
Presumably the other senses, such as moral sense, also will have these three 
properties.  
In comparison with external sense, there is an obvious difficult with calling 
beauty a sense. While few people will fail to agree on whether something is red or 
blue, beauty seems to be often controversial and subjective. Assuming that St. 
Matthew Passion is indeed beautiful music, why do so many people find it boring? 
Hutcheson attributes this difference to taste:  
 
It is plain from experience that many men have in common meaning the senses of 
seeing and hearing perfect enough… And yet perhaps they shall find no pleasure in 
musical compositions, in painting, architecture, natural landscape, or but a very 
weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same object. This greater 
capacity of receiving such pleasant ideas we commonly call a fine genius or taste.137  
 
The difference between internal and external sense is that inner sense requires 
something called taste, which is lacking in brute animals and weak in some people. 
External ideas are the product of bodily organs. Eyes will automatically give us sight. 
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Internal sense is a response to complex ideas about external objects.138 According to 
Hutcheson, not all people are equipped to perceive these complex ideas. The mind’s 
power in this area varies from person to person. But what is taste? How is it formed? 
What explain for the differences in people’s taste? How can we discern that someone 
has taste, other than using the circular definition that a tasteful person is someone 
who can discern beauty? Hutcheson does not address these issues in any of his 
works.139 As we shall see, this creates insurmountable problems for his aesthetic 
theory. 
Having explained internal sense in general, let us turn to the definition of beauty. 
What gives unity to the sense of beauty? While it is easy to see the commonality in 
the concept of novelty, such as a new shirt, a new song or a new idea, it is not 
obvious if there is commonality among a beautiful picture, a beautiful song, and a 
beautiful idea. What is the class of ideas unified by the word beauty? Hutcheson 
distinguishes two kinds of beauty: absolute (original) and relative (comparative) 
beauty. The two are quite different concepts. 
We shall begin with absolute beauty. This is beauty that we find in an object in 
itself. For Hutcheson, the scenery of sunset has absolute beauty because it gives 
pleasure without requiring us to compare it with another object. For absolute beauty, 
‘the figures which excite us the ideas of beauty seem to be those in which there is 
uniformity amidst variety.’140 Hutcheson gives a variety of examples, beginning with 
geometric figure. A square is more beautiful than an equilateral triangle, because the 
former has more variety than the latter within equal level of uniformity. Equilateral 
triangle is more beautiful than isosceles triangle because the former has more 
uniformity within the equal level of variety. A scientific theory is beautiful because it 
gives uniform explanation for a variety of particular case. Therefore beauty tempts us 
to the impossible task of explaining everything with one simple principle. In 
Hutcheson’s opinion, Descartes, Leibneiz, and Puffendorf have all fallen into this 
trap.141 Hutcheson applies the same principle to music, architecture and other areas 
of art. 
                                                 
138 Kivy, Seventh Sense, 260-265, discusses the issue whether beauty is a simple or complex idea in 
Lockean sense. Kivy concludes that beauty is an idea about other ideas.  
139 Alexander Broadie, ‘Art and Aesthetic Theory,’ in The Cambridge Companion to The Scottish 
Enlightenment, ed. Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 284. Little 
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140 Beauty 2.3, 15 
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Relative beauty ‘is apprehended in any object commonly considered as an 
imitation of some original. And this beauty is founded on a conformity, or a kind of 
unity between the original and the copy.’142 The original need not be beautiful by 
itself. Thus a novel about a villain can be quite beautiful, though a real villain would 
not be beautiful. In fact, a book about a perfect person would be rather boring, 
because we find it hard to identify with such a beautiful person.143 Hutcheson takes 
all examples from fine arts (literature, painting etc.). Though he does not explicitly 
say so, Hutcheson here is suggesting a norm for good art works. Art should copy life 
exactly. 
We should note that the definitions of absolute and comparative beauty are not 
intended to be normative. Hutcheson’s intention is not to prescribe a standard of 
beauty. His intention is the positive task of analyzing what is the idea of beauty in 
humankind. Presumably, we can test the validity of Hutcheson’s theory by asking 
whether most people throughout different ages use the word beauty to express the 
pleasure of perceiving uniformity amidst variety and conformity to the original. 
As an empirical theory, the diversity of taste among people is a major challenge 
to his theory. The concept of uniformity amidst variety suggests an almost 
mathematical precision in the grading of beauty, as illustrated by his discussion of 
geometric figures. In fact, people’s taste about a lot of things belies such variety that 
any uniformity in the standard of beauty seems questionable. One person’s ideal of 
beauty may be another person’s nightmare. How does one account for such variety? 
Hutcheson’s answer has two parts. The first is to say that uniformity is much 
more important than variety. ‘But in figures, did ever any man make choice of a 
trapezium, or any irregular curve, for the ichnography or plan of his house, without 
necessity, or some great motive of convenience?’144 For Hutcheson, it is sufficient 
proof for his theory that ordinary folks like neither chaos nor monotony. It is just 
common sense that only the orderly can be beautiful. 
Second, Hutcheson claims that: 
 
… associations of ideas make objects pleasant and delightful which are not naturally 
apt to give any such pleasure; and the same way, the causal conjunction of ideas may 
give a disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself.145  
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Though the standard of uniformity among variety is universally recognized, it is 
often distorted in individuals by the wrong kind of associations. For example, many 
people have irrational fears about swine and serpents. Accordingly, Hutcheson 
recommends that one of the goals of education is to eradicate these prejudices so that 
people can enjoy real beauty. For example, people should learn to dissociate fear 
from dark places, or dissociate illness from eating meat.146 
Before we go into the theological significance of Hutcheson’s theory of beauty, 
let us take a short digression into sublimity. Hutcheson applauds Addison for 
bringing out the importance of sublimity: 
 
The ingenious Mr. Addison, in his treatise of the pleasures of the imagination, has 
justly observed many sublimer sensations than those commonly mentioned among 
philosophers: he observes, particularly, that we receive sensations of pleasure from 
those objects which are great, new, or beautiful;147 
 
Hutcheson is obviously familiar with Addison’s discussion in The Spectator. 
The interesting aspect is that Hutcheson seems to think all the pleasures of the 
imagination are sublime. Here sublimity is probably contrasted with selfishness. 
Hutcheson does not have an aesthetic theory specifically for sublimity.  
We return to the theory of beauty. Assuming that Hutcheson have proven this 
case, what is the significance of his definition? First, it is the rejection of a purely 
subjectivist theory of beauty. For such kind of theory, beauty is separable from the 
pleasure of beauty. In other words, beauty is just another word for our delight in a 
certain object. Calling something beautiful is the same as saying ‘Wow!’148 In 
Hutcheson’s theory, beauty and pleasure are distinct concepts. Beauty represents a 
recognizable pattern of ideas. Both uniformity and variety are ideas that supposedly 
reflect objective characteristics of the external objects. Just as novelty has objective 
meaning, so does beauty in Hutcheson’s theory. Uniformity amidst variety is an 
objective quality without the intonation of almost mathematical precision. As we 
shall see, Hutcheson argues that the fact that beauty causes pleasure serves as a 
theistic proof. 
Secondly, beauty transcends social convention. Hutcheson argues against a 
narrow understanding of the human mind, where it has no inherent qualities.  
 
                                                 
146 Beauty 7.2, 39. 
147 To the Author of the Dublin Journal, Philosophical Writings, 52. The intent of the letter is to refute 
Hobbes’ account of laughter as a product of our self-love. 
148 Kivy, Seventh Sense, 63 calls this the noncognitive understanding of beauty. 
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Nothing is more ordinary among those, who, after Mr. Locke, have reject innate 
ideas, than to allege that all our relish for beauty and order is either from prospect of 
advantage, custom, or education, for no other reason but the variety of fancies in the 
world.149  
 
If we can find universal standard for beauty, then it is more plausible that the sense of 
beauty is a natural power of humankind. 
What difference does it make to claim that beauty is a natural power? The 
answer is that it gives a positive picture of human nature, and it gives credibility to 
the existence of a benevolent Creator. If beauty is merely a subjective feeling or a 
social convention, then beauty has no inherent purpose. If beauty has an objective 
basis, then we can ask if the existence of beauty points to a higher purpose.  
Hutcheson asks: 
 
There seems to be no necessary connection of our pleasing ideas of beauty with the 
uniformity or regularity of the objects, from the nature of things, antecedent to some 
constitution of the Author of our nature, which has made such forms pleasant to 
us.150  
  
So beauty is a sign of God’s benevolence towards humanity; it seems that 
beauty serves no other purpose than making us happier. It is particularly a benevolent 
act towards rational human beings. As rational but finite, we yearn to simplify reality 
with general principles. Moreover, we find it easier to understand and remember 
objects that agree with general laws.151 Were people to delight in deformity and 
irregularity, their affections will conflict with the tendency for understanding to 
search for general principles.152  
The second question raised by Hutcheson is why there are so many regularities 
in the world. The answer is that the world is a product of intelligent design. In God’s 
benevolence, the world is full of uniformity for the enjoyment of humankind. 
The third question is why God chooses to order the universe according to 
general laws, a special form of uniformity amidst variety. Hutcheson is alluring to the 
success of Newtonian science. Hutcheson suggests that this is the way we finite 
beings can enjoy more the diversities of the universe. Had God chosen to order the 
universe with particulars all the time, the human mind would be baffled and left in 
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misery. Moreover, morality would suffer because our actions would carry no regular 
consequences.153 
We shall now evaluate the significance of Hutcheson for our study. As an 
empirical theory to explain the origin and meaning of the concept of beauty, 
Hutcheson’s theory is incomplete because of its inherent ambiguities.154  
We begin with internal sense. Hutcheson advances beyond Addison by giving 
criteria for demarcating an internal sense. Yet the criteria are not perfect. For 
example, the first argument – independence from knowledge – has obvious problems. 
As a counter-example, my pleasure of listening to Bach’s St. Matthew Passion will 
suffer without understanding the theological message and its correspondence with the 
music. Moreover, someone with no background in classical music is unlikely to 
appreciate the Passion. For example, is knowledge required in taste? We need a 
clearer distinction between rational knowledge and aesthetic experience. 
The criterion of disinterestedness would become a major issue in later aesthetic 
theory. Hutcheson brings out more clearly than Shaftesbury and Addison that 
disinterestedness is specifically associated with aesthetic experience. Can this 
disinterestedness be explained? As we shall see, Edwards thinks so, and so does Kant. 
Modern aesthetics tend to shrink away from explaining it. . 
The definition of uniformity amidst diversity has its problems. In real life, 
uniformity and diversity are often hard to define or measure. For example, if one 
(like myself) is bored by the paintings of Jackson Pollack, should the reason be too 
much diversity (too many colours randomly mixed together) or too much uniformity 
(drippings all look the same)? Moreover, there are examples of natural beauty that 
seems difficult to be explained with uniformity amidst diversity. For example, the 
beauty of sunset or vast landscape seems to be beautiful for different reasons. The 
relationship between uniformity amidst diversity and other aesthetic experience is 
left unexplored. On the other hand, Hutcheson’s attempt to explain diversity of taste 
by means of association seems to be too successful. For example, people who like 
the pictures of hills and lakes usually associate these with serenity. Yet there is 
arguably nothing inherently serene about hills and lakes, where Darwinian struggles 
go on everyday. Take away all associations, and we are left with a very poor concept 
of beauty. One way out is to suggest that the formal properties of an object become 
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154 Kivy is harsh on Hutcheson: ‘Viewed in the light of this progressive aesthetic empiricism, 
Hutcheson’s aesthetic theology seems like deplorable backsliding.’ (Seventh Sense, 123) Kivy offers 
other criticism from the perspective of modern aesthetics. 
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beautiful only when they become symbols of some reality. Again, Edwards and Kant 
will go along this road, though with very different reality in mind. 
The theological message of Hutcheson is similar to Addison. It is basically a 
teleological argument. The design of the human psyche suggests a designer.155 The 
teleological argument is probably the most popular theistic argument in the English 
Enlightenment.156 The design argument agrees well with the contemporaneous 
emphasis on empiricism. Hutcheson follows this ethos in presenting the sense of 
beauty as theistic evidence.  
For Puritans, the problem with this kind of argument is that it gives only the 
benevolent God and the affable humankind. These English philosophers never dream 
that aesthetic experience can represent either the condemning or the saving act of 
God. Their God is too reasonable to hold humankind responsible for anything 
beyond the deliverance of reason. Edwards will give a radically different 
interpretation of aesthetic experience.  
 
2.6. Edwards 
In developing Edwards’ aesthetics, one must make a choice on how to organize 
the material. Edwards never wrote an explicit treatise on aesthetics, and his most 
important treatment of aesthetics is contained in a work on the nature of virtue.157 
One can follow Edwards in that treatise by starting on the fundamental connections 
between beings and beauty.158 One then moves down the scale of beauty until one 
reaches beauty in inanimate object. Alternatively, one can start with the beauty in 
inanimate or sensible objects. Then she will demonstrate how the need for 
completeness gradually leads one to fundamental questions about the nature of 
beings. In order to facilitate comparison with other British aestheticians, I shall 
employ the second approach. 
Edwards calls the beauty perceived by our physical senses ‘secondary beauty’. 
                                                 
155 Kivy (Seventh Sense, 115-116) asserts that Hutcheson’s arguments are all varieties of the God of 
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This is in contrast to spiritual beauty, which is ‘primary beauty’. Sensible beauty is 
defined by Edwards as ‘a mutual consent and agreement of different things in form, 
manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by various names of regularity, 
order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc.’159 Following this definition, 
Edwards claims that his definition is ‘the same that Mr. Hutcheson, in his treatise on 
beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety.’160 Edwards has probably 
read Hutcheson’s work,161 but he offers no other comments about the aesthetics of 
Hutcheson. It is not clear whether Edwards quotes Hutcheson as supporting authority 
just on the wordings of the definition, or Edwards truly regards his theory as similar 
to that of Hutcheson. 
In fact, there are significant differences between Hutcheson and Edwards. Let us 
begin with the similarities. Both use geometrical figures as the simplest illustration of 
beauty. Squares and equilateral triangles are cited as examples of uniformity amidst 
diversity.162 If there are two circles lying between two parallel lines, Edwards claims 
that the most beautiful form will have both lying midway between the parallel lines. 
Hutcheson claims that square, having greater diversity, is more beautiful than triangle. 
Edwards does not compare the relative beauty of geometric figures. 
For Hutcheson, the geometric examples are paradigmatic examples. They 
express beauty in its clearest form, and other examples of beauty are seen as opaque 
extension of this simple beauty. The association of ideas with specific object is 
regarded as a cause of distortion and prejudice.  
For Edwards, the geometric examples serve as illustration of the simplest kind 
of mutual consent. They are the most obvious examples, but they are also the most 
simplistic example. For Edwards, mutual agreement is pleasant because it expresses 
design. It is not simply the quantity of uniformity amidst diversity that determines 
the level of beauty, but the sophistication of the design expressed by such mutual 
agreement that carries the degree of beauty: 
 
Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in 
different places, is not an equal degree of beauty as that uniformity in so many 
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pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended 
effect are related one to another.163 
  
To use a terminology not employed by Edwards, we may call the regularity of 
geometric figures ‘brute beauty,’ because geometric figures alone do not serve any 
purpose. When we use geometric figures to design and build a house, the beauty is 
multiplied because the uniformity of shapes is employed to achieve a harmonious 
result – the house. On the other hand, the house becomes more beautiful if it is built 
in harmonious geometric figures and proportions. The means and end come together 
in a harmonious design, which manifests to our mind as beauty. 
The importance of design is also brought out by Edward’s distinction between 
simple beauty and complex beauty.164 Simple beauty is strict equality (e.g. a square), 
while complex beauty is proportion. In a complex design, we may have to give up 
simple beauty for the sake of complex beauty. Consider the two sets 
A = {1, 3, 4, 9} 
B = {2, 6, 8, 18} 
Judging A or B by itself, the numbers in them are chaotic and without beauty. 
Putting A and B together, we see the proportion between the two sets and chaos turns 
into beauty. Should we change B to {2, 6, 8, 9}, a kind of proportion is established 
within the set B; but we lost the proportion between A & B. For Edwards, the 
complex beauty of the totality takes precedence over the simple beauty of the 
elements. 
In Edwards, uniformity cannot be measured by mere equality of the parts. The 
parts joined together in harmonious proportion for a singular purpose gives it an 
extra dimension of beauty. In the case of paintings by Jackson Pollack, if one can 
discern a unitary purpose that somehow harmonizes the drippings with certain 
purposes (symbol of artistic freedom?), then one can call them beautiful by Edwards’ 
standard. 
Then Edwards goes where Hutcheson and Addison (along with modern 
aesthetics) avoid: extending the definition of beauty to immaterial entities. 
 
If uniformity and proportion be the things that effect, and appear agreeable to, this 
sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same 
sense in immaterial things as well as material, if there be equal capacity of 
discerning it in both? And indeed more in spiritual things (ceteris paribus) as these 
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are more important than things merely external and material?165 
 
Harmonious society, harmonious thinking or wisdom, harmonious acting or 
justice, are examples of spiritual beauties.166 For example, in the case of justice, it 
requires that ‘he which from his will does evil to others should receive evil from the 
will of others.’167 There is a spiritual equality in justice. A clear self-consciousness is 
another form of spiritual beauty, as it implies an equality between who a person 
actually is and what she thinks she should be.168  
Though inanimate objects can be arranged according to purpose or intent, the 
objects themselves do not have intention. They do not consciously arrange 
themselves in a purposeful way. From this perspective, we understand why Edwards 
call beauty in material objects secondary beauty. Only beings with intentions, i.e. 
spiritual beings, can self-consciously adhere to some purpose. This joining of the will 
of spiritual beings is primary beauty.  
For Edwards, the end of secondary beauty is to lead us to primary beauty: 
 
God has so constituted nature that the presenting of this inferior beauty, especially in 
those kinds of it which have greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the 
harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those hearts 
are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of 
divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty.169  
 
Hutcheson has emphasized that beauty is a sense of delight. Why should 
uniformity amidst diversity lead to pleasure? His answer is that God set up such rules 
in our psyche. God wants to make the task of understanding this world a pleasure. 
Beauty is a property of this world designed to make this world pleasant. For Edwards 
too, the pleasure of secondary pleasure is also a rule set up by God:  
 
The cause why secondary beauty is grateful to men is only a law of nature, which 
God has fixed, or an instinct he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the 
same thing which God is pleased to have regard to, as the ground rule by which he 
has established such a law of nature.170 
  
God makes secondary beauty pleasurable so that it may enliven people to 
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spiritual beauty. In seeing harmonies in the material world, we are supposed to be 
enlivened to the harmonies of the spiritual world. But people often stop at the 
pleasantness and fail to appreciate the true nature of beauty. Therefore they enjoy 
beauty without reflecting on the creator of beauty.171 For Hutcheson, it is the essence 
of beauty to be non-reflective. For Edwards, it is a failure of our mind if beauty does 
not lead to intellectual reflection. Beauty comes from proportion, and proportion is a 
construction of the mind. For Edwards, the focus on proportion should lift us from 
the confinement of material reality to spiritual reality. 
If secondary beauty is the harmonious arrangement of material objects for a 
unitary purpose, then primary beauty is the consent of minds on a common purpose. 
However, not any kind of consent is beautiful. Suppose two people consent to go on 
a killing spree in St. Andrew Square, it would be an ugly act. Edwards would argue 
that their consent may have a particular beauty (in respect to the two people only), 
but it does not have general beauty (in respect to all people).172 Considered in its 
most comprehensive context, beauty is consent to all beings.  
 
And if every intelligent being is some way related to Being in general, and is a part 
of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connection with the whole; 
what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great 
whole?173  
 
In other words, general beauty is the union and consent of all intelligent beings 
with the great whole. While Shaftesbury and Hutcheson focus beauty on the 
proportions of individual objects, Edwards wants us to ask about proportions on a 
global scale. Each level of beauty is related to a bigger context. A knife may be 
beautifully crafted, but it becomes an ugly tool in the hand of a murderer. From 
Edwards’ perspective, we cannot know anything is really beautiful until we have a 
picture of the totality of beings. 
But what is the purpose of the great whole, or the totality of beings? Does the 
totality of beings have a purpose? We are driven by Edwards’ theory of beauty to the 
concept of God again. If the totality of beings can have a purpose, then either this 
totality is in some sense intelligent,174 or the Creator of this totality gives it a 
purpose. If the world is created by God, then we cannot truly appreciate the beauty of 
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this world unless we know God’s purpose for the world. As we shall see, Edwards 
argues that the glory of God is the purpose of the world. It turns out that the theory of 
beauty in Edwards can only be completed in a theistic worldview. The beauty of a 
flower can be fully appreciated only when we behold the glory of God. Yet how doe 
we know God’s glory? How does the world exhibit divine glory? We shall address 
these questions in the following chapters. 
 
2.7. Some Comparisons 
The British aestheticians and Edwards are all writing in response to the 
empiricism of the new science and the search for a reasonable faith. On the question 
of empiricism, there are different understandings of its implication for aesthetics. For 
Addison and Hutcheson, it means theorizing as closely as possible with observable 
data and sensible objects. Addison’s pleasures of the imagination and Hutcheson’s 
internal sense are both attempts to ground beauty on our perception process of 
sensible objects. Beauty is portrayed as part of the structure of human psyche that is 
verifiable by simple reflections. For Shaftesbury and Edwards, they start their 
theories with sensible objects. However, they soon turn their attention from the 
perception of sensible objects to the self-perception of one’s own affections. If we 
can analyze the perception of external objects, then we can analyze the perceptions 
of affections too. For Addison and Hutcheson, beauty is applied only to external 
objects. Shaftesbury and Edwards apply beauty to internal affections too. Just as 
there are beautiful objects, so there are beautiful souls where the affections are 
well-proportioned. Though all four writers subscribe to the empiricism of Locke to 
some extent, they differ on what can be taken as the raw data (the ideas in a Lockean 
sense). In particular, they differ on whether our affections can be taken as a form of 
raw data for higher level of synthesis. 
These writers also differ on the role of reason in shaping our sense of beauty. 
Shaftesbury believes that we can change and shape our sense of beauty by the study 
of philosophy. For Addison and Hutcheson, the sense of beauty is aroused 
spontaneously without the use of reasoning. For Addison, we improve our taste by 
spending more time with recognized examples of beauty. For Hutcheson, reason has 
a negative function of training us to disassociate unhealthy associations (e.g. 
darkness with fear). For Edwards, the picture is more complicated. With his focus on 
overall purpose, it seems that beauty cannot be separated from the reasoning about 
purpose. However, as we shall see on the next chapter, Edwards emphasizes that 
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God – the final purpose of everything – cannot be grasped by reason. It can only be 
perceived passively through spiritual sense.  
While all four writers adopt some of the Lockean perspectives or vocabulary, 
none of them is slavish in following Locke. The pleasures of imagination or the sense 
of beauty are natural abilities of our psyche not readily explainable in a strictly 
Lockean framework. For these writers, people naturally develop a sense of beauty. 
This sense is not further explained by certain associations of simple ideas. For 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (probably for Addison too), this indicates a richness and 
goodness of human nature not strictly verifiable under Lockean scheme. For 
Edwards, this sense of beauty is a clue for a higher reality beyond our physical 
senses.  
We now turn to the relationship between beauty and God. All four writers regard 
beauty as a doorway to God, though in different ways. Shaftesbury focuses on the 
issue of design: if human can design material beauty, there should be a designer who 
designs human beings. All beauties or designs remind us the great Designer. For 
Addison, aesthetic experience of greatness makes us yearn for the true greatness of 
God. Beauty and newness testify to the goodness of God in making our life on earth 
more pleasurable. Hutcheson is similar to Addison in saying beauty is a testimony to 
divine goodness. He gives particular attention to how uniformity amidst diversity is 
fitting to our cognitive process. They are variations of the teleological argument. The 
God in such theories is a benevolent Watch-maker that gives human a pleasurable 
faculty. In Edwards’ theory, God becomes the telos of the universe, the apex of 
beauty. This set Edwards apart from the other writers. While other claim that 
aesthetic experience points to the goodness of God, Edwards claims that true 
aesthetic experience is inseparable from the perception of God. God is not merely the 
creator of our aesthetic experience; it is also the essence of our aesthetic experience. 
Instead of being a connatural to human beings, aesthetic experience in Edwards’ 
perspective is perception of divine revelation. 
By asking for the meaning of the totality of being, Edwards is driven to 
metaphysics. Our next chapter will be devoted to this topic. For Addison and 
Hutcheson, beauty is an accidental part of reality. For Edwards, beauty reveals the 
essence of reality. For Edwards, reality and totality is based on God. Yet, 
philosophically, this is not the only solution. Another solution is to propose that any 
knowable totality is based on the perceiving subject. It is the knowing ‘I’ that gives 
meaning to the totality. This is the road taken by the great Emmanuel Kant. Like 
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Edwards, Kant is not ready to concede aesthetic experience to merely a matter of 
psychology. Like Edwards, he develops aesthetic theory into a theory about the 
essence of totality. In his case, the totality concerns the essence of the knowing ‘I.’ 
After we finish our exposition of Edwards, we shall return briefly to Kant. Despite 
their radically different construction of total reality, their common search for 
grounding aesthetics in totality reveals some interesting clues to a philosophical 
interpretation of the nature of beauty. 
We conclude this chapter by pointing out that several features of Edwards’ 
aesthetics resembles the English aesthetics familiar to Edwards. If there are internal 
sense and moral sense, then spiritual sense seems a natural development. If internal 
sense is the idea raised in us by a physical object, then spiritual sense would similarly 
be the idea raised in us by a spiritual object. If the true sense of beauty comes from a 
right ordering of our affections, then would not true spiritual beauty come also from 
the right affections? If God is generally acknowledged to the source of beauty, and 
beauty is generally acknowledged to be related to proportions, it seems logical to 
suggest that God is well proportioned in some way. Of course, these look like natural 
development only from hindsight. It takes a theological genius like Edwards to 
creatively integrate the English Enlightenment with the Puritan heritage. The 
Enlightenment uses beauty to portray an indifferently benevolent God. Edwards joins 
the aesthetic experience of the Enlightenment with the Reformed concept of the 
glory of God, so that both redemption and condemnation are manifestations of divine 
beauty. In our next four chapters we shall see how Edwards develops his definition of 




Chapter Three: Metaphysics of Beauty    
For Edwards, beauty is not just a curious fact of human behaviour. Beauty is a 
foundational reality that gives meaning to both the natural world and the human 
world. As Delattre observes, ‘beauty is the central clue to the nature of reality’.1 In 
this chapter, we shall explore how Edwards uses the concept of beauty to defend his 
theistic worldview against the challenges raised by the Enlightenment. We call this 
defence Edwards’ metaphysics of beauty. It is a theory about different levels of 
reality and their interrelationship. The heart of their interrelationship is proportional 
consent, or beauty.  
It has generally been recognized that Edwards is one of the greatest American 
philosophers.2 Among recent scholarship, the opinion is divided on the originality of 
the Edwards’ metaphysics. Delattre, Lee, Matless3 all claim that Edwards offers a 
revolutionary perspective on metaphysics. Whether called ‘depositional metaphysics’ 
(Lee) or the ‘relational metaphysics of love’ (Matless), these proponents claim that 
Edwards provides a dynamic version of reality that is particularly fruitful for the 
twenty-first century. On the other hand, Norman Fiering groups Edwards with ‘the 
theocentric, rationalist metaphysicians’ such as Malebranche and Leibniz.4 He 
emphasizes the historical continuity of Edwards with his predecessors. The novel 
camp claims that metaphysics is central to Edwards’ thinking, while Fiering tries to 
shift the focus away from Edwards’ metaphysics.  
We shall claim that both perspectives are partially valid. The continuity school 
is correct to claim that the conclusions of Edwards’ metaphysics are conventional. 
Edwards defends a two-tier reality (spiritual/ material) that has always been part of 
the tradition of the church. Following the Platonic tradition of the church, he 
championed the priority of spiritual reality over material reality. However, Edwards 
employs innovative arguments, based on the ideas of Newton and Locke, to defend 
this worldview. His originality does not lie in a brave new metaphysics, but a new 
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greatest figure before the Civil War.’ (A History of Philosophy in America, 2 vols. (New York: 
Capricorn Books, 1977), 142. Chapter 3 of Flower and Murphey provides probably the best summary 
of Edwards’ metaphysics. 
3 Lee, Sang Hyun, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988); Matless, Sally I., Jonathan Edwards’ Relational Metaphysics of Love, unpublished Th.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2002. 
4 Norman Fiering, ‘Rationalist Foundations of Jonathan Edwards’ Metaphysics,’ in Nathan O. Hatch 
and Harry S. Stout, eds., Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 93. 
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synthesis of the old Christian doctrines and the scientific perspectives of the 
Enlightenment.5 Reformed theology and Enlightenment philosophy are two legs that 
together build the philosophical theology of Edwards.6 We may regard Edwards as a 
Thomas Aquinas of the eighteenth century.7  
While potentiality and act become are crucial concepts for Aquinas in 
harmonizing the Christian faith with Aristotelian science, the concepts of beauty and 
sensibility are crucial for Edwards in his defence of the Christian faith. In particular, 
beauty is essential to Edwards’ conception of the being in general, the being of God 
and the nature of morality.8 Edwards employs the concept of beauty to harmonize 
traditional Christian belief with the challenges of Enlightenment. As indicated in a 
previous chapter, Edwards classifies beauty into two kinds: secondary beauty and 
primary beauty. The former applies to material objects; the second applies to spiritual 
objects. We shall follow this scheme and divide our discussion into the metaphysics 
of material objects and the metaphysics of spiritual objects. In each section, we shall 
begin with the questions posed by the Enlightenment to traditional Christian 
doctrines. Then we shall lay out the defence offered by Edwards’ metaphysics of 
beauty.  
                                                 
5 Fiering says that the uniqueness of Edwards lies in ‘his being a daring and acute philosophical 
speculator who shared the (perhaps naive) trust common in his time that modern philosophy – that is 
philosophy beginning with Descartes – could be turned to the advantage of orthodox religion.’ 
(‘Rationalist Foundations,’ 78) Fiering is right about Edwards’ uniqueness, but we would put more 
emphasis on Newton and Locke. To anticipate later discussion, we maintain that Fiering exaggerates 
the influence of Cartesianism in Edwards because he neglects the importance of sensibility in 
Edwards. 
6 For example, Matless attempts to reduce Edwards’ metaphysical thinking into the theme of 
‘benevolent love as that which seeks no boundaries and expresses itself towards all beings and to the 
natural world as a whole’ (Metaphysics of Love, 306). She ignores much of Edwards’ theology (for 
example, the order of beings with God as the prime reality, the importance of ordering our affections 
according to that order) that comes from the Reformed or general Christian heritage. In Matless’ 
analysis, Edwards’ main insight is that only love matters. This Edwards is both boring and divorced 
from his Reformed heritage.  
7 Edwards had probably never read any writings by Aquinas and the other medieval schoolmem. All 
the comparisons with Aquinas are our interpretations. However, Edwards is aquainted with general 
metaphysical notions of God of the medieval schoolmen through the writings of Reformed schoolmen 
(particularily Francis Turretin and Peter Mastricht). Misc. 880 (Works 20:121-139), for example, bears 
remarkable resemblence to Aquinas’ theology. The title of the article is ‘Being of a God.’ Edwards 
begins by using ad infinitum arguments to demonstrate that the material universe must have a first 
efficient cause and a first mover, in ways similar to the famous theistic proofs in Summa Theologica 
(I.2.3). Then Edwards argues that it is almost impossible that two particles should fall just into the 
right distance so that the appropriate physical laws will operate. (20:128-130). It follows that it is even 
more incredible the whole universe, with many intricate laws and millions of particles, should all 
work together harmoniously just by chance. In other words, Edwards uses the Newtonian conception 
of the universe to argue against the self-sufficiency of the universe. He uses the contemporaneous 
science to give a new twist to an old argument. 




3.1. The Beauty of Material World 
A. Theistic Idealism 
We shall begin our section with a review of some challenges the English 
Enlightenment brought to the Puritan worldview. As we have indicated in our 
previous chapter, empiricism is one central ingredient of the Enlightenment. What 
counts as evidence for our knowledge? For Locke, the most common source of 
knowledge is the external world. Our sensational experience reveals to us truth about 
the external world. In Lockean terminology, our ideas of the world are the evidences 
for reasonable knowledge. However, the Lockean paradigm immediately raises the 
question: how do objects in the external world become ideas in our mind?9 My idea 
of a cup exists only in my mind. It is immaterial and unobservable by others. The cup, 
in Lockean conception, is material and it exists independent of my mind. How are 
the two related? First, there is the epistemological question: how does the cup 
generate the idea of a cup in my mind? How do I know that my idea of the cup 
accurately represents the physical cup? This is the challenge of scepticism, typified 
by Hume. Though Edwards is acquainted with Hume’s writings, he seems to be 
unaware of the seriousness of the challenge.10 Like Locke, he does not question the 
general reliability of our sensational knowledge. Edwards is not interested in a 
general theory of epistemology. For him, the important epistemological question is 
our cognition of spiritual truth. If our knowledge comes from sensations, and God is 
not a material object, how do we perceive God? We shall answer this question in the 
next section, on the beauty of humanity. 
The second question raised by empiricism is the challenge of materialism. This 
can be interpreted as a metaphysical question about the reality of ideas: is my idea of 
cup real in the same way that the cup is real? Do abstract concepts such as love 
                                                 
9 Leon Chai, Jonathan Edwards and the Limits of Enlightenment Philosophy. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), chapter one, discusses the ambiguity of Locke on this question. For an 
introduction to a similar dualism (intuition and concept) in Kant and the attempt by German idealism 
to resolve it, see Paul Guyer, ‘Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism’, in Karl 
Ameriks, The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).  
10 In letter no. 212 (written in 1755), Edwards writes, ‘I had before read that book of essays; … and 
also that book of Mr. David Hume’s which you speak of. I am glad of an opportunity to read such 
corrupt books; especially when written by men of considerable genius; that I may have an idea of the 
notions that prevail in our nation.’ (Works 16:679) We do not what work Edwards is referring to, 
though he mentions A Treatise of Human Nature in his Catalogue. Edwards regards Hume as a clever 
and popular writer on anti-Christian themes, but not necessarily a profound philosopher. That seems to 
be the only reference to Hume in all of Edwards’ published works. 
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represent any reality? Is one reality more fundamental than the other? Or does a third 
fundamental reality undergird both types of reality? Although empiricism does not 
logically imply materialism, the focus on sensational knowledge naturally leads to a 
questioning of spiritual realities. If all our knowledge comes from senses, and our 
senses can only tell us material objects, perhaps all we can know is only material 
objects. Any claim about the significance of spiritual realities may look like empty 
speculations. Whether God exists or not, perhaps all rational discourse should be 
limited to the material world. For Edwards, such materialistic thinking is anathema to 
Christianity.  
Beside empiricism, the second challenge of Enlightenment is the rise of 
Newtonian science, where the universe is described by mathematical equations. In 
the Aristotelian conception of science, we study objects by discerning their essence 
and accidents. By using the scheme of potentiality and actuality in understanding 
essence, medieval theologians like Aquinas build up impressive system of scientific 
knowledge in which God is the origin and the end of the universe. The conception of 
potentiality and actuality is inherently teleological. If the seed is potentially a flower, 
it is natural to say that the end of the seed is a flower. Beginning with the end of 
specific beings, Aquinas takes the next step and asks the end of beings. This final end, 
in which all actuality is embodied, is God. For Aquinas, the world cannot be 
understood apart from God. The essence of humanity cannot be understood apart 
from its theological virtues. 
In Cartesian science, material objects have no inherent purpose. They are 
conceived as extension and force. Descartes himself still needs a God to guarantee 
that material objects are real. Once reality is established, the world of Descartes runs 
on its own. For Locke, who shares neither the skepticism on senses nor the 
confidence in innate ideas, the God of Descartes is both superfluous and unknowable. 
Locke may still believe in God in some sense,11 but the world can be understood on 
its own without reference to God. This God may intervene once in a while in 
performing some miracles, but reason alone is sufficient in our search for the true 
and the good. Newtonian science portrays all motions as governed by mechanical 
laws. Motions have no telos; they merely follow mathematical necessities. If there is 
no telos, then there is no meaning. Without meaning, there is no intentionality. 
                                                 
11 For Locke’s theology, in particular with reference to his empiricism, see Caleb Henry, Jonathan 
Edwards as Lockean Puritan? Epistemology and Natural Law in Jonathan Edwards, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School (2000), chapter three. Henry believes that Locke is likely to 
be a deist or even an agnostic rather than a traditional Christian. 
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Without intentionality, God (at least a sovereign and personal God) has no place in 
the world. As Laplace has pointed out: we do not need the hypothesis of God.  
In his defence of the traditional Christian worldview, Edwards offers an 
idealistic interpretation of the material world. It is idealistic in the sense that the 
material is dependent on the ideal. Edwards remarks, ‘It the more confirms me in it, 
that the perfect idea God has of himself is truly and properly God, that the existence 
of all corporeal things is only ideas.’12 For Edwards, material objects can be truly 
understood if only they are regarded as images of spiritual objects. ‘For indeed the 
whole outward creation, which is but the shadows of beings, is so made as to 
represent spiritual things.’13 While the link of telos has been broken by Newtonian 
science, Edwards offers the link of beauty. The material world is infused with 
secondary beauty, which is the image of spiritual beauty.  
Before we examine how Edwards develops his idealism, we will briefly review 
how recent scholars have addressed this issue. This has been a subject of some 
ambiguities. Delattre ignores this question in his book. He claims that, in Edwards 
thought, ‘beauty has priority over the other categories of being, such as those 
summed up by scholastic philosophy under the aspects of unity, truth, and 
goodness.’14 However, Delattre does not delineate how this priority shapes the 
metaphysics of Edwards. In his analysis, the central division is between 
being-in-itself and being-as-perceived. While this brings out the importance of 
sensibility in Edwards’ thought, it gives no significance to Edwards’ idealism. Lee is 
careful in delineating the objective idealism of Edwards,15 and he is the best 
expositor of Edwards’ philosophical theology among recent scholars. Matless is 
apologetic about the idealism of Edwards.16 Perhaps she regards the term idealism in 
a primarily negative way, as denying the existence of ordinary things. But idealism 
does not necessarily mean a denial of the reality of the material world. ‘The positive 
meaning of “idealism”, in contrast, involves seeing the term as adding rather than 
subtracting significance, as emphasizing that, whatever we say about the status of 
many things that are thought to exist at a common-sense level, we also need to 
                                                 
12 Misc. 179. Works 13:327. 
13 Misc. 362, Works 13:434. 
14 Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility, 105. 
15 See his Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, chapter 3 and 4. 
16 ‘What the following analysis will strive to make clear is that if we must classify his thought as 
portending an “idealism” then “objective idealism” or “idealistic phenomenalism” (as dubbed by 
Anderson), may be more helpful, but even these designations are misleading without further nuance 
and clarification. What this chapter will strive to show is that ideas for Edwards are “stuff” of the 
really real.’ Matless, Metaphysics of Love, 209-210. 
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recognize a set of features or entities that have a higher, a more ‘ideal’ nature.’17 
Understood in this positive sense, Edwards stands squarely within the idealist 
tradition that runs from Plato to Hegel. 
On the other hand, Fiering regards Edwards as a (perhaps indirect) follower of 
Malebranche. Malebranche is led by the scepticism of Descartes to the conclusion 
that we really see God in all things. For Malebranche, material objects are veils for 
the thought of God. On this level, Edwards does bear some resemblence to 
Malebranche. However, Malebranche has a distinctive understanding of idea. For 
him, we perceive the ideas of God directly. When I perceive a round table, what I 
really perceive is a circle with certain color and shades. The idea in my head (the 
circle) is not actually some subjective mental state, but the eternal idea of God put 
into my mind.18 Edwards’ concept is Lockean rather than that of Malebranche. For 
Edwards, ideas are mental objects aroused passively by the presence of physical 
objects.19 They are not eternal and infinite ideas of Malebranche.20 Secondly, 
Cartesianism starts with the thinking self and self-consciousness is the foundation of 
knowledge. For Edwards, the existence of objects and other minds is self-evident. 
The challenge is to comprehend their interrelations in which neither spiritual world 
nor the material world are rendered into phantoms. Though Malebranche’s Search 
after Truth and the English idealist John Norris’ Essay towards the Theory of the 
Ideal or Intelligible World were both included in the Drummer collection donated to 
Yale College,21 Edwards did not refer to them in his writings. It is difficult to give a 
precise evaluation how much he may have been directly influenced by Malebranche 
(or by the Cambridge Platonists, or Berkeley).22 Given their different concerns, we 
think that Malebranche and Edwards are espousing two different kinds of idealism.23 
                                                 
17 Karl Ameriks, German Idealism, 8. Ameriks is describing the character of German Idealism. 
Nonetheless it aptly describes the idealism of Edwards. 
18 Though his best known work is Search after Truth, the best succinct treatment is found is the first 
three dialogues of his Dialogues on Metaphysics on Religion. See also the editor’s introduction by 
Nicholas Jolley in Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy edition of the Dialogues (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
19 Edwards’ solution to dichotomy of physical objects and mental objects is occasionalism grounded 
on divine rule. ‘Our perceptions, or ideas that we passively receive by our bodies, are communicated 
to us immediately by God while our minds are united with our bodies; but only we in some measure 
know the rule. We know that upon such alterations in our bodies there follow such ideas in the 
mind. … according to some rule, no doubt, only we know not what.’ ‘The Mind’ 3, Works 6:339. 
20 For a brief discussion on the various meanings of ideas, see Roger Ariew and Marjorie Green, 
‘Ideas, in and before Descartes,’ Jornal of the History of Ideas (Jan. 1995) 56(1), 87-106. 
21 Wallace E. Anderson, ‘Editor’s Intoduction’, Scientific and Philosophical Writings, Works 6:20-21. 
22 On the source of Edwards’ idealism, see the bibliography and the brief discussion in Michael J. 
McClymond, Encounters with God, 128.  
23 Paul Copan, ‘Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophical Influences: Lockean or Malebranchean?’ JETS 
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We begin our systematic exposition of Edwards’ metaphysics of beauty. The 
starting point, both chronologically and logically in the development of his thought, 
is his conception of substance.24 Edwards studied Gassendi and Henry Moore as a 
college student. He would be familiar with the debate on the nature of substance in 
his time, and the relation between spiritual and material substance.25 In Newtonian 
science, material substance interacts with each other in mathematical precision. 
Newtonian science does not answer the question of the nature of substance, nor why 
they should have mass and other properties. Is substance identical with its properties 
(in other words, substance is no more than colour, shape and so on), or is there an 
underlying ‘stuff’ that underlies all these properties?26 
Edwards develops an idealistic answer to these questions. First, he gives an 
idealistic interpretation of the nature of atoms. Edwards gives this definition to atom: 
 
‘that body that is absolutely plenum, or that has every part of space included within 
its surface impenetrable, is indivisible; and that the parts thereof can by no means 
[be] separated from each other, by any force how great soever.27 
  
How can atoms resist all forces, no matter how great, that try to penetrate them? 
It follows that ‘it must needs be an infinite power that keeps the parts of atoms 
together.’28 Who can have this power except God? ‘[I]t is God himself, or the 
immediate exercise of his power, that keeps the parts of atoms or two bodies 
touching, as aforesaid, together.’29 Moreover, this power of resistence must work 
continuously as long as the atoms exist.  
                                                                                                                                          
(Mar. 2001) 44(1):107-24, argues for Malebranchean influence. The weakness of Fiering and Copan is 
that they emphasize the general Platonic worldview of Edwards as contrasted with a more 
materialistic worldview of Locke. We (unlike Miller) readily concedes Edwards’ Platonic tendency, 
but Edwards could have received this from Turretin, Moore or even Shaftesbury. There is nothing 
particularly Malebranchean or Cartesian about Edwards’ idealism. On the other hand, a Lockean 
influence does not imply Edwards take over the whole philosophy of Locke.  
24 Edwards wrote his theory of substance in 1721-2 (Schafer, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works 13:91). 
For further discussion of Edward’s of substance, see Flower and Murphey, American Philosophy, 
143-151; Matless, Metaphysics of Love, 122-144; Anderson (Works, 6:53-68) locates Edwards thought 
in the debates of his time. 
25 See Anderson, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works 6:53-68 for a summary of this debate. 
26 For example, Locke regards substance as an unknowable entity. ‘To conclude, Sensation convinces 
us, that there are solid extended substances; and Reflection, that where are thinking one; Experience 
assures us of the Existence of such Beings;… But beyond these ideas [of sensations and reflection], as 
received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach.… From whence it seems probable to 
me, that the simple Ideas we receive from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our 
Thoughts.’ An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1975), II.23.29, 312. 
27 ‘Of Atoms’, Works 6:208 
28 ibid., 214. 




[I]t follows that the constant exercise of the infinite power of God is necessary to 
preserve bodies in being.  
Hence, also an incontestable argument for the being, infinite power, and 
omnipotence of God: of the two latter, inasmuch as we see that the infinite power [is] 
actually exerted in an infinite number of places at once, even in every part of every 
atom of the universe.30 
 
Using the same logic, Edwards concludes that solidity results from the 
immediate exercise of divine power. It is God who bounds two atoms together so that 
they cannot be separated.31 Solidity is nothing but the binding of atoms together to 
form an object. Similarily, motion is also the outcome of immediate divine power. 
Motion is ‘the communication of body, solidity, or this resistance, from one part of 
space to another successively (that is, from one part of space to the next etc.).’32 In 
other words, motion and solidity are manifestations of the same power of God. In the 
solidity, the resistance is stabilized in one particular space. In motion, the resistance 
is changing its spatial reference over time.  
These laws of resistance exist only as long as God is exerting his power to 
maintain the order. All mechanisms or physical laws do not exist by themselves. The 
atoms do not have an inherent power of resistance, since they are no existence 
independent of the power of resistance. They are willed by God moment by moment. 
Similar to Aquinas, Edwards believes that God is the efficient cause of the existence 
of all material objects. For Aquinas, this existence of material objects consists of 
substance and accidents. For Edwards, this existence consists of its physical laws and 
properties. We can understand a material object only in relationship to other objects. 
For example, resistance to penetration of a particular atom is comprehensible if there 
are other objects that try to penetrate it. Motion is comprehensible if there are objects 
distributed over space that try to penetrate the atom. Ultimately, these relationships 
must be grounded in the power of God. 
With this ingenious conception of solidity and motion, Edwards provides a 
coherent answer to the question of the place of a personal God a mechanistic 
universe.33 The mystery of the concept of substance is resolved by understanding 
physical laws as the working of the divine will. There is no need for a mysterious 
‘substance’ to guarantee the continuity of reality underlying changing appearances. 
                                                 
30 ibid., 214. 
31 ibid., 213. 
32 ibid., 215-216. 
33 The theocentric nature of Edwards’ idealism is emphasized in McClymond, Encounters, 28-30. 
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The regularity of the changes is itself the continuity and foundation in all changes. 
The regularity is grounded on the constant will of God and nothing else.34 The 
intentionality of the Aristotelian world is replaced by the God-instituted regularities. 
In Edwards’ universe, God is not invoked to answer the telos of the world. God is 
invoked to explain the very existence of a mechanistic universe.35 Edwards draws 
two conclusions from his construction of the physical world. First, the laws of nature 
are only ‘the stated methods of God’s acting with respect to bodies, and the stated 
conditions of the alteration of the manner of his acting.’ Second, ‘there is no such 
thing as mechanism, if that word is taken to be that whereby bodies act each upon 
other, purely and properly by themselves.’36  
We pause here and examine again the two interpretations of Edwards among 
scholars. As pointed out above, Lee has popularised the concept of a dynamic 
ontology in Edwards. In other words, the physical laws themselves become the 
substance of reality. In Matless’ presentation of Edwards’ metaphysics, relationship 
itself is what is really real.37 As the discussion above indicates, the really real in 
Edwards are God and the power of God. On one level, we may indeed detach 
Edwards’ dispositional metaphysics from his theocentrism. As a constructive 
theologian, one may take elements of Edwards’ thought that are helpful and reject 
outdated elements. On the other hand, if our goal is to understand Edwards per se, 
then detaching his dispositional ontology from his theocentric idealism gives a 
distorted picture of Edwards. It may give the impression that Edwards prefers the 
category of becoming to the category of being. The major metaphyiscal division in 
Edwards is not being and becoming, but material and spiritual world. Dispositional 
ontology may sound like that the physical laws of nature are self-regulating. Thus 
Delattre compares Edwards to Whitehead several times in his book.38 We claim that 
Edwards is closer to Aquinas than to Whitehead. The essence of matter is dynamic in 
                                                 
34 Therefore occasionalism is probably the best description of Edwards’ view on causality. See Oliver 
Crisp, ‘How “Occasional” was Edwards’s Occasionalism?’, in Paul Helm and Oliver D. Crisp (eds.), 
Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 61-77. 
35 ‘…God’s upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is 
altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each moment, because its 
existence at this moment is not merely in part from God, but wholly from him; and not in any part, or 
degree, from its antecedent existence.’ OS 4.3, Works 3:402. 
36 ‘Of Atoms’, Works 6:216. In Edwards time, it is common to believe that some physical laws are the 
immediate working of God. For example, Edwards and Whiston (from whose textbook Edwards learnt 
his astronomy) believe that gravity is the immediate operation of God. ibid., 234. But Edwards is 
unique in asserting all physical laws are the immediate operations of God. 
37 Metaphysics of Love, 21-23. 
38 Beauty and Sensibility, 25, 29, 111, 130. 
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the sense that it is the realization of the will of God. The will of God, for both 
Aquinas and Edwards, is essentially dynamic. However, God is the same yesterday, 
today, and tomorrow.39  
On the other hand, Edwards’ conception is also different from the Cartesianism 
of Malebranche. Edwards’ starting point is not the thinking self, but speculations on 
the essence of material objects. For Edwards, the mysterious nature of substance is 
accessible to human knowledge. Scientific laws are not merely heuristic devices with 
which we construct our reality; they are the essence of material objects as created by 
God. Edwards’ idealism is also a confident realism,40 where the essence of the 
material world is accessible to the human mind. Nor is the world merely a veil to 
God’s mind. The laws of nature have their own integrity within a space-time reality. 
They are God’s work ad extra, to be distinguished from the inner wisdom of God.41  
Having laid out Edward’s idealistic understanding of material, we have to ask 
how is this idealism related to his concept of beauty. The short answer is that the end 
of the material world is to display beauty. There are two ways in which the material 
world fulfils its purpose: it displays the wisdom of the Creator and it serves as the 
image of spiritual things. 
 
B. The World as the Theatre of God’s Wisdom 
Edwards emphasizes that it is inconceivable that the material world can exist 
without spiritual beings. For Edwards, an idealistic understanding of the material 
world implies the existence of beings who can understand ideas. ‘[F]or we are to 
remember that the world exists only mentally, so that the very being of the world 
implies its being perceived or discovered.’42 ‘How impossible is it, that the world 
should exist from eternity without a mind.’43 
Perhaps the best way to understand Edwards is to compare the material world to 
                                                 
39 On the theological conservatism of Edwards, and the dynamic nature of both traditional and 
Edwards’ conception of God, see Stephen Holmes, ‘Does Jonathan Edwards Use a Dispositional 
Ontology? A Response to Sang Hyun Lee’, in Helm and Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards, 99-114. 
40 Here realism means that we can have knowledge of the noumena, as contrast with only knowledge 
of the phenomena. Edwards’ idealism is a form of realism under the terminology of Kant, as opposite 
to the transcendental idealism of Kant. See Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An 
Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), ch. 2. 
41 Lee has carefully laid out the realism of Edwards, in the sense physical laws are permanent and true 
characteristics of the world,) in Philosophical Theology, 56-67. Lee’s own terminology, ‘permanence 
of the created world’, can be misleading in suggesting the world has a permanence independent of the 
continuous willing of God for its existence. See Crisp, ‘How ‘Occasional’ is Edwards’s 
Occasionalism?’ 
42 Misc. 247; Works 13:247 
43 ‘The Mind’ 28, Works 6:351 
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mathematical theorems. In a way, mathematical theorems are objective entities. They 
do not perish along with the person who is thinking about the theorems. They 
confront the mind with an objective validity; we cannot arbitrarily decide what 
theorems are true. We can recognize true theorems, or we may fail to understand 
them. In either case, we recognize that we are recipient of truth and not the creator of 
truth. Mathematical theorems have meaning only in relationships. The number one 
has meaning only as a member of a set (natural numbers, real numbers etc.), 
operating under the rules of the set. However, it is difficult to conceive of 
mathematics without at least one mind who knows mathematics. Of course there are 
particular mathematical theorems that nobody in the world today know about. 
However, mathematical concepts and rules in general are known by minds. If there 
were no mind from eternity, if this universe contains only mindless matter, does it 
still make sense to say that there are mathematical theorems in this universe? Is there 
any existence of mathematics totally independent of minds? For Edwards, the answer 
is no. This is a metaphysical presupposition of Edwards. 
We have seen that, for Edwards, the essence of the material world is the exertion 
of God’s power according to God-ordained rules. The laws are real in the sense that 
they are God’s power ad extra, but they are inseparable from the active will of God. 
The relationship between the material world and God’s mind is somewhat analogous 
to the relationship between mathematics and our mind. The mathematical theorem in 
our mind exists only as long as we are thinking about them. The difference is that 
God’s creation is a working of the mind ad extra, while the mathematical theorem is 
internal to our mind.44 The similarity is that, for both material world and 
mathematical theorems, intelligibility is the essence of their existence. 
If intelligibility belongs to the essence of the material world, then it is natural to 
claim that being understood is part of the goal of the material world. Since the 
material world is God’s will ad extra, it is also natural that the intelligibility should 
not be limited to God alone. If this were no intelligent being other than God, the 
material world would have existed in vain. What we know about the world are 
relations and proportions. As we have indicated in a chapter two, secondary beauty is 
relations and proportions. Therefore the purpose of the material world is that its 
                                                 
44 Why can God create a world by his thinking and willing, and we cannot? Edwards does not provide 
a direct answer. Perhaps, for Edwards, a metaphysical answer is neither possible nor desirable. It is an 
incomprehensible infinite gap between Creator and creatures. The answer depends on how close we 
want to align Edwards with Neoplatonism. For Aquinas, the answer is that only in God is essence 
identical to existence. Therefore the thinking of God (part of his essence) can generate existence. 
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beauty should be known to intelligent beings beside God.  
 
’Tis most certain that God did not create the world for nothing. ’Tis most certain that 
if there were not intelligent beings in the world, all the world would be without any 
end at all… So certainly senseless matter would be altogether useless if there was no 
intelligent being but God, for God could neither receive good himself nor 
communicate good. What would this vast universe of matter, placed in such 
excellent order and governed by such excellent rules, be good for, if there was no 
intelligence that could know anything of it?45 
  
Therefore beauty is not just an accidental property of the world; it is the very 
essence and purpose of the world. The world is order and proportions; and order and 
proportions is beauty. Beauty is objective in the sense that it is there even if not 
perceived by human beings. But it will be meaningless. It would be like someone 
speaking without an audience. The words exist objectively (in the sense of vibrations 
of the air), but there would be no communication of meaning. The words have failed 
in their purpose of communication. Similarly, the order and proportions of the world 
are exhibitions of the wisdom of God. Its purpose is to be appreciated by spiritual 
beings.  
The analogy of language is particularly apt in Edwards’ case, because Edwards 
does believe that the material world is a song for spiritual things. We shall turn to this 
topic in the next section. 
We can briefly compare Edwards with George Berkeley (1685-1753), the other 
leading British idealist of Edwards’ time. For Berkeley, the essence of material is our 
perception of it: 
 
For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any 
relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is 
percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of minds or thinking 
things which perceive them.46 
 
                                                 
45 Misc. gg, Works 13:185. In this note, Edwards continues to argue as a corollary that human beings 
must be made immortal. ‘The world had as good have been without us, as for us to be a few minutes 
and then be annihilated – if we are now to own God’s works to his glory, and only glorify him a few 
minutes, and then be annihilated, and it shall after that be all one to eternity as if we never had been, 
and be in vain after we are dead that we have been once; and then after the earth shall be destroyed, it 
shall be for the future entirely in vain that either the earth or mankind have ever been.’ However, the 
question whether ephemeral events have significance is not directly related Edwards’ idealism or his 
concept of beauty. In any case, immortality of the human soul is not a major theme in Edwards’ 
writings. 
46 On the Principles of Human Knowledge, I.3, in George Berkeley, Philosophical Works, including 
the Works on Vision, ed. Michael Ayers (London: J.M. Dent, 1975), 90. Emphasis is original. 
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For Edwards, there is a table first and then there is our perception of the table. 
For Berkeley, our perception of the table is the table itself. So why can people agree 
on seeing the same table? Berkeley’s answer is that God has put the same perception 
into people thinking that they have seen the same table. It is not an external table that 
leads to my mental picture of a table, but God projects the mental picture directly 
into my mind. ‘From all which I conclude, there is a mind which affects me every 
moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive.’47 The difference between 
hallucinations and real things is that the former are impressions I conjure up myself, 
while the latter are impressions conjured up by the infinite Spirit. Therefore the latter 
is much more vivid and strong.  
Starting from the axiom that all we can ever perceive are mental objects, 
Berkeley concludes that real things are also mental objects. From the need to explain 
the giveness of our ordinary perceptions, Berkeley concludes that there must be a 
Spirit who impresses those perceptions in us. Berkeley does not have a material 
world in his worldview. On the other hand, Edwards reaches his idealistic conclusion 
through musing on the nature of atoms and motions. 
We take a short detour to compare this idealistic argument with the design 
argument of Hutcheson. Edwards’ argument is a form of teleological argument, in 
that he argues from the purpose of the world. However, it is a question about the 
purpose of the existence of the material world. Why should God exert his effort to 
maintain a law-bound material world? It is a metaphysical quest.  
For Hutcheson, the material world has an integrity of its own. Hutcheson avoids 
metaphysical questions such as the nature of material beings. The question of 
Hutcheson is why some specific laws work in those specific ways. In particular, why 
should uniformity amidst diversity generate pleasure in human beings? It could have 
been that uniformity amidst diversity would generate grief in human beings. The 
question is about the purpose of specific laws within the material world, not the 
existence of the material world as a whole. Edwards himself employ similar 
arguments in some of his writings. For example, he asks why spiders should always 
fly towards the shore in New England. His answer is that God designs spiders that 
way so that the vast amount of spiders can die and sink conveniently into the sea, 
instead of becoming a nuisance to people.48 In Hutcheson and the ‘Spider’ letter of 
Edwards, the argument is why scientific laws seem to favor human beings 
                                                 
47 Three Dialogues, Second Dialogue; Philosophical Works, 205.  
48 ‘Spider’ letter, Works 6:167-8 
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specifically. For Hutcheson, Edwards and many others in the seventeenth century, 
such favoring of human beings within the laws of nature is a sure sign of the 
existence of a benign Creator.  
 
C. World as Images of Divine Thing 
 Edwards claims that the material world is not only beautiful in its harmonious 
internal working, but it is also beautiful because they are externally harmonious with 
spiritual things. Edwards calls such harmonies between material and spiritual 
realities images of divine things. Edwards remarks,  
 
I am not ashamed to own that I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air 
and seas, and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of 
images of divine things, as full as a language is of words; and that the multitude of 
those things that I have mentioned are but a very small part of what is really 
intended to be signified and typified by these things: there is room for persons to be 
learning more and more of this language and seeing more of that which is declared 
in it to the end of the world without discovering all.49 
 
Edwards has written about 100 pages of printed text on examples of how the 
natural world images the spiritual world,50 and Edwards claims that this is but a 
small portion of all the existing images. As an example of Edwards creativity on this 
question, we quote his example of the silkworm:  
 
The silkworm is a remarkable type of Christ, which, when it dies, yields, us that of 
which we make such glorious clothing. Christ became a worm for our sakes, and by 
his death finished that righteousness with which believers are clothed, and thereby 
procured that we should be clothed with robes of glory.51  
 
The death of the silkworm produces beautiful silk for clothes, and this typifies 
the death of Christ that clothes us with righteousness. 
In a complete theory of typology, Edwards would need to develop criteria to 
distinguish true types from mere human imagination. For example, does God intend 
silkworm to be a type of Christ, or is it merely the product of Edwards’ creative mind? 
                                                 
49 ‘Types’, Works 11:152. 
50 The ‘Images of Divine Things’ and ‘Types’ in Works 11. These notes are records of about 30 years 
of reflections, from 1728 to 1757. See Wallace Anderson’s ‘Notes on the Manuscript,’ Works 11:38-46. 
Sang Hyun Lee gives a good introduction to Edwards theology of nature in ‘Edwards on God and 
Nature’, in Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C Guelzo, (eds.) Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and 
the Shaping of American Religion (Grand Rapids : William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 15-44. 
51 ‘Images’ 35, Works 11:59. 
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Edwards himself distinguishes between true type and signification.52 Presumably, a 
type is literally an image of divine things, and a signification is only metaphorically 
an image. Edwards does not give us any formal criteria for distinguishing between 
the two. For our purpose, we do not need to ask further about his method for 
discerning true types. 
However, we do need to know the rationale for Edwards’ interpretation of the 
nature of the material world. There are both theological and philosophical reasons for 
such typological reading of nature. The theological reason is obvious: Edwards is 
following the example of the Scripture. For example, Jesus called himself the true 
light (Jn. 1:9) as well as true vine (Jn. 15:9). For Edwards, that means that Jesus 
taught us that many things in nature are types of spiritual reality.53 To vindicate his 
case, Edwards writes up an index of Scripture verses using natural objects as types 
for spiritual realities, as well as an index of Scripture verses used in his notes 
‘Images of Divine Things.’54 In his theology and methodology, Edwards is following 
the Puritan tradition.55 
The philosophical reason is more complicated. Edwards says that ‘as a language 
is full of words,’ so is the fecundity of divine types in the material world. In other 
words, nature is a form of divine speech.56 Edwards compares the learning of 
reading types to the art of learning a language. 
 
Types are a certain sort of language, as it were, in which God is wont to speak to us. 
And there is, as it were, a certain idiom in that language which is to be learnt the 
same that the idiom of any language is. viz. by good acquaintance with the 
language, … Great care should be used, and we should endeavor to be well and 
thoroughly acquainted, or we shall never understand [or] have a right notion of the 
                                                 
52 ‘There are many things in the constitution of the world that are not properly shadows and images of 
divine things, that yet are significations of them; as children’s being born crying is a signification of 
their being born to sorrow.’ ‘Images’ 25, Works 11:57 
53 ‘Images’ 45, Works 11:62. 
54 Works 11:131-5, 141-2. 
55 The Puritans regard nature and the Bible as two books of God where we can mine for images of 
spiritual truth. Concordances were developed to help them understand the typologies in the Bible. See 
Susan Hardman Moore, ‘For the mind’s eye only: Puritans, images and ‘the golden mines of 
Scripture,’ forthcoming, Scottish Journal of Theology 59/3 (2006).  
56 We have discussed Stephen Daniel’s thesis in Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards in chapter one. See 
also his ‘Postmodern Concepts of God and Edwards’s Trinitarian Ontology,’ in Lee and Guelzo, (eds.), 
Edwards in Our Time, 45-64. Beside the criticism offered there, we note also that there is no 
dichotomy between reason and language in Edwards. Edwards shares the Enlightenment’s confidence 
in universal reason. In his thinking, language does hold some privileged position in contrast to 
ratiocination for our grasping of reality. Moreover, Edwards assumes that language’s function is to 
refer to something extra-lingual. The material world is like a language because it refers to the spiritual 
world. It is quite different from Daniel’s claim that meaning is totally immanent in the message.  
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idiom of the language.57 
  
In other words, God makes the world in such a way so that it will speak spiritual 
truths to us. As shown in the previous section, Edwards believes that the harmonious 
physical laws are in themselves beautiful. Here, we see that the material world is also 
beautiful because it speaks of spiritual beauty.  
In chapter two, we have pointed out the difficulty of the definition ‘uniformity 
amidst diversity’ in explaining the beauty of sunset. For Edwards, the answer for that 
question is easy. It is not the orange colour of sunset per se that is beautiful. The 
reason is rather that the warmth and light of the sun remind us of God’s love and 
holiness. For atheists, it will be like listening to a song of foreign language. They 
may appreciate the melody, but they do not truly understand the song. They are 
touched by the material beauty, but cannot sense the spiritual beauty behind it. If we 
ask why God designs nature to work in a certain way (for example, the source of 
light should usually also be the source of heat; insects who feed on garbage usually 
look hideous to us), the answer is that they are designed to be types of spiritual 
beauty. God designs the laws of nature so that they can speak to us about spiritual 
beauty. 
Since the material world as a whole is a type of spiritual beauty, beauty becomes 
a bridge between the material world and the spiritual world. The Christian church has 
a long tradition of regarding creation in an anagogical fashion. This is usually 
grounded in a Neoplatonic framework of process and return. Edwards seems to have 
little direct acquaintance with the Neoplatonic tradition. On the other hand, the 
Puritans have a strong tradition in the typological reading of history and Scripture.58 
Edwards is distinguished from other Puritans by his pursuit of a philosophical basis 
for typology. He succeeds in providing an alternate explanation to Neoplatonism for 
the anagogical function of nature. The link in Edwards is not an ontological process 
of emanation, but the communication of meaning through language. The world is the 
language; spiritual beauty is the meaning.  
We conclude this section by looking at one of the most striking examples of 
typology in Edwards - human appearance. For Edwards, physical appearance cannot 
itself be the source of real beauty. Unlike Shaftesbury, this is not about the contrast of 
                                                 
57 ‘Types,’ Works 11:150-1. 
58 See Anderson’s ‘Introduction’ for a brief discussion of the history of types in the Christian church, 
Works 11:11-32. See also fn. 55. On his typological reading of history, see Zakai, Avihu, Jonathan 
Edwards’s Philosophy of History. 
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form and material. The contrast is between physical being and spiritual being. A 
statue of identical appearance would not arouse our emotions the way a real person 
does. Edwards concludes that the reason is that the body is only an image of the real 
beauty. The beauty that we really love is spiritual beauty, the beauty of the soul 
within the body. For Edwards, this indicates that the physical world in general is also 
an image of the spiritual beauty of God. The long quotation below shows not only 
Edwards’ idea but also some of his most poetic language: 
 
When we behold a beautiful body, a lovely proportion, a beautiful harmony of 
features of face, delightful airs of countenance and voice, and sweet motion and 
gesture, we are charmed with it; not under the notion of a corporeal, but a mental 
beauty. For if there could be a stature that should have exactly the same, … we 
would not be so delighted with it; we should not fall entirely in love with the image, 
if we knew certainly that it had no perception or understanding.… And ’tis certainly 
because there is an analogy between such a countenance and such airs, and these and 
those excellencies of the mind – a sort of I know not what in them, that is agreeable 
and does consent with such mental perfections – so that we cannot think of such 
habitudes of mind without having an idea of them at the same time. Nor can it be 
only from custom, for the same dispositions and actings of mind naturally beget such 
kind of airs of countenance and gesture; otherwise, they never would have come into 
custom.… 
 
He who by his immediate influence gives being every moment and by his Spirit 
actuates the world, because he inclines to communicate himself and his excellencies, 
doth doubtless communicate his excellency to bodies, as far as there is any consent 
or analogy. … the beauties of nature are really emanations, or shadows, of the 
excellencies of the Son of God. 
 
So that when we are delighted with flowery meadows and gentle breezes of wind, 
we may consider that we only see the emanations of the sweet benevolence of Jesus 
Christ; when we behold the fragrant rose and lily, we see his love and purity.59 
 
A body without a soul does not have real beauty. A beautiful face is a 
God-ordained symbol for a beautiful soul. In the quotation above, Edwards 
concludes that the same is true for the natural world. Why are we so deeply moved 
by sceneries of the natural world? Edwards believes that mere material objects, 
whether a statue or a flower, cannot truly fill our soul with joy. We are moved by the 
natural world because, consciously or unconsciously, the beauty of God has touched 
                                                 
59 Misc. 108, Works 13:278-9. Misc. 108 becomes well know through its reprint in Jonathan Edwards: 
Representative Selections, eds. Clarence H. Faust and Thomas H. Johnson (New York: American Book, 
1935), 372-74. According to Schafer, the first paragraph in our quotation may be alluring to Sarah 
Pierpont. On Sarah’s piety and Edwards’ admiration for her, see George M. Marsden, Jonathan 
Edwards: a Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 239-252. 
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us through the world. Unlike the Neoplatonism of the medieval age, Edwards does 
not rely soley on the forms residing in material objects to communicate spiritual 
meaning. The forms along with the affections aroused by the object together 
communicate the spiritual truth.  
We note here Edwards intuitively recognizes the difficulty of explaining the 
relationship between the signs and the signified. Modern philosophy of language has 
rejected the solution of logical positivism (the attempt to develop a one-to-one 
mapping between signs and the things signified). Stephen Daniel follows the 
postmodern trend in claiming that meaning is totally immanent in the message. The 
signs merely point to other signs. In the passage quote above, Edwards says that  
 
there is an analogy between such a countenance and such airs, and these and those 
excellencies of the mind – a sort of I know not what in them, that is agreeable and 
does consent with such mental perfections. 
 
In other words, the beauty of the body somehow speaks of the beauty of soul 
(‘there is an analogy’), yet the way it communicates it is unclear to Edwards. 
Meaning (mental perfections) is communicated through the signs (the countenance) 
in a way that cannot be explained rationally. The signs do refer to something beyond 
the signs, yet how this referring works cannot be explained rationally. 
For Edwards, we are primarily spiritual beings. Therefore only spiritual beings 
can truly satisfy our soul. Ultimately, nothing is beautiful except divine beauty. To 
participate in divine beauty is our destiny. This destiny will be the theme of our next 
section. 
 
3.2. The Beauty of Humanity – the Divine Image 
From the material world we now enter into the world of spiritual beings – 
human beings. For Edwards, human beings possess the archetype of the beauty of the 
material. Their potentiality for beauty is therefore infinitely greater than material 
objects. ‘Excellency may be distributed into greatness and beauty. The former is the 
degree of being, the latter is being’s consent to being.’60 Spiritual beings have a 
qualitatively higher degree of being than material beings, so their excellencies (if 
they consent to being) are also infinitely higher than material beings.61 To be exact, 
                                                 
60 ‘The Mind’ 64, Works 6:382 
61 The diagram of Delattre in Beauty and Sensibility, 31, is misleading in a fundamental way. The 
most important thematic division in Edwards is not the distinction between being as existence and 
being as perceived, but material beings and spiritual beings. The discussion in Beauty and Sensibility, 
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the beauty of spiritual beings is divine. The purpose of this section is to show how 
Edwards substantiates this claim. 
In our previous section, we have seen that material beauty, or secondary beauty, 
is an image of spiritual beauty. In our previous chapter, we have shown that consent 
to being is primary beauty, or the beauty of spiritual beings. In this section we want 
to show that how, in Edwards’ thought, primary beauty serves as an ontological link 
between human beings and God. We can use Aquinas as an analogy again. In 
Aquinas’ thinking, we participate in God by fixing our mind on the eternal truth of 
God and fixing our will on God. Theology is no mere intellectual exercise; it is a 
participation in the being of God that can lead to climatic union with God. For 
Edwards, meditation on the being of God means appreciating the beauty of God. 
Appreciating the beauty of God means participating in the Holy Spirit, because the 
Holy Spirit is his infinite beauty, ‘God’s infinite consent to being in general.’62 For 
Edwards too, meditating on God is participation in God. The originality of Edwards 
lies in his articulating the traditional doctrine of divine perception and participation 
in Lockean vocabulary. 
 
A. Sensing the Beauty of God 
Lockean empiricism poses one difficulty for the Christian worldview of 
Edwards: how do we perceive God and God’s revelation? If knowledge about 
external objects comes only through sensations, and if God is external to us and 
immaterial, how may we arrive at any knowledge of God? The traditional Christian 
vocabulary of participation in being is tied to an outdated mode of Neoplatonism. In 
medieval science, hotness in a specific object comes from participation in 
hotness-in-itself (understood as the element of fire). Therefore it is natural to 
conceive existence of specific beings as participation in being-in-itself. We process 
from God, and we perceive God when we return to God through ecstasy.   
In the new science of the Enlightenment, there is no such thing as 
hotness-in-itself. Hotness is merely a form of energy. There is no such thing as 
whiteness-in-itself either. Whiteness is merely a form of light energy. Energy is 
conceived in a mathematical form as interaction between objects. If the new science 
                                                                                                                                          
38-41 is unnecessarily confused when Delattre tries to categorize the divine Being as part of 
being-in-general. Edwards has little interest in being-in-general. For him, the divine Being (as 
necessarily existence) is the source both beauty and being of all other beings. Being-in-general or 
beauty-in-general are concepts alien to Edwards’ thought. 
62 ‘The Mind’ 45.9, Works 6:364. 
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cast away the quality-by-participation concept of physics, can human participation in 
God be understood intelligently? Is there an alternative to Neoplatonism to 
understand divine participation philosophically? 
Moreover, Locke has insisted that there are no innate ideas in the human mind. 
All our knowledge comes from senses.63 The Reformed tradition, following a long 
Christian tradition, has insisted that the idea of God is in some ways innate to human 
being. Reformed tradition, along with medieval theologians such as Aquinas, has 
always insisted that faith includes knowledge. In Aquinas, faith (or knowledge of the 
First Principle) is infused into the mind. The Reformed tradition is less specific about 
how God illumined our mind. If, as insisted by Locke, knowledge comes only 
through ideas formed through senses, how can we arrive at knowledge about God? 
God is obviously not a material object, and therefore God is not accessible through 
the senses of bodily organ. Is there a way we can talk about knowledge of God 
within a Lockean framework? 
Faced with this Lockean challenge, one may abandon the concept of faith as 
knowledge or try to adjust the nature of doctrines to harmonize with the delivery of 
reason. The former is the route of mysticism and the latter is close to the path taken 
by Locke. Edwards is unique in emphasizing perception as a way of vindicating the 
unique revelation of Christianity.64 Edwards’ theory of spiritual perception asserts 
that spiritual realities are sensible to our soul in a similar way that the material 
realities are sensible to our bodily organs. 
In an important note,65 Edwards distinguishes between signs and ideas in our 
mind. Signs are symbolic constructions in our mind. For Edwards, the most 
important example of sign is the term God. When we read the word God or think 
about God, we do not actually have an idea (in a Lockean sense) of God. God is 
really a sign to represent a highest being, however we may understand that being. 
Edwards claims most general terms (e.g. humanity, sanctification or perplexity) are 
signs. While a table in front of me can give me immediately the idea of a table, 
nothing in the real world can give me an immediate idea of perplexity. Edwards 
                                                 
63 Essay I.2, 48-65. Locke does claim that the existence of a eternal, thinkg God is the certain delivery 
of reason (Essay IV.10). The question at issue is whether we can have immediate knowledge of God, 
i.e. divine knowledge not mediated through our knowledge of material world. 
64 Michael J. McClymond points this out in Encounter with God: An Approach to the Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), vi-vii. His review of on the 
interpretation of Edwards’ theory of spiritual perception as well as his exposition of Edwards’ teaching 
(chapter one) is quite helpful. 
65 Misc. 782, Works 18:452-66. Also published in Perry Miller with an introduction in ‘Jonathan 
Edwards on the Sense of the Heart,’ Harvard Theological Review 41 (1948) 123-45. 
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refers to Locke explicitly by calling such general things mixed modes.66 ‘Very 
commonly we discourse about them in our minds, and argue and reason concerning 
them, without any idea at all of the things themselves in any degree.’67 Thus, we 
may write volumes on the beauty of God without actually having the idea of divine 
beauty in our mind. Even for things that we can actually form an idea, we often think 
symbolically anyway to speed up our thinking. For example, we do not usually evoke 
the idea of a table in our mind when we come across the word table in books. Only 
God can and does always think in ideas.68  
However, Edwards believes that there are objects that cannot be thought only in 
signs. ‘[P]ersons can’t have actual ideas of mental things without having those very 
things in the mind.’69 To understand the statement ‘A triangle has three angles,’ one 
must necessarily invoke the idea of a triangle. But the mental object called triangle is 
exactly the idea of a triangle. Therefore, we cannot understand ‘a triangle’ only 
symbolically. Similarly, when we think of our love to someone, 
 
we either so frame things in our imagination that we have for moment a love to that 
thing or to something we make represent it, or we excite for a moment that love 
which we have and suppose it in another place, or we have only an idea of the 
antecedents concomitants and effects of love, and suppose something unseen, and 
govern our thoughts about [it] as we have learned how by experience and habit.70  
 
In other words, our thought of our love may either be a reliving of that loving 
affections, or just a recounting of some actions done presumably under the motive of 
love. In the first case, we truly have an idea of that love. In the latter case, that love is 
merely a presumed motive. Edwards claims that we cannot have an idea of that love 
unless that loving affection is actually in our mind. 
Therefore our knowledge of spiritual beings can be distinguished into mere 
speculation and sense of the heart.71 Speculation is ‘all that understanding that is 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 454. Lock discusses mixed modes in Essay II.22, 288-295. 
67 Ibid., 455. 
68 Ibid., 455-6. 
69 Ibid., 459. 
70 Misc. 238, Works 13:353. 
71 Erdt, Terrence, Jonathan Edwards: Art and the Sense of the Heart (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1980), 1-42 (chapter one and two), discusses the sense of the heart in Calvin, the 
Puritans and Edwards. Erdt correctly points out that Edwards’ spiritual sense builds on the Reformed 
and Puritan doctrine of the sweetness of the Lord, while reshaping the Puritan concept into an 
aesthetic quality with Lockean vocabularies. The meaning of Edwards’ spiritual sense has generated 
substantial discussion, one of the best is Miklos Vetö, ‘Spiritual Knowledge according to Jonathan 
Edwards,’ Calvin Theological Journal 31 Ap 1996, 161-181. We focus on the epistemology of 
spiritual sense and its role in the union of God and human beings. 
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without any proper ideal apprehension or view, or all understanding of mental things 
of either faculty that is only by signs.’72 For example, if I had never tasted any apple 
before, then my knowledge of the sweetness of apple is speculation. After I have 
tasted one, I have sensible knowledge of its sweetness. Only sense can give us a 
concrete idea of an object. Edwards extends Locke by claiming that we have an 
inward sense for spiritual realities:  
 
All knowledge of this sort [greatness, meanness, contemptibleness, value etc.], as it 
of things that concern the heart, or the will and affections, so it all relates to the good 
or evil that the sensible knowledge of things of this nature involves; and nothing is 
called a sensible knowledge upon any other account, but on the account of the sense, 
or kind of inward tasting or feeling.73  
 
Suppose that I tell you that the way American soldiers treat Iraqis in Abu Ghraib 
is disgusting. You have only a speculative knowledge of the disgust involved. Then 
you look at the photos and feel the disgust. Now your internal sense has a sensible 
knowledge of the disgust of the situation. Edwards claims that the same distinction 
applies to our knowledge of God. There is a difference between a speculative 
knowledge of the beauty of God as well as a sensible knowledge of it. In our latter 
case, our internal sense actually grasps the beauty of God as our eyes grasp the sight 
of a table. 
In the sight of the table, our sense is passive. We may imagine a table, but we 
cannot force our eyes to see a table. They can see a table only when they are 
presented with one. Edwards claims that the same situation applies to the spiritual 
realities. You cannot actually feel the disgust of Abu Ghraib unless you have 
encountered with the pictures or something similar. The same applies to divine things. 
In a sensible knowledge of divine things, we are passive recipients of divine 
revelation. ‘[T]his knowledge is above any flesh and blood can reveal.’ ‘They [the 
saints] believe the doctrines of God’s Word to be divine, because they see divinity in 
them, i.e. they see a divine, and transcendent, and most evidently distinguishing 
glory in them; such a glory, as if clearly seen, don’t leave room to doubt of their 
being of God, and not of men.’74 Only a table can give us sensible knowledge of 
table, so only God can give us sensible knowledge of God. Once you see a table with 
                                                 
72 Misc. 782, Works 13:459. 
73 Ibid., 13:459. 
74 ‘A Divine and Supernatural Light,’ a sermon on Matt. 16:17, preached 1733, in Works 17:405-425. 
The quotations are from 409 and 415 respectively. The sermon expounds on the difference between 
speculative and sensible knowledge of God. 
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your eyes, you do not need further proof that the table exists. So the glory of God is 
self-evident to those who have beheld it. 
There is a second reason for the need for revelation. A person born blind cannot 
have any sensible knowledge of sight unless her eyes are healed. Similarly,  
 
a sense of divine things with respect to spiritual good and evil, because these don’t 
consist in any agreeableness or disagreeableness to human nature as such, or the 
mere human faculties or principles, therefore man, merely with the exercise of these 
faculties and his own natural strength, can do nothing towards getting such a sense 
of divine things; but it must be wholly and entirely a work of the Sprit of God, not 
merely as assisting and co-working with natural principles, but infusing something 
above nature.75 
  
Like Aquinas, Edwards claims that human beings do not have the natural faculty 
to perceive God. Are human beings made that way or is it a result of the Fall? 
Edwards does not elaborate. As Edwards puts it, God must first put new principles 
into the human soul. It is 
 
through the saving influences of the Spirit of God, there is a new inward perception 
or sensation of their minds, entirely different in its nature and kind, from anything 
that ever their minds were the subjects of before they were sanctified.’76 
 
 However, this new inward perception is not a new faculty, but a new kind of 
our exercise of our natural faculties: 
 
So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new 
foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same 
faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new 
sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for 
a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of will.77 
 
Edwards does not elaborate on how a new exercise of the faculty is possible. In 
the case of the person born blind, a healing of the bodily organ is needed. It would 
seem strange to suggest that we have spiritual organs. How does the soul acquire new 
exercise? How many different kinds of exercises can the soul possibly have? How do 
we experimentally differentiate between a new exercise and an old exercise of the 
soul in a new way? Edwards does not answer these questions. However, the purpose 
of stressing a new kind of exercise is clear. He wants to deny the claim of the 
                                                 
75 Misc. 782, Works 13:463. 
76 Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 205. 
77 Ibid., 206 
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enthusiasts that ecstatic visions are bona fide evidence of regeneration. Those visions 
may be (or may not be) pure human imaginations.78 Imaginations can be fabricated, 
but new spiritual sense cannot be fabricated. In theory the distinction is clear; in 
practice, it is difficult to differentiate. Since we are not studying Edwards’ religious 
psychology, we shall not go further into these issues. 
We return to the questions that we raise at the beginning of the section: how can 
we defend Christian revelation in a Lockean framework? The answer by Edwards is 
both simple and controversial: divine realities are presented to the soul through the 
spiritual sense the same way as a table is presented to the soul through visual sense. 
Since the latter kind of apprehension is self-evident knowledge, Edwards claims that 
the first kind of apprehension is self-evident knowledge too. It need not be justified 
by rational arguments.79 Perhaps it cannot even be fully justified rationally. However, 
for those who have seen the glory of God, rational justification is superfluous. For 
those who have not seen the glory of God, no rational arguments can produce the 
sensible knowledge of God. 
 
B. Sensing as Deification 
We are finally ready to bring in our major theme – beauty. For Edwards, God 
presents divine beauty to our soul through our spiritual sense.80 Why does God 
present divine beauty? First, our souls are inevitably drawn to the greatest beauty, 
and God wants to draw our souls to Himself. Second, God is beauty itself. We shall 
return to the second theme in the next chapter. Here we want to know how human 
soul can participate in divine beauty. Earlier on, we have seen that Edwards 
distinguishes the knowledge of table from the knowledge of our affections. While 
our knowledge of the table is not the table itself, Edwards claims that genuine (as 
contrasted with symbolic) knowledge of affections consists of reliving those 
affections. In other words, our knowledge of the affections is exactly those affections 
themselves. Similarly, to truly know God is to have the love of divine excellency in 
our mind. We do not merely know the excellency in signs or speculatively, but we 
actually have that love dwelling in our soul.  
The next step is to claim that loving affection towards God is the essence of the 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 210-213. 
79 The fifth sign of genuine gracious affections in Religious Affections is the certainty of conviction. 
Works 2:291-311. 
80 The third sign of genuine gracious affections is that they are founded on the moral excellency of 
divine things, as distingusihed from natural excellency such as aesity. Works 2:253-266. 
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Holy Spirit. This affection is not just a product of the Holy Spirit, but it is the Holy 
Spirit: 
 
Holiness is the nature of the Spirit of God, therefore he is called in Scripture the 
Holy Ghost. Holiness, which is as it were the beauty and sweetness of the divine 
nature, is as much the proper nature of the Holy Spirit, as heat is the nature of fire.81 
 
Since the saints have holy affections, they literally have the Holy Spirit within their 
souls and partke in divine beauty:  
 
The Spirit of God so dwells in the hearts of the saints, that he there, as a seed or 
spring of life, exerts and communicates himself, in this his sweet and divine nature, 
making the soul a partaker of God’s beauty and Christ’s joy, so that the saint has 
truly fellowship with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ, in thus having the 
communion or participation of the Holy Ghost.82  
 
The Holy Spirit is holy affections. In imparting holy affections to our soul, the Spirit 
communicates himself and therefore we are made ‘partakers of divine nature.’83 We 
are not made into God. The Holy Spirit is God’s affection for himself, and our 
affection remains our affections. However, if our affections are truly holy affections, 
then it must be by participation in the nature of the Holy Spirit. 
Beside the nature of the Holy Spirit, Edwards also makes a crucial assumption 
about the nature of personhood. The assumption is an extension of his concept of 
solidity. For Edwards, the material world is essentially a set of interacting laws 
sustained by God. By analogy, the person is only the aggregation of the operations of 
the soul. At one point of his thinking, the young Edwards claims that the following: 
 
Well might Mr. Locke say that identity of person consisted in identity of 
consciousness; for he might have said that identity of spirit, too, consisted in the 
same consciousness. A mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is 
included in it. The same consciousness is to all intents and purposes the very same 
spirit of substance, as much as the same particle of matter can be the same with itself 
at different times.84 
 
If a person is ‘nothing else but consciousness, and what is included in it,’ then 
                                                 
81 Religious Affections, Works 2:201. 
82 Ibid., 2:202. 
83 II Pet. 1:4, quoted in ibid., 203. 
84 ‘Mind’ 11, Works 6:342. The reference is probably to Essay II.27.9-29, 335-348. Locke says, ‘For 
as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with the same consciousness it 
had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same 
personal self.’ (p. 336) Note the importance of memory in Locke’s definition of personhood. 
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there is no deep ego underlying the operations of the mind. The operations taken 
together are the essence of a person. However, further reflections lead to his 
retraction of such a bold assertion. In a note in the same series written after the above 
notes, Edwards assert that ‘identity of person is what seems never yet to have been 
explained.’85 Edwards goes on to muse two hypothetical questions. If God 
annihilates me, and then God recreate another individual with identical set of 
memories and other mental operations, is that person the same as I? Suppose also 
that after my annihilation, God creates two people in different parts of the universe 
with identical memory as mine when I was annihilated. Should we say that now there 
are two I’s living two separate lives? The young Edwards concludes by saying that 
the essence of identity or personhood cannot be answered.  
On the other hand, the mature Edwards believes that ‘there is no such thing as 
any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what 
depends on God’s sovereign constitution.’86 If God constitutes a set of mental acts 
(memories, affections etc.) as forming the same person, then that set of mental acts 
has the identity of one person. If God puts holy affections into the set of mental acts 
that God sovereignly constitutes as Kin, then those affections become part of the 
essence of me. I do not have divine beauty accidentally; divine beauty is an integral 
part of me. 
Edwards’ definition of personal identity can lead to bizarre consequences. Can 
God arbitrarily constitute my conscience and Britney Spears’ conscience into one 
person? Even if the fundamental reason for identity is God’s sovereign will, how do 
we discern for ourselves what God has constituted as one person? Edwards provides 
no answer to these questions. 
However, we do not need to resolve these questions. Whatever a complete 
definition might be, it will include affections as part of the essence of personhood.87 
According to Edwards, ‘the word “spirit,” most commonly in Scripture, is put for 
                                                 
85 ‘Mind’ 72, Works 6:385 
86 Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), Part IV, chapter 2, 
p. 404. In his chapter, Edwards argues that Adam and all his descendants are constituted by God to be 
one moral person. Therefore we are all guilty of Adam’s sin. To back up his argument, Edwards claims 
that all identities (e.g. the same atom, the same person) among creatures are arbitrary established by 
the laws of God.  
87 ‘And if we come even to the personal identity of created intelligent beings, though this be not 
allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i.e. same consciousness; yet I think it 
can’t be denied, that this is one thing essential to it.’ Original Sin IV.3, Works 3:398. For further 
discussion, see Paul Helm, ‘A Forensic Dilemma: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Personal 
Identity,’ in Helm and Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards, 45-60. 
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affections of the mind.’88 The spirit of a person means the affections of the mind. 
Therefore, when a person acquires loving affections towards God, these affections 
are part of her essence. Since her essence has changed, we can also say that she has a 
new human nature. In her new nature, she participates in the divine nature.  
For Edwards, loving affections toward God are essentially part of divine nature. 
‘The Holy Spirit is the act of God between the Father and the Son infinitely loving 
and delighting in each other.’89 In other words, the act of loving and delighting in the 
Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. When Edwards claims in Religious Affections 
that the Holy Spirit indwells in all saints, he is not talking metaphorically. Since true 
love for God is by essence the Holy Spirit, saints are literally partakers of divine 
essence. 
We can illustrate the perspective of Edwards by comparing it to our loving 
affections for apple. How does the love for apples become part of us? The process 
begins with our eating apples. By divine establishment, when the apples touch our 
tongues, they create a sweet favor in our soul. Then the sweet sense generates the 
loving affections towards it. In the case of our affections towards God, we have no 
natural sense that can let us taste divine beauty. Therefore, for the saints, God 
directly generates the loving affections to God in our soul. But then affections are not 
a ‘thing’ that you can put into someone’s soul. The notion of affections may be 
understood abstractly. However, there are no affections without their being the 
affections of somebody specifically. Affections are part of the essence of a person. In 
particular, loving affections toward God is part of the ontological essence of God. 
When God implants loving affections toward God in our soul, God is implanting 
God’s own love towards the God-self. That love is the Holy Spirit. 
We shall now summarize the main theme of this section: spiritual beauty is the 
ontological bridge between God and human beings. We have indicated that the 
Enlightenment worldview challenges the medieval doctrine of illumination and 
divine participation. By formulating an idealistic understanding of personhood in 
which affections stand in the center both human and divine persons, Edwards 
reinterprets the traditional doctrines with Lockean vocabularies. He reaffirms their 
credibility. Illumination is an extension of external sense to a spiritual sense, and 
divine participation is the implanting of divine affections into our soul. We have seen 
that loving affection between spiritual beings is, by definition, spiritual beauty. We 
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partake the divine nature when we hold the divine beauty and acquire the same 
beauty in our soul. 
As a footnote, we examine the metaphysical relation between God and human 
beings in Edwards. This is a perennial question for medieval mysticism. If the human 
person can truly participate in the divine person, does it mean that humanity and God 
really share the same essence? In a remarkable note, Edwards claims exactly this 
point,  
 
Many have wrong conceptions of the difference between the nature of the Deity and 
created spirits. The difference is no contrareity, but what naturally results from his 
greatness and nothing else, such as created spirits come nearer to, or more imitate, 
the greater they are in their powers and faculties. So that if we should suppose the 
faculties of a created spirit to be enlarged infinitely, there would be the Deity to all 
intents and purposes, the same simplicity, immutability, etc.90 
 
Behind this cryptic remark, Edwards seems to assume that affections and 
knowledge (‘their powers and faculties’) are the essence of spirits. Since both human 
beings and God are spiritual beings, their affections and knowledge differ only in 
quantity, not in kinds. The gap between God and all other creatures is the infinity of 
God.91 The differences between God and the spirit of human beings are that God has 
perfect knowledge and infinite affections. 
On the other hand, Edwards suggests that there is a radical break between God 
and human beings. That break is the aseity of God. All creatures have only dependent 
identity. Only God has ‘that absolute independent identity of the First Being, 
whereby “he is the same yesterday, today, and forever.”’92 The existence of all 
creatures are purely contingent. Only God has existence and identity in the God-self. 
‘Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be 
the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of God.’93 Therefore God and 
creatures are radically different in that only God has existence within himself. All 
creatures are merely expression of the power of God.  
How do we reconcile the two conflicting views? One is to say that the 
continuity is a product of the young and speculative Edwards. ‘Miscellanies’ No. 135, 
our quotation above, was written in 1724, along with earlier entries of the ‘Mind.’94 
                                                 
90 Misc. 135, Works 13:295. 
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Those early writings are full of philosophical speculations. Perhaps by the time 
Edwards wrote Original Sin in the 1750s, he had learnt to trim his speculations and 
emphasized the transcendence of God for apologetic purpose. The problem with this 
solution is that the Religious Affections was written in the mid-1740s, and the book 
represents the view of the mature Edwards. As we have seen, in that work Edwards is 
emphatic that we truly partake the divine nature. Edwards is probably unaware of the 
contradiction in his view. On the one hand, within the metaphysics of beauty, he 
believes that God and human beings share the same spiritual beauty. Since spiritual 
beauty (a kind of affection) is part of the essence of spiritual beings, Edwards is 
logically led to great continuity between God and human beings. On the other hand, 
Edwards believes in the complete sovereignty of God. That implies that only God is 
ultimate, and human beings cannot share the same ultimate nature of God. Perhaps 
Edwards can claim that aseity is actually a consequence of God’s infinity. Just as the 
infinity mass of a black hole leads to the annihilation of matter, so the infinite scale 
of being in God makes God a self-generating being. Though Edwards has much to 
say about the beauty of God, he offers little for a metaphysical theory of the aseity of 
God. We shall not try to resolve what is left unresolved by Edwards.  
On the other hand, Edwards devotes considerable effort in expounding the 
relationship between divine beauty and the Holy Spirit. This will be the topic of our 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: The Beautiful God 
‘God is God, and distinguished from all other beings, and exalted above ’em, 
chiefly by his divine beauty, which is infinitely diverse from all other beauty.’1 For 
Edwards, God is beauty itself – the archetype and source of all beauty. Our purpose 
in this chapter is to explicate the beauty of God according to Edwards. God is 
beautiful both in himself and as the redeemer of the world. In this chapter, we shall 
address the first kind of beauty. In this and the following chapters, doctrinal concern 
will be more prominent than the previous chapters. Consequently, we shall pay more 
attention to the doctrinal background of Edwards’ thinking. 
For Edwards, God is beautiful only because God is triune. Strictly speaking, 
beauty is not as attribute of the undivided divine essence. Divine beauty is a moral 
perfection of God, which is embodied in the triune life of God.2 Edwards is not eager 
to develop a complete theory about divine essence. However, the essence of God is 
what makes God’s beauty ‘infinitely diverse from all other beauty.’ In Edwards’ 
thought, the triune life of God is the bridge between God and humanity, while the 
essence of God makes clear the infinite gap between God and humanity. Before 
going into the Trinity, we shall say a few words about Edwards’ thinking on the 
divine essence. 
 
4.1. Divine Essence 
For Edwards, ‘God is a necessary being, as it is impossible but that God should 
exist, because there is no other way.’3 In his early philosophical speculations, 
Edwards claims that the statement ‘nothing exists’ is absolutely meaningless: 
 
The mind can never, let it stretch its conceptions ever so much, bring itself conceive 
of a state of perfect nothing. It puts the mind into mere convulsion and confusion to 
endeavor to think of such a state, and it contradicts the very nature of the soul to 
think that it should be.4 
                                                 
1 Religious Affections 2.5, Works 2:298. 
2 Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to say that ‘there are three stages or moments in our knowledge 
of God… the knowledge of God’s natural perfections, the knowledge of His moral perfections, and 
finally the knowledge of His beauty.’ (Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility, 133.). Delattre suggests that 
first we can know that God is holy, and then we can know the beauty of God’s holiness. For Edwards, 
if we have a sensible knowledge of God’s holiness (as opposed to a notional knowledge of it), we 
necessarily know also the beauty of this holiness. 
3 Misc. 587, Works 18:122 
4 On Being, Works 6:202. Murphey and Flower, Philosophy in America, 151, is wrong to challenge 
Edwards on the premise that he misunderstands the semantic content of the statement ‘nothing exists.’ 
Edwards does not claim that the statement ‘nothing exists’ is self-contradictory. He does not 
mistakenly assume ‘nothing’ is a subject that we can predicate attributes such as existence. His point 
is that the concept ‘absolute nothingness’ is inconceivable in our mind. To use modern modal 
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 From the necessity that something must exist, he argues that there exists a 
necessary being.5 This necessary being guarantees that absolute nothingness is an 
impossibility. It encompasses all possibilities of existence.6 God is, of course, the 
name for this necessary being.  
We can challenge Edwards on the coherence of his theistic proof on a number 
of issues. Is it coherent to talk about the ground of existence as a being similar and 
yet in contrast to all other beings?7 Is this necessary being just a pantheistic God, like 
substance in the thought of Spinoza?8 How do we know that this ground has a mind 
and a will? Edwards does not attempt to demonstrate that this necessary being has 
the usual attributes associated with God; he merely assumes it.9 We shall not pursue 
these issues further. For Edwards, these difficulties are more symptoms of our finite 
intelligence rather than the inherent intelligibility of the concept of necessary being:  
 
’Tis from the exceeding imperfect notions that we have of the nature or essence of 
God, and because we can’t think of it but we must think of it far otherwise than it is, 
                                                                                                                                          
vocabulary, Edwards claim that ‘There is nothing at all’ is not a possible world because it is not 
conceivable. 
5 Edwards muddies the water considerably by claiming that ‘space is this necessary, eternal, infinite 
and omnipresent being.… I have already said as much as that space is God’ (p. 203). Yet Edwards 
goes on to clarify that ‘all the space there is not proper to body, all the space there is without the 
bounds of the creation, all the space there was before the creation, is God himself.’ So the space that 
Edwards refers to here is not merely the physical space of the universe, but some kind of ‘space of 
existence.’ Edwards is adopting here the concept of absolute space of Henry More. See Jasper Reid, 
‘Jonathan Edwards on Space and God,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, Jl 03; 41(3): 385-403, 
for details. Reid argues that later on Edwards reversed course and rejected the concept of absolute 
space. However, he maintained throughout his life that all reality is contained in God. 
6 Edwards’ concept of necessary being is different from the contemporary of necessary being as 
expressed in, for example, Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, chapter 10. For Edwards, God is 
necessary not only in the sense of existing in every possible worlds, but God is necessary in the sense 
of being the ground for the possibility of having any worlds at all. Edwards’ argument is closer to the 
Third Way of Aquinas’ Five Ways (Summa Theologica, I.2.3) than modern modal arguments of God. 
Aquinas argues from the contingency of all beings in the world to the existence of a necessary being 
undergirding the existence of our world. 
7 Paul Tillich has raised this point prominently among theologians. See his Systematic Theology, vol. 1 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 235-241. In contrast to Tillich, Edwards wants to 
emphasize the ontological continuity between the ground of being and human beings. For Edwards, 
God is a spiritual being similar in structure to the human mind.  
8 On the Spinozian concept of God, see Alan Donagan, ‘Spinoza’s Theology,’ in Don Garrett ed., 
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 343-382. Both 
Spinoza and Edwards try to reformulate the concept of God to incorporate Cartesian concept of nature. 
It is significant that both identify the essence of God as space. Though, as we have indicated in 
footnote 5, we should not simply identify space in Edwards as physical space. 
9 Edwards does believe that God’s infinity implies God’s omnipresence, omniscience and 
immutability. Yet he also confesses that such concepts are full of logical difficulties. We cannot be 
sure of the attributes of God apart from divine revelation. (Misc. 1340, Works 23:371-2.) On this issue, 
he is closer to the Reformed schoolmen than to the medieval schoolmen. The Reformed schoolmen 
usually do not try to deduce divine attributes from theistic proofs. 
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that arises the difficulty in our mind of conceiving of God’s existence without a 
cause.10 
 
The crucial idea here is that God contains the possibility (or space) of the 
existence of all beings. All other beings derive their existence from God. In this 
sense, God includes the being of everything else. Therefore, all beauty is included 
within God. ‘Existence or entity is that into which all excellency is to be resolved.’11 
Edwards is not claiming that beauty and existence are materially the same.12 As we 
have shown before, beauty is most basically agreement. Nothing cannot agree with 
anything else. Only something existing can agree with other beings. In this sense, 
‘being and existence is what is necessarily agreeable to being.’13 The greater the 
scale of being, the greater is the potentiality for agreement: 
 
Therefore, not only may greatness be considered as a capacity of excellency, but a 
being, by reason of his greatness, considered alone, is the more excellent because he 
partakes more of being; though if he be great, if he dissents from more general and 
extensive being, or from universal being, he is the more odious for his greatness, 
because the dissent or contradiction to being in general is so much the greater.14 
 
Only beings can be beautiful; non-beings have no capacity for beauty. Since 
God is the ground of all existence, God is also the ground of beauty. All beauty is a 
participation in divine beauty firstly because a being can be beautiful only when God 
calls it into existence. However, existence itself does not produce beauty. A being 
must also assent to universal being before it can be truly beautiful.15  
For Edwards, universal being is another name for God.16  This brings us to the 
second essential divine attribute – infinity. Divine beauty is the prototype of all other 
                                                 
10 Misc. 650 
11 The Mind 62, 6:381. 
12 By contrast, Aquinas argues the being and goodness are materially the same in Summa Theologica 
I.5.1. 
13 The Mind 62, 6:381. 
14 Ibid., 6:381. 
15 Some of Delattre’s remarks on the relation between being and beauty are confusing and misleading. 
For example, he says, ‘The beauty of any being designates its ontological weight, its distance from 
nonbeing or “nothing.”’ (Beauty and Sensibility, 45.) Edwards states explicitly that ontological weight 
only gives a greater potential to beauty. Delattre also says that ‘beauty is an abiding principle of being, 
tending not only to sustain itself in being but also to nourish and enrich the universal system of being 
by bestowing being and beauty.’ (108) Delattre seems to give a self-generation power to beauty, 
similar to the effulgence of being in Neoplatonism. For Edwards, it is God alone who brings beings 
into existence out of freedom. Beauty is not a creative principle by itself. 
16 Does this make Edwards pantheistic, or panentheistic? This is Charles Hodge’s accusation against 
Edwards. See John Gerstner, The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 2 (Orlando: 
Ligonier Ministries, 1992), 10-15. Gerstner is correct in stressing that Edwards’ eschatology is 
incompatible with panentheism. As we shall see, his eschatology emphasizes divine freedom in 
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beauty because God is infinite. God is infinite in the sense that its existence includes 
the existence of everything else: 
 
The unity of Godhead will necessarily follow from God’s being infinite: for to be 
infinite is to be all, and it would be a contradiction to suppose two ALLS, because if 
there be two or more, one alone is not all but the sum of the put together are all.17 
 
Infinity is the natural corollary to God’s necessity, as understood by Edwards. 
Since all beings are dependent on God for their existence, nothing can exist outside 
God.  Outside of God is only nothing or nowhere. So God must be everywhere, or 
infinite.18 God is simply being in general. Since God is everywhere, Edwards 
deduces that there cannot be more than one God.  
As we have discussed before, Edwards differentiates between particular and 
general beauty. General beauty is ‘that by which a thing appears beautiful when 
viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with regard to all its 
tendencies, and its connections with everything it stands related to.’19 We have also 
shown that beauty for spiritual beings is love. Therefore the most general beauty for 
spiritual beings is love for being in general. Since God is being in general, the love 
for God is the highest beauty for a spiritual being. In loving God, a spiritual being 
also loves everything. There cannot be a greater love. For medieval schoolmen such 
as Duns Scotus, the infinity of God is the heart of a metaphysical theory of divine 
essence. For Edwards, the primary importance of the infinity of God is its 
implication for moral or spiritual beauty. 
 A modern reader may raise this question: can there be really a love for being in 
general? Does not love require a definite object? Is God, as being in general, really 
an object that we can love? In a way, Edwards would readily agree with such an 
objection. As we have seen, Edwards insists that divine love is supernatural. We 
cannot grasp or love God by our natural ability. True virtue is both our necessary 
duty and our morally impossible duty.20 Edwards is not troubled by this seeming 
inconsistency, and we shall not enter the debate on whether Edwards has provided a 
cogent concept of true virtue. 
                                                                                                                                          
relation to human beings. Unlike panentheism, existence does not imply participation in divine life. 
‘We may say that he is a Calvin with a metaphysical mind.’ (p. 15)  
17 Misc. 697, Works 18:281. 
18 On Being, Works 6:202. 
19 Nature of True Virtue ch. 1, Works 8:540. 
20 See the correspondence between Gillespie and Edwards in Works, 2:470-513. 
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Edwards believes that we can love God truly only when God put this love in our 
soul. Only God can grasp God as an object, and only God can have divine love 
naturally. God understands and loves himself, and these acts of understanding and 
loving form the Trinity. We shall now turn to the doctrine of the Trinity of Edwards. 
 
4.2. The Triune God 
A. Background 
In an often quoted phrase, Edwards asserts that ‘One alone, without any 
reference to any more, cannot be excellent; for in such a case there can be no manner 
of relation no way [sic.], and therefore, no such thing as consent.’21 Therefore, to 
truly appreciate the beauty of God is to participate in the triune life of God.  
Pauw22 has given us the most detail published work on Edwards’ doctrine of 
Trinity. Her main thesis is that Edwards’ Trinitarian theology is an ambidextrous 
theology. According to Pauw, Edwards employs both the social model of Trinity and 
the psychological model of Trinity. ‘Edwards appeared unconcerned to render a 
coherent biblical portrait of God or Christ.’23 Pauw believes that Edwards is to be 
recommended for leaving the two models in mutual contradistinction. ‘There is 
really no alternative to Edwards’s multi-lingual approach.’24 
Though Pauw believes both models are equally important in Edwards’ theology, 
she believes that Edwards advances beyond his Reformed heritage mainly in his 
social model.25 Pauw thinks that the Reformed schoolmen26 have let the doctrine of 
simplicity control their Trinitarian theology. Since simplicity implies unity, the 
Trinitarian images of God are hampered and left undeveloped in Reformed 
scholasticism. Edwards, while not rejecting the doctrine of simplicity outright, put 
little importance on the doctrine. In fact, he is somewhat critical of the doctrine.27 
Therefore, he is able to develop a relational ontology in which God’s beauty is 
defined in terms of relationships. In Edwards, divine excellency is exemplified not 
                                                 
21 The Mind 1, 6:337. 
22, Amy Plantinga Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards (Grand Rapid, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002). 
23 Ibid., 184; see also her summary in p.50-55. 
24 Ibid., 190. 
25 See chapter 2, ‘A Redefinition of Divine Excellency’ in ibid. 57-90. In a reply to a book review of 
her Supreme Harmony by Studebaker, Pauw retracts partially her claims.  
26 Peter van Mastricht and Francis Turretin are the most cited example in Pauw, Supreme Harmony. 
27 Ibid., 72. 
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by unity, but by diversity. This allows the more profound social image of the Trinity. 
The editor of Edwards’ Discourse on the Trinity, Lee, adopts Pauw’s thesis.28 
Pauw thesis is severely criticized by Studebaker.29  First, Studebaker questions 
whether it is appropriate to contrast a western oneness model of God with an eastern 
threeness model. Modern theologians, including Pauw, tend to associate the 
psychological model with Augustine and the social model with the Cappadocian 
Fathers. They assert that the Augustinian model begins with and accentuates the 
unity of God, while the Cappadocian model begins with and accentuates the 
threeness of God. Studebaker questions the historical reliability of such a paradigm. 
He asserts that the main concern of Augustine is the unity of operations rather than 
unity of essence. His concern is actually similar to that of the Cappadocian Fathers.30 
In particular, the analogy of three human persons is regarded by Gregory of Nyssa as 
a distortion of orthodox doctrine.31 It is not clear in what sense the Cappadocian 
conception of the Trinity is more social than the Augustinian conception. While 
Pauw cites the formula of the Fourth Lateran Council as an example of the triumph 
of the oneness of God over the threeness of God, Studebaker points out that the same 
formula also contains explicit reference to the threeness of God.32 It is beyond our 
concern to assess the history of the doctrine of Trinity. We share Studebaker’s 
concern that the oneness-threeness paradigm is too often adopted uncritically.33  
Like Pauw, we shall examine how Edwards develops the traditions that he grew 
up with. We shall give a brief survey of the doctrine of Trinity in Reformed 
scholasticism. Edwards is both faithful to the framework of scholastic theology that 
nurtured him, and creative in the way he develops this framework.  
We begin with a correction to Pauw’s reading of Reformed scholasticism. She 
claims that the importance of the doctrine of simplicity inhibits the development of a 
social image of the Trinity.34 She also claims that, since Edwards explicitly claims 
that there is a triplicity in God,35 he contradicts Turretin’s claim that triplicity is 
                                                 
28 Sang Hyun Lee, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works 21:22-27. 
29 Steven Michael Studebaker, Jonathan Edwards' Social Augustinian Trinitarianism: A Criticism of 
and an Alternative to Recent Interpretations, Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 2003. See 
especially chapter two.  
30 Ibid., 91-99. 
31 On ‘Not Three Gods,’ NPNF, series 2, vol. 5, The Ultimate Christian Library [Windows DVD], 
(Rio, WI: AGES Software, 2000), 649-653. 
32 Studebaker, Social Augustinian Trinitarianism, 97-8. Pauw, Supreme Harmony, 26. 
33 Studebaker, Social Augustinian Trinitarianism, 83-7, gives a succinct summary of theology of 
modern social trinitarian theologians. 
34 Pauw, Supreme Harmony, 66-68.  
35 Misc. 94, Works 13:262. 
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opposed to the simplicity of God.36 If we read the passage referred to by Pauw in its 
totality, we shall find that there is no contradiction after all: 
 
Simplicity and triplicity are so mutually opposed that they cannot subsist at the same 
time (but not simplicity and Trinity because they are said in different respects): 
simplicity in respect to essence, but Trinity in respect to persons. In this sense, 
nothing hinders God (who is one in essence) from being three persons. 37 
 
In Turretin, triplicity refers to either three gods or three parts of Gods. In 
Edwards, triplicity refers to three persons in God. Turretin explicitly states that the 
simplicity of God is consistent with the doctrine of Trinity. Simplicity is an attribute 
of God’s essence, while the Trinity is about God’s mode of existence. In fact, 
Turretin claims that the Socinians deny the doctrine of simplicity in order to discredit 
the doctrine of Trinity.38 Since the doctrine of simplicity asserts that there are no 
accidents in God, it follows that the relations between the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit are no mere accidents. The Trinitarian relations together constitute the divine 
essence. The Trinity is not a matter of the number of Gods, because quantity cannot 
be part of the essence of a being. (For example, the number of people on earth plays 
no role in defining the essence of a human person.) The Trinity is about the essence, 
not the number of God.39 Richard A. Muller summarizes the relationship between the 
doctrine of simplicity and Trinity in Reformed scholasticism as following: 
 
In short, the plurality of persons in God does not contravene the divine simplicity, 
but can even be said to imply it. As far as the seventh-century orthodox are 
concerned, moreover, the doctrine of divine simplicity is a corollary and support of 
the doctrine of the Trinity: in the polemics of the day, in fact, the Vorstian and 
Socinian denials of simplicity were directly connected with the affirmation of an 
alternative, seemingly tritheistic view in Vorstius’ case and with an overt 
antitrinitarianism in case of the Socinians.40 
 
                                                 
36 Pauw, Supreme Harmony, 69-70. Studebaker does a similar re-examination in Social Augustinian 
Trinitarianism, 103-105. Our discussion differs from him in emphasizing the doctrine of simplicity is 
actually regarded by Reformed scholasticism as a defence of the doctrine of Trinity. 
37 Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1,  tran. George M. Giger, ed. James T. 
Dennison (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1992), III.7.9, 193. 
38 Ibid. III.7.1, 191. 
39 Turretin does not formulate the connection between simplicity and the divine persons. The classic 
statement of this viewpoint is Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.28.2, p.369-371. 
40 Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, c.a. 
1520 to ca. 1725, vol.3, The Divine Essence and Attributes (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2003), 
282. 
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Pauw is correct to point out that neither Reformed scholasticism nor the 
Puritans develop a social conception of the Trinity. However, it is dubious to claim 
that the reason is the doctrine of simplicity. The social model is not considered and 
rejected for theological reasons; it is neglected because it serves no useful functions 
in the Reformed tradition. Edwards does have some problems with the scholastic 
doctrine of simplicity,41 but this is not related to his desire to develop a social model 
of Trinity.  
In general, Reformed scholasticism is rather circumspect in using any model to 
describe the immanent Trinity. Neither the Augustinian model nor the social model 
plays a significant role in the Reformed scholastic doctrine of Trinity. Reformed 
scholasticism does use different analogies (the sun and its rays is one of the most 
popular) to illustrate the Trinity. However, they are merely heuristic device, not to be 
raised to the level of doctrinal statement: 
 
The orthodox, thus, feel that dogmatic discussion of the Trinity is mandated by 
revelation even though the doctrine be an impenetrable mystery  and that, further, 
the revelation, insofar as it can be understood, must be illustrated or explicated with 
the tools of reason. The illustrations, however, cannot be considered any more than 
very limited aids to understanding: here the epistemological side of the Reformed 
non capax comes to the fore.42 
 
We may take Turretin’s discussion of the Trinity as typical of the teachings 
received by Edwards.43 Turretin begins with clarification of terms such as essence, 
person, homoousia and emperichoresis.44 The main concern for Turretin is to claim, 
against the Socinians and Remonstrants, that the Trinity is a fundamental doctrine 
necessary for salvation.45 Then Turretin defines the doctrine of Trinity as followings: 
                                                 
41 Studebaker, Social Augustinian Trinitarianism, 108-113. 
42 Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed 
Orthodoxy, c.a. 1520 to ca. 1725, vol.4, The Trinity of God (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2003), 
153. See 157-167 for the reservations in Reformed scholasticism to the idea of vestigia trinitatis in 
creation. 
43 On the divinity textbooks used by Puritans in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, see 
Perry Miller, New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 96-7. Ames, Wollebius and Mastricht were all popular during this period. Edwards mentioned 
Turretin four times in his letters to Joseph Bellany. In one, he recommended Turretin and particularly 
Mastricht to Bellany as excellent textbook on divinity(No. 73, Works 16:217). In another, he sent the 
books of Mastricht and Turretin to Bellany (No. 76 16:223). In the other two, he asked Bellany to 
bring Turretin’s book back to him so that he could consult it (No. 91, 16:266; No. 224, 16:701). 
Edwards also refers to Turretin in his private musings on soteriological issues (Misc. 292, 13:384; 
Misc. 706, 18:327). Both Mastricht and Turretin would be excellent guide to doctrinal teachings 
received by Edwards. We choose Turretin because it is easily accessible to modern readers. 
44 Turretin, Intitutes III.23.1-30, 1:253-260. 
45 Ibid. III.24.1-11, 1:261-265. 
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 in the one only and most simple essence of God there are three distinct persons so 
distinguished from each other by incommunicable properties or modes of subsisting 
that one cannot be the other  although by an inexpressible circum-insession 
(emperichrsin) they always remain and exist in each other mutually.46 
 
Turretin deliberately uses traditional and abstract vocabularies so that the 
mystery of the Trinity remains a mystery with his definition. He claims that various 
similitudes from the human soul or the sun are only obscure analogies.47 While 
Turretin cites copious Scripture verses to substantiate the doctrine of the Trinity,48 he 
refuses to suggest any rational ground for believing the Trinity. While he does 
employ the traditional vocabulary of generation and procession, he emphasizes that 
any model cannot explain those terms: 
 
That this procession differs from the generation of Son cannot be denied because 
they are different persons who stand related to each other in origin. But the nature of 
this distinction cannot be explained and may more safely be unknown than inquired 
into.… I know that the Scholastics wish to derive this difference from the operation 
of the intellect (modum intellectus)  hence he is called the Wisdom of God; but 
procession by way of the will (modum voluntatis)  hence he is called Love and 
Charity. But as this is unsupported by Scripture, so it entangles rather than explains 
the thing.49 
 
What does it mean to say that the Father, Son and Spirit are different persons? 
What is a person? Turretin explains: 
 
Thus the person may be said to differ from the essence not really (realiter), i.e. 
essentially (essentialiter) as thing and thing, but modally (modaliter)  as a mode 
from the thing (modus a re).50 
 
In other words, the three persons of the Trinity are three modes of subsisting of 
the one divine essence. But what are modes? Could there have been four modes of 
subsisting in God? Turretin does not provide further answers. He emphasizes that the 
                                                 
46 Ibid. III.25.1, 1:265. 
47 Ibid. III.25.4, 1:266. 
48 Ibid. III.25.7-13, 1:267-270; III.26.4-11, 1:273-277;  
49 Ibid. III.31.3, 1:309. We can cite John Owen as another example of agnosticism concerning the 
meaning of procession. Owen, a Puritan divine familiar to Edwards, writes a two-volume tome on the 
person and wok of the Holy Spirit. Yet he claims that the manner of immanent procession is 
incomprehensible to saints on earth (PNEUMATOLOGIA: A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, 
Works of John Owen, ed, William Goold, 3:156, pages number according to Ultimate Christian 
Library (DVD).) Edwards cites Owen’s Discourse on Holy Spirit in Misc. 1047 to support the notion 
that the Holy Spirit is the love and the blessedness of God. 
50 Ibid. III.27.3, 1:278. 
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differences between the modes of subsisting are real and positive, but it cannot be 
explained.51 The major concern of Turretin is that we should reject both Sabellianism 
and Tritheism.52 Turretin is wary of using any model to explain the Trinity. He is 
contented to repeat the orthodox formula of ‘one essence in three persons.’  
There are Reformed schoolmen who adopt the Augustinian model of Trinity. 
William Ames, for example, claims that  
 
The Father is, as it were, Deus intelligens, God understanding; the Son who is the 
express image of the Father is Deus intellectus, God understood; and the Holy Spirit, 
flowing and breathed from the Father through the Son, is Deus dilectus.’53 
 
However, Ames does not develop this analogy into a theology of the inter-
Trinitarian life or a model of our spirituality. As a minority, Keckermann and 
Ainsworth use the Augustinian model to defend the reasonableness of the Trinity.54 
The majority of the Reformed schoolmen rejects philosophical defense of the 
doctrine of Trinity.55 
 
B. The Psychological Model 
We have examined the theological background to Edwards’ doctrine of Trinity. 
It is time to turn to Edwards. We shall not examine all aspects of his doctrine.56 Our 
focus is the relationship between the Trinity and beauty. Compared with Reformed 
scholasticism or the Puritan tradition, Edwards is very bold in developing a 
speculative theology of the Trinity. His breakthrough with the Puritan tradition is not 
in the development of a social model of Trinity. His breakthrough is in using a 
philosophical model to explain the immanent Trinity. Moreover, the inter-Trinitarian 
dynamics becomes the archetype for the spiritual life of the saints. The beauty of the 
Trinity also binds God and humanity together. 
The young Edwards asserts that ‘it is within the reach of naked reason to 
perceive certainly that there are three distinct in God, each of which is the same 
[God], three that must be distinct.’57 For Edwards, the psychological model of Trinity 
                                                 
51 Ibid. III.27.14-5, 1:280. 
52 Ibid. III.27.9, 1:279. 
53 William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, tran. John Dystra Eusden (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 
1968), 89. 
54 Muller, Trinity of God, 163, 
55 Ibid., 167. 
56 Studebaker has given a detail exposition in Social Augustinian Trinitarianism, 186-245. 
57 Misc. 94, Works 13:257. According to the chronology of Schafer (Works 13:94), Edwards was 
merely 20 years old when he penned this note. According to Schafer again (13:256, fn. 2), there was a 
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is not merely illustrative; it is demonstrative of the reasonableness of the Trinity. In 
order to illustrate the logic of Edwards in explaining the generation of the Son, we 
shall quote Edwards at length: 
 
The Almighty’s knowledge is not so different from ours, but that ours is the image 
of [it]. It is by an idea, as ours is, only his [is] infinitely perfect. If it were not by idea, 
it is in no respect like ours; ’tis not what we call knowledge, nor anything whereof 
knowledge is the resemblance; for the whole of human knowledge, both in the 
beginning and end of it, consists in ideas.… But yet it would suppose imperfection 
in God, to suppose that God’s idea of himself is anything different from himself.… 
The immediate object of the mind’s intuition is the idea always, and the soul 
receives nothing but ideas; but God’s intuition of himself, without doubt, is 
immediate. But ’tis certain it cannot be, except his idea be his essence, for his idea is 
the immediate object of his intuition. An absolutely perfect idea of a thing is the very 
thing, for it wants nothing that is in the thing, substance nor nothings else.58 
 
Edwards begins by asserting that God’s way of knowing must be similar to ours. 
Our mind operates spiritually, and Edwards assumes that spiritual operations in 
human beings and in God do not differ qualitatively. Since human beings know an 
object through ideas, Edwards believes that God knows in a similar way too. The 
difference is not in the way of knowing, but in the clarity of the ideas. God perceives 
all ideas in its full clarity, while human beings often have only opaque ideas. In 
particular, our ideas of other spiritual beings are always mediated. I do not know 
immediately what you are thinking. I can only know your thinking through your 
speech. You describe your thinking with words, and I reconstruct your thinking in 
my mind through interpreting your words. For God, he knows your thinking 
immediately. God can literally think your thoughts while you are thinking about 
them. God also knows his own thought completely, and his thoughts know God 
completely. The idea of a table is not the same as a table, because a table is not a 
spiritual object. The ideas that belong to a spiritual being are the essence of those 
spiritual beings. In other words, a spiritual being is simply its thoughts and affections. 
For human beings, we do not fully understand even our own thoughts, nor are we 
fully aware of all our own affections. We can know ourselves through imperfect self-
                                                                                                                                          
fierce debate on the doctrine of Trinity at that time among Samuel Clarke, Isaac Watts and others. All 
the parties were eager to avoid what were regarded as speculations. Against this background, the 
rationalism of Edwards is even more remarkable. Edwards developed his thoughts on the immanent 
Trinity most carefully in Discourse on the Trinity (Works 21: 109-144), written in early 1730s. Since 
this does not reflect significant departure from Misc. 94, we shall integrate Misc. 94 and the Discourse 
in our discussion. 
58 Ibid., Works 13:257-8. 
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reflection. By contrast, God’s knowledge of himself is immediate and complete. 
God’s knowledge contains completely and perfectly all of God’s thoughts and 
affections. It is in fact God again.59 
For illustration, we may compare Edwards’ approach to Aquinas. Aquinas 
claims that, though God knows all other things by ideas, God does not know himself 
through ideas.60 For Aquinas, ideas are plans through which God creates everything 
else. Ideas are the essence of earthly objects, in the sense that the idea of a table in 
the divine mind defines whether a particular object is a table. For God, essence and 
existence are identical. So God’s essence cannot be given an abstract definition (or in 
Aquinas’ terminology, God does not belong to any genera). The definition of the 
divine nature is simply what God actually is. Therefore God is not known through 
ideas. Aquinas describes the Son as the thoughts that proceed from the thinking of 
God.61 The focus is not on what God is thinking about, but on the thinking process. 
To explain why the thinking of God is itself God again, Aquinas invokes the 
principle of simplicity.62 If God’s acts are different from the nature of God, then 
there is potentiality in God. Therefore God’s operation must itself be part of the 
divine essence. Therefore, the thinking of God is also God. The Word of God, as the 
thinking of God, contains the forms or ideas of all creatures. Thus the Word is a 
mediator ontologically between the Father and the world.63 
Edwards does not operate with the paradigm of potentiality and act, and 
simplicity is not as important for his theology of divine nature. He adopts the 
epistemology of Locke, and he creatively projects it into the inner life of the Trinity. 
He extends the meaning of ideas to all mental objects, not just impressions received 
                                                 
59 Is Edwards’ argument logically cogent? Oliver Crisp (‘Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity and 
Individuation,’ paper presented at the Rutherford House Dogmatic Conference 2005) argues that 
Edwards’ theory suffers from the problem of ‘the third man.’ If God has an idea of himself, he can 
also have an idea of that idea of himself, and the process can go on forever, giving us infinite Sons of 
God. Yet Edwards does not claim that the Son is an idea of a certain thought about God or any 
particular object. The Son is God’s idea of the whole thinking and willing process. Even when God 
has an idea of the idea of his thinking process, this idea still belongs to God’s thinking process. It is 
not a separate thinking process, therefore not a separate Son. In Kantian idealism, the apperception of 
the transcendental ego is very tricky question (see Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, ch. 13). 
Implicitly, Edwards claims that God can have experiential knowledge of the divine transcendental ego, 
something impossible for a human thinking subject.  Crisp raises other important issues that we 
cannot go into now. I think that while Edwards model has its problems, but it is not logically 
incoherent. 
60 Summa Theologica I.15.1.ro2. 
61 Ibid. I.27.1. 
62 Ibid. I.27.2.ro2. 
63 Ibid. I.34.3. 
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through physical sensations.64 Insofar as something can be grasped mentally as an 
object, it is grasped through ideas. For example, our affections can be known 
mentally through self-reflection. As discussed in a previous chapter, Edwards 
believes that a true idea (as contrasted with mere notions) of an affection is having 
that same affection in our mind again at the moment of self-reflection. With this 
conception of ideas, Edwards can claim that even God know himself through ideas. 
Insofar as God can be known concretely (not abstractly or notionally), God is also 
known through ideas. There is no other alternative within Edwards’ epistemology. 
By focusing on God’s self-knowledge (as opposed to God’s thinking in general), 
Edwards constructs speculatively the Son as a divine person. Since the Son is God’s 
self-knowledge, the Son does not serve as an ontological link between the Father and 
the world in the thought of Edwards.65 
If the Son is the self-knowledge of God, the Spirit is the self-love of God66:  
 
Again, that image of God which God infinitely loves and has his chief delight in, is 
the perfect idea of God. It has always been said, that God’s infinite delight consists 
in reflecting on himself and viewing his own perfections, or which is the same thing, 
in his own perfect idea of himself; so that ’tis acknowledged, that God’s infinite love 
is to, and  his infinite delight in, the perfect image of himself.67  
 
The Holy Spirit is the act of God between the Father and the Son infinitely loving 
and delighting in each other.… This is certainly distinct from the other two; the 
delight and energy that is begotten in us by an idea is distinct from the idea.… It is 
distinct from each of the other two, yet it is God; for the pure and perfect act of God 
                                                 
64 On Edwards’ extension of Lockean ideas into imaginations or non-physical impressions, see Lee, 
Philosophical Theology, 115-146. 
65 Lee claims that Edwards’ conception of the Trinity is dispositional and inherently dynamic. Lee 
believes that Edwards breaks new ground from traditional conception of Trinity in terms of static 
actuality (Philosophical Theology, 185-195). The problem with Lee’s interpretation that the traditional 
conception of Trinity – as exemplified by Aquinas – is dynamic by nature too. When Aquinas claims 
that God is pure act, by definition God is always acting. The Trinity is the internal acting (thinking 
and willing) of God in both Aquinas and Edwards. Lee claims that the traditional doctrine of Trinity is 
obscured by divine impassibility. Therefore, there is a divorce between the doctrine of Trinity and 
Christian life (‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works 21:3). This is a debatable assessment. For medieval 
theologians like Aquinas, the doctrine of the Trinity is closely tied to the theology of the divine image 
in human beings. This divine image is the foundation of medieval mystical theology. As far as 
Edwards is concerned, there is no evidence that he wants to revise traditional understanding of divine 
aseity. For further critique of the bifurcation between a traditional static God and the dynamic God of 
Edwards, see Holmes, ‘Does Jonathan Edwards Use a Dispositional Ontology?’ 
66 Edwards’ doctrine of Holy Spirit is discussed in details by Robert Caldwell, The Holy Spirit as the 
Bond of Union in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Ph.D. dissertation, Trinity Evangelical Divinity 
School, 2003. We shall limit ourselves to issues where the concept of beauty is important. Caldwell (p. 
52-55) agrees with Studebaker (pace Pauw) that Edwards works within the Augustinian model. 
67 Misc. 94, Works 13:259. 
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is God, because God is pure act. It appears that this is God, because that which acts 
perfectly is all act, and nothing but act.68 
 
The Holy Spirit is the love between God and his perfect self-image. It is the 
perfect self-love of a perfect being. To put it crudely, it is the perfect narcissism.69 
For illustration, we may bring in Aquinas again. Aquinas also believes that the name 
of the Holy Spirit is love, and the Father and Son love one another by the Holy 
Spirit.70 However, the Holy Spirit also has the name ‘Gift.’ It is the essence of love to 
give, as Scripture tells us that the Father has given the Son in love.71 In eternality, the 
Holy Spirit is the love between the Father and the Son because only God exists 
eternally. However, it is significant that Aquinas does not deny that God’s love for 
the world is also embodied by the Holy Spirit. Edwards, on the other hand, calls 
specifically the Holy Spirit as love for God. Holy Spirit is not the spirit of love in 
general. For example, he never associates brotherly love between human beings as 
work of the Spirit according to his nature.  
Does it seem blasphemous to suggest that God is engaged in a perfect act of 
narcissism? Edwards believes that self-love, in a broad sense, is not evil at all. It is 
merely the capacity of a spiritual being to take delight in an object: 
 
But if he is capable of inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and 
chooses, is grateful to him; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the 
good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far it is grateful or pleasing to 
him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness.72 
 
Self-love is a man’s love of his own pleasure and happiness, and hatred of his own 
misery; or rather, ’tis only a capacity of enjoyment or taking delight in anything. For 
to say a man loves his own happiness and pleasure, is only to say that he delights in 
what he delights [in]; and to say that he hates his own misery, is only to say that he 
is grieved or afflicted in his own affliction.73 
 
Insofar as a spiritual being inclines towards whatever delights him, this is self-
love in the broad sense. The greater a spiritual being is, the greater is his capacity for 
self-love. Edwards believes that this is simply the natural constitution of spiritual 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 13:260. 
69 Matless and Lee, who emphasize the centrality of relationship in Edwards’ thinking, fail to 
appreciate that it is not relationship per se that is beautiful in Edwards’ thinking. It is always 
relationship in reference to God. 
70 Summa Theologica I.37.1-2.  
71 Ibid. I.28.1.ro2. 
72 Nature of True Virtue ch.4, Works 8:576 
73 Misc. 530, Works 18:73. 
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beings to incline towards what is perceived as good.74 Self-love in this broad sense is 
the source of all other kinds of love. Given that self-love in this sense is not bad, can 
self-love in a narrow sense be justified? Self-love in the narrow sense is the loving of 
oneself, and Edwards clearly condemns this kind of self-love in human beings.75 
Why is the case different for God?  
We need to recall Edwards’ definition of true virtue: 
 
…the primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered; or that true virtue 
primarily consists, not in love to any particular beings, because of their virtue or 
beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart 
to Being simply considered; exciting “absolute Benevolence” (if I may so call it) to 
Being in general.76 
 
As we have shown in the last section, infinity is the primary property of God in 
Edwards’ thought. God is the ground of all beings. God is ground both in the sense 
of being the original source of all beings, and in the sense that God supports the 
existence of all beings at every moment. It is impossible for God to be selfish. ‘This 
is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own 
essence. The first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, Being in general; 
and comprehends universal existence.’77 In loving the God-self, God also loves every 
being. Far from carrying a bad connotation, self-love is a virtue for God. If God is 
good, God must love himself: 
 
From hence also it is evident that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, 
must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which 
subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead, or 
that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another.78 
 
We have seen that the beauty of spiritual beings consists in virtuous affections. 
Therefore, the Holy Spirit is the beauty of God: 
 
Holy Ghost is divine beauty, love and joy.79   
 
This makes the third, the personal Holy Spirit or the holiness of God, which is his 
infinite beauty, and this is God’s infinite consent to being in general.80 
                                                 
74 Edwards’ theory of human choices is remarkably similar to Aquinas. The will always follows what 
the intellect perceives as the greatest good. See Studebaker, 164-184. 
75 See, for example, ‘Charity Contrary to a Selfish Spirit,’ in Charity and Its Fruits, Works, 8:252-271.  
76 True Virtue ch.1, Works 8:544. 
77 End of Creation, Works 8:461. 
78 True Virtue ch.2, Works 8:557. 
79 Discourse on the Trinity, Works 21:144. 
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’Tis peculiar to God that He has beauty within himself, consisting in being’s 
consenting with his own being, or the love of himself in his own Holy Spirit; 
whereas the excellence of others is in loving others, in loving God, and in the 
communications of his Spirit.81 
 
For Edwards, true spiritual beauty is the love of Being simply considered. 
Besides God, nothing can be Being simply considered. For all finite beings, they 
must love more than themselves. Therefore their beauty is judged in relation to their 
relationship to something outside of themselves. God is Being simply considered. 
For God, self-love is God’s love for Being simply considered. Therefore, God has 
‘beauty within himself.’ His beauty is included within himself. Moreover, the beauty 
of God is the archetype of all beauty. Beauty is the consent of being to being. In God, 
the infinite Being consents to the infinite Being. Any consent of particular being to 
any particular being is included in the consent of the Infinite to the Infinite. Since 
love for particular objects can be beautiful only if it is pursued in accordance to love 
for Being simply considered, all spiritual beauty must implicitly be the love of God. 
The Holy Spirit is the perfect love from God to God. When God communicates the 
Holy Spirit to spiritual beings, God communicates beauty too. One cannot truly 
receive the Spirit without at the same time receiving spiritual beauty. 
Does that mean that particular objects or the love of particular objects cannot be 
beautiful? The answer is that, in Edwards’ thinking, the beauty of a particular object 
cannot be answered apart from the context of the totality of being. As we have 
indicated, a knife may be beautiful to look at. It will turn into an ugly thing if it is 
used for killing. However, the knife may be beautiful if the killing is somehow 
mandated by God (e.g. Abraham’s knife for the slaughter of Isaac).  
A similar case applies to our affections. Edwards emphasizes that ‘a Christian 
spirit is not contrary to all self-love.’82 This self-love becomes corrupt only when he 
loves himself too much when compared with others, or when he places too much of 
his happiness on things confined to himself. We should love things according to their 
ontological weight. We should love people more than things. Since God has formally 
all the ontological weight, we should love God above all things. 
 
C. The Social Model 
                                                                                                                                          
80 Mind 45.9, Works 6:364. 
81 Mind 45.12, Works 6:365 
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So far, we have emphasized that the Trinity is a self-reflective movement. This 
obviously runs counter to a social model of the Trinity. We admit that there are other 
passages from Edwards that suggest a more interpersonal form of love within the 
Trinity: 
 
No reasonable creature can be happy, we find, without society and communion, not 
only because he finds something in others that is not in himself, but because he 
delights to communicate himself to another.… So that we may conclude, that 
Jehovah’s happiness consists in communion, as well as the creature’s.83 
 
From the above passage, we see that Edwards considers the Son as ‘another’ to 
God the Father. Strictly speaking, God’s love for the God-self is not narcissism, 
because what God loves is the idea of himself, not himself directly. Similarly, God is 
loved by his own idea. Moreover, since everything is virtually in God, God also 
loves everything in loving himself. God also loves all the saints through Christ the 
Head of the church.84 However, the ‘another’ in Edwards’ Trinity should be 
distinguished from the concept of ‘others’ usually championed by social 
trinitarianism. The Son does not have a separate intellect and will from the Father. 
The Son and Father are totally transparent to one another. Within the immanent 
Trinity, any dialogue (in the sense of revealing to and learning from one another) 
between the Father and the Son is neither necessary nor possible. As we shall see, the 
case is somewhat different when Edwards comes to the economic Trinity. 
Lee has a different interpretation of the Trinitarian model of Edwards: 
 
With his dispositional argument for the real distinctions, however, Edwards has 
transformed the psychological analogy into a perspective that clearly emphasizes the 
three-ness of the Trinitarian persons. His use of the psychological analogy ends up 
reinforcing the social analogy, or at least makes the two analogies compatible.85 
 
How is the psychological model transformed into the social model? First, Lee 
cites the following textual evidence: 
 
They are equal in honor besides the honor which is common to ’em all, viz. that they 
are all God; each has his peculiar honor in the society or family.86 
 
                                                 
83 Misc. 96, Works 13:264. 
84 ‘Sermon Fifteen: Heaven is a World of Love,’ Charity, Works 8:373. 
85 ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works, 21:19. 
86 Discourse on the Trinity, Works 21:135; cited in ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works, 21:20. 
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Secondly, Lee claims that Edwards has a different understanding of the divine 
essence:  
 
For Edwards, ‘there is no substance lying behind God’s self-repeating and self-
communicating activities. Direct existence, reflexive knowing, and reflexive loving 
do not belong to the Divine Being but rather are, and constitute, the Divine Being. 
The divine disposition is the general law that governs their pattern. This divine 
disposition is an abiding reality apart from its exercises. 87 
 
Thirdly, Lee claims that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have their own separate will 
and mind. He quotes the following passage from Edwards: 
 
There is understanding and will in the Father, as the Son and the Holy Ghost are in 
him and proceed from [him]. There is understanding and will in the Son, as he is 
understanding and as the Holy Ghost is in him and proceeds from him. There is 
understanding and will in the Holy Ghost, as he is the divine will and as the Son is in 
him.88 
 
Lee claims that the above passage shows that Edwards has moved from a unitary 
conception of the Trinity to a perichoretic formulation of the Trinity. 
How strong is the case of Lee? While Edwards uses words such as ‘family’ or 
‘society,’ we have to interpret these words within the context of his theology. Within 
his immanent Trinity, this is a family of the different aspects of the same subject. The 
bond of the Trinitarian family is not mutual love among the three independent 
persons. Edwards emphatically points out that, in Scripture, ‘we never once read 
either of the Father or the Son loving the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit loving either of 
them.’89 The reason is that the Spirit is the love between the Father and the Son. 
Similarly, the Son does not know the Father like the way we know another person; 
the Son is simply God’s self-knowledge. The bond of the Trinitarian family is the 
one subjectivity of the Father. 
Our argument is actually confirmed by the passage quoted by Lee in his third 
argument. In that passage, Edwards argues that the Son has will because the Spirit is 
in him. The Spirit has understanding because the Son is in him. In other words, there 
is no separate will of the Son independent of the will of Father, which is the Spirit. 
Similarly, right after the quoted passage, Edwards says that it should not be ‘looked 
upon as a strange and unreasonable figment that the persons should be said to have 
                                                 
87 ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Works 21:20. 
88 Discourse on the Trinity, Works 21:134; cited in  ‘Editor’s Introd/uction,’ Works, 21:27. 
89 Treatise on Grace, Works 21:186. 
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an understanding or love by another person’s being in ’em.’90 Edwards claims that 
this is warranted by Scripture, because Scripture claims that the Father has wisdom 
by the Son’s being in him. Edwards does claim that ‘all the three are persons, for 
they all have understanding and will.’91 However, they all have the same 
understanding and will; the three persons form the same subject. 
As for Lee’s second argument, a full answer will take us too far from our 
concern. Nonetheless, we believe that Lee’s picture needs to be corrected. First, the 
traditional concept of God does not say that thinking and loving belong to the divine 
substance. Aquinas clearly states that the triune relations are the essence of God: 
 
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His 
essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that 
regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear 
that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the 
same.92 
 
Even in Aquinas, there is no substance lying behind the thinking and loving of God. 
To use the terminology of Lee, Aquinas also believes that the divine act of thinking 
and loving constitutes the divine substance. This is the implication of simplicity. As 
we have indicated above, Edwards does depart from Aquinas by emphasizing that 
thinking and loving are self-reflexive. That would hardly argue for a social analogy 
of the Trinity. The crucial claim of Lee is that ‘divine disposition is an abiding reality 
apart from its exercises.’ In other words, the divine essence is constituted by divine 
disposition, but divine disposition is not exhausted by divine acts. This dispositional 
God is not pure act, but pure disposition. The consequence is that God’s being can be 
enlarged by further acts without changing its essence. Lee claims that creation is an 
act that enlarges God’s being.93 As a crude analogy, we may define a running 
machine as a machine that has the disposition to run fast. It is not identical with all 
the races it has run yet. It can always enlarge its life by another race. Similarly, Lee 
claims that God has the disposition to communicate. This disposition is not 
exhausted by the immanent Trinity. The creation is the further act coming from the 
divine disposition to communicate. Thus the creation enlarges the being of God. 
                                                 
90 Discourse on the Trinity, Works 21:134. 
91 Ibid., 134. 
92 Summa Theologica I.28.2, p.371. 
93 See also Philosophical Theology, 184. We shall return to this issue in the context of heaven in 
chapter six. 
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We have textual evidence that runs against Lee’s claim. In order to answer the 
question why the Holy Spirit is God again, Edwards claims that ‘the pure and perfect 
act of God is God, because God is pure act.’94 This self-love is God again because 
the act of God is also God. God is ‘nothing but act.’95 The text argues against a 
distinction between dispositions and their exercise within God. This would also go 
again Edwards’ thought to say the Holy Spirit is merely a disposition to act. The 
Spirit is the act of love.  
It is indeed true that Edwards claims that God is by nature communicative. In an 
often quoted passage, Edwards says that ‘a disposition in God, as an original 
property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited 
him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last 
end of creation.’96 What does divine disposition mean? Edwards gives the analogy of 
the root of a tree. It is the natural disposition of the root to diffuse life and sap.97 This 
would suggest that creation is not a voluntary choice of God. The root does not 
consciously choose to support the fruits. An involuntary creation would run against 
Edwards’ Reformed heritage. A more appropriate interpretation would take 
disposition as action that befits the character of God. In other words, such action is 
delightful to God. Edwards claims that ‘if God both esteem and delight in his own 
perfections and virtues, he can’t but value and delight in the expressions and genuine 
effects of them.’98 When Edwards claims that there is a disposition in God to 
emanate his own full ad extra, he probably means that it is delightful to God to 
communicate his fullness ad extra. 
What is the fullness that God delights in communicating? First, it is the exercise 
of God’s infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. The second is the knowledge of 
God’s glory. The third is the delight or love of divine glory.99 Though Edwards does 
not say it explicitly, the first fullness corresponds to the Father, who is the source of 
all acts. The second fullness corresponds to the Son, who is God’s self-knowledge. 
                                                 
94 Misc. 94, Works 13:260. 
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similar to the medieval concept of simplicity. His misgivings about the doctrine of simplicity (Works 
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The third corresponds to the Holy Spirit, who is the God’s self-love. It is the inter-
Trinitarian life that is communicated ad extra. 
 
D. Creation and the Trinity 
Finally, we return briefly to Edwards’ theology of creation and spiritual 
theology in order to show some implications of his Trinitarian theology.100 Edwards 
believes that the goal of creation is the emanation of the intra-Trinitarian life. Since 
this life is the life of personal subjectivity, its emanation would imply creatures with 
personality. In order for the Son’s life to be duplicated, there must be knowledge in 
creation. Therefore it is natural for Edwards to argue that the goal of the material 
world is to be known by immortal souls. The significance of the material is that it 
shows the wisdom of the Father. The Son can appreciate the Father’s perfections 
directly; human beings appreciate the Father’s perfections indirectly through creation. 
The theology of the Son as self-knowledge corresponds to the theology of creation as 
a messenger for divine perfections. Similarly, the Holy Spirit as the self-love of God 
corresponds to the theology that the Holy Spirit is the divine love in the saints. God’s 
self-love is duplicated in the saints’ love for God. 
We should note that this extension of intra-Trinitarian life is not automatically 
associated with creation and existence. If the social model were the prominent model 
of Trinity in Edwards, it might suggest (e.g. Matless) that relationship per se is the 
emanation of divine life. Insofar as anything exists in this world, it must necessarily 
have relationship with things around it. This makes Edwards’ theology similar to the 
panentheism of Neoplatonism. The psychological model implies that participation in 
divine life is based on a certain model of spiritual life. One must consciously know 
and love God in order to replicate the intra-Trinitarian life. The extension of intra-
Trinitarian life is actually a two-stage process. First, material and spiritual beings are 
created. Second, some spiritual beings receive the gift to know and love God. As we 
shall see, Edwards emphasizes the second stage is a free act of God. The emphasis on 
divine nature in the creation account is balanced with the emphasis on divine will in 
the redemption account. 
In conclusion, beauty serves as the binding principle of the whole system. We 
recall again that beauty, for Edwards, is fundamentally consenting. For spiritual 
being, this consenting consists in love, or embracing with the will. The scale of 
                                                 
100 See McClymond, Encounters with God, ch. 4 for a critical evaluation of Edwards’ creation 
theology. 
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beauty is measured by ontological weight of the object of love and the intensity of 
the love. Since God is Being simply considered, and God loves the God-self with 
perfect love, God is beauty essentially. All other beings are beautiful to the extent 
that they love God, because their love for God (or divine love) is their consent for 
Being simply considered. Therefore, they are beautiful to the extent that they 
participate in the nature of the Holy Spirit, which is divine love. God, in turn, loves 
the saints with an everlasting love. In loving the saints, God loves the divine love, the 
emanation of the Holy Spirit, that is within the saints. God’s love of saints is an 
extension of the intra-Trinitarian life, because God loves his own beauty in loving 
the saints. Logically, spiritual beings that do not love God would have no beauty in 
them. They have no share in the intra-Trinitarian life of God. If they in turn would 
receive no love from God, this would be beautiful in the Edwardsian sense. A being 
that does not participate in the Holy Spirit, which is divine love, will also receive 
nothing of God’s love for others. If there is an equality of love between God and the 
saints, there is an equality of enmity between God and the reprobates. According to 
this logic, God and the saints would appreciate the beauty of eternal damnation. This 
is, in brief, Edwards’ argument for the beauty of hell. Before we examine this in 
detail, we shall first turn to the beauty of the economic Trinity. 
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Chapter Five: The Beautiful Christ      
Having examined the beauty of the immanent Trinity in the theology of 
Edwards, we are now in a position to examine the role of beauty in the economic 
Trinity. While Edwards is unique among both Puritans and Reformed scholasticism 
in emphasizing the beauty of the triune life, he stands within his tradition in heaping 
praises of beauty on Jesus. Though staying within the mainstream of the Reformed 
understanding of Christology, Edwards also has his idiosyncratic perspectives. Most 
of these come from Edwards’ zeal to provide a rational defense of traditional 
doctrines. Where his Reformed predecessors are content to accept as revealed 
mysteries, Edwards strives to make them reasonable beliefs. Pushing those doctrines 
to their logical ends, Edwards demonstrates some of the strength and the weaknesses 
of his tradition. We shall not offer a complete overview of his Christology or his 
soteriology.1 Our goal is to show how Edwards develops his theory of beauty in the 
work of the economic Trinity. In what sense are the Redeemer and the redemptive 
plan of God beautiful? We shall go about in a roundabout way. We shall begin by 
examining Edwards’ theology of the covenant of redemption. This will provide us 
with important insight into Edwards’ understanding on the beauty of Christ. It also 
serves as a footnote to the question whether there is a social model of the Trinity in 
Edwards.  
 
5.1. Covenant of Redemption 
A. Background 
The covenant is a central doctrine in the Reformed tradition. Our concern here 
is with the relationship between the covenant and the intra-Trinitarian life. Edwards 
is unique in this tradition in justifying the need for a covenant of redemption upon 
the dynamics of intra-Trinitarian life. We want to examine briefly the covenant of 
redemption in Reformed scholasticism and Puritan theology to provide a background 
for Edwards’ treatment on this issue. 
Most Reformed schoolmen give ample attention to the covenant of grace. 
Turretin, for example, devotes a whole topic to the covenant of grace in his Institute 
of Elenctic Theology.2 Turretin defines the covenant of grace as ‘a gratuitious pact 
                                                 
1 See Michael David Bush, Jesus Christ in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Princeton Theological Seminary, 2003) for Edward’s Christology; Anri Morimoto, Jonathan Edwards 
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entered into in Christ between God offended and man offending. In it God promises 
remission of sins and salvation to man gratuitously on account of Christ; man, 
however, relying upon the same grace promises faith and obedience.’3 While going 
into a detail exposition of the history of the covenant of grace in its twofold economy 
(Old and New Testament), Turretin does not mention the covenant of redemption at 
all. His main concern is to defend the continuity of the Old and New Testament 
against the opinion of the Socinians and Remonstrants.4 
Other Reformed schoolmen postulate a pre-temporal pact between the Father 
and the Son.5 Witsius writes: 
 
In Gal. 3:17 Paul tells of a certain 	
	
				
 , a pact or testament ratified beforehand by God to Christ. The contracting 
parties are indicated, on the one hand God, on the other Christ, and the convention 
ratified between the two.6 
 
The schoolmen emphasize that the pact is a testament, in that God has promised 
unilaterally a heavenly inheritance for the saints. If it is a covenant between God and 
people, the people may fail (as Adam did). Since the pact is between God and Christ, 
it cannot fail. Our inheritance is assured.  
For the schoolmen, the covenant of grace ‘is at once a covenant and a testament, 
more properly a testament.’7 Wyttenbach writes: 
 
The covenant of grace is nothing but the execution of the eternal testament of grace. 
In the eternal testament the Father asked the Son to make a placation in time et., – 
Hence it follows that this covenant is in itself a testament and only a covenant in its 
execution.8   
What is the content of this pact? Heidegger explains: 
 
The covenant of God the Father with the Son is a mutual agreement, by which God 
the Father exacted from the Son perfect obedience to the law unto death which he 
must face on behalf of chosen seed to be given him; and promised him, if he gave 
the obedience, the seed in question as his own perquisite and inheritance;9 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid. XII.2.5, 2:175. 
4 Ibid. XII.5.2-3, 2:192-3. 
5 Cocceius and the federal theologians develop the doctrine covenant of redemption explicitly in the 
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decrees of God and its economical working ad extra. See Muller, Trinity of God, 263-7.  
6 Cited in Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics set out and illustrated from the Sources, ed. Ernst 
Bizer, trans. G.T. Thomson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), 374. 
7 Ibid., 375. 
8 Ibid., 375. 
9 Ibid., 376. 
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In coming into this pact, the Father and Son act freely and equally. The Father 
cannot simply command the Son to enter into the covenant. Mastricht says: 
 
The Reformed recognise both that God most freely demanded the Son should take 
up the province of mediator, and that the Son had undertaken it with equal freedom, 
in that each acted on rational design and assent;… They likewise acknowledge that 
as divine persons both Father and Son were sui iuris and to such an extent, that 
considered in Himself and in His nature the Father could not have demanded it, and 
to this extent too the Son might not have accepted what was demanded.10 
 
With the Reformed schoolmen, we are concerned with two questions. First, why 
do some schoolmen emphasize the Father-Son pact, while others choose to ignore it? 
The main reason is that some want to emphasize the unilateral dimension of the 
covenant of grace, while others want to emphasize its bilateral dimension. The 
bilateral dimension means that saints are called to obedience when they enter into 
covenant of grace. The danger here is that obedience may sound like a condition to 
be fulfilled by human effort. The unilateral dimension emphasizes that our salvation 
is initiated and completed by divine power alone. Only in the divine promise can we 
be assured of our ultimate salvation. The danger here is that people may sound like 
mere puppets in this scheme. As we shall see, Edwards’ inclination is to stress the 
all-sufficiency of divine power. The covenant of redemption is a natural component 
of his theology. 
The second question is why the emphasis on the freedom of the Father and the 
Son in entering into the pact. Unfortunately, Heppe gives us no clue on this question. 
Our guess is that this is to safe-guard the gratuitousness of the Incarnation. Calvin 
debated with Osiander about whether the Son would be incarnated in the absence of 
sin.11 Osiander believes that Christ, as the Second Adam, would have come to even a 
sinless humanity in order to complete the divine image in human beings. The 
Incarnation is therefore implied in creation. By emphasizing the freedom of the 
Father and the Son, the schoolmen deny any suggestion that the Incarnation is 
implied in creation. It is out of sheer mercy that the Son and Father entered into a 
separate covenant to redeem fallen humanity. As we shall see, Edwards will make 
Christ voluntary entry into the covenant of redemption a major theological theme. 
Edwards goes beyond the Schoolmen in making the voluntary humiliation of the Son 
a central aspect of the beauty of Christ. 
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The covenant of grace is also a major theme to the Puritans.12 As in the 
Reformed scholastic tradition, the covenant of redemption is a not central issue 
among the Puritans. The Westminster Confession gives this reason for the need of a 
covenant: 
 
The distance between God and the creature is so great, that although reasonable 
creatures do owe obedience unto Him as their Creator, yet they could never have any 
fruition of Him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary 
condescension on God’s part, which He hath been pleased to express by way of 
covenant.13 
 
It continues to articulate the meaning of the covenant of works and the covenant of 
grace. God enters into the covenant of grace  
 
… wherein He freely offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ; 
requiring of them faith in Him, that they may be saved and promising to give unto all 
those that are ordained unto eternal life His Holy Spirit, to make them willing, and 
able to believe.14 
 
The Confession understands the covenant as an instrument through which God 
condescends to relate humanity in a partnership. In particular, the covenant of grace 
is the means through which sinners can enter into partnership with God. Since the 
Father and Son are in partnership from eternity, there would be no need for a 
covenant between them. Indeed, the Confession says nothing about a covenant of 
redemption. 
According to von Rohr, the theological motivation for developing explicitly a 
covenant of redemption among the Puritans is to ground the covenant of grace firmly 
on Christology. A second motif is that ‘in the intra-Trinitarian covenanting there was 
the inclusion of those who were to be its ultimate beneficiaries.’15 In the covenant 
between the Father and the Son, the elect is the reward that the Father promised to 
the Son for the Son’s agreement to carry out the work of redemption. Thus the 
covenant of redemption provides a Christological foundation for predestination and 
limited atonement. However, the covenant of redemption has the potentiality to 
render the covenant of grace superfluous. If God has already made a covenant with 
Christ to save the elect, why does God need to make another covenant with the elect 
                                                 
12 See John von Rohr, The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986) 
for an excellent general treatment. 
13 Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) VII.1. 
14 WCF VII.3. 
15 von Ruhr, Covenant of Grace, 44. 
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(the covenant of grace)? Nevertheless, except for the Antinomian wing, most 
Puritans insist on dwelling extensively on the covenant of grace.16 For them, the 
covenant of grace brings out clearly the mutuality in our process of salvation. God 
has unilaterally offered the gospel, but we need to embrace it personally. 
Among the Puritans, Owen is the Trinitarian theologian par excellence.17 In his 
various writings, he emphasizes that the redemption must be understood in a 
Trinitarian framework. He believes that ‘the agent in, and chief author of, this great 
work of our redemption is the whole blessed Trinity.’18 Owen explicitly adopts the 
importance of a covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son: 
 
The third act of this sending [his Son as redeemer] is his entering into covenant and 
compact with his Son concerning the work to be undertaken, and the issue or event 
thereof; of which there be two parts: — 
First, His promise to protect and assist him in the accomplishment and perfect 
fulfilling of the whole business and dispensation about which he was employed, or 
which he was to undertake.19 
Secondly, [His promise] of success, or a good issue out of all his sufferings, and a 
happy accomplishment and attainment of the end of his great undertaking.20 
 
In this covenant, the Son promises to the task of ‘willingly undergoing the 
office [of Mediator], wherein by dispensation the Father had and exercised a kind of 
superiority, which the Son, though “in the form of God,” humbled himself unto, 
Philippians 2:6-8.’21 The Son promises to subject himself to the eternal decree of 
God. In return, the Father offers the Son ‘a promise of applying the benefits 
purchased by this Savior so designed to them that should believe on him, to be given 
in fullness of time.’22  
For Owen, the covenant of redemption is one way to emphasize the intimate 
relationship between Christ’s work and the salvation of the elect. Unlike the 
Arminians, which have two separate decrees for Christ’s mediation and the 
predestination of the elect, Owen includes the sending of Christ as mediator and the 
elect of the saints in the single event of the covenant of redemption. In the same 
event that the Son promises to be mediator, the Son is also promised the elect as a 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 44. 
17 See Carl R. Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle, UK: 
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18 The Death of Death in the Death of Christ I.3, Works 10:212 (Ultimate Christian Library). 
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reward. The issues of predestination and limited atonement are formulated as a 
distinctively Christological problem.23 Since the work of Incarnation, satisfaction 
and intercession are included in one covenant of redemption, the accomplishment 
and application of the redemption of Christ are tied together. There is no need for 
separate decrees for Christ’s mediation and the application of Christ’s benefits. 
 
B. Edwards 
Edwards pushes Owen’s reasoning to its logical conclusion.24 Following the 
Reformed tradition, he believes that there is a covenant of works between God and 
Adam.25 Building on Mastricht, he emphasizes the unilateral dimension of grace by 
denying that there is a covenant of grace between the Father and the elect.26 If there 
is a covenant of grace, and faith is a condition to enter this covenant, then it is 
structurally similar to the covenant of works. In both covenant of works and 
covenant of grace, God promises blessings on condition that human beings perform 
certain acts. ‘The second covenant is as much a covenant of works as the first.’27 To 
emphasize the graceful nature of salvation, the young Edwards believes that the 
covenant of works and the covenant of redemption are the two only covenants: 
 
It seems to me to be true, that as the first covenant was made with the first Adam, so 
the second covenant was made with the second Adam; as the first covenant was 
made with the seed of the first Adam no otherwise than it was made with them in 
him, so the second covenant is not made with the seed of the second Adam any 
otherwise than as it was made with them in him.28 
 
In the covenant of redemption, Christ is the only one that performs the condition of 
the covenant. Faith is not so much a condition for us to enter a covenant of grace, as 
                                                 
23 Here I follow the analysis of Trueman, Claims of Truth, 134-9. 
24 Edwards never cites Owen’s Death of Death. He does refer to Owen’s commentary on the book of 
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it is one of the benefits accrued by Christ for the elect. Christ’s work of redemption 
and its application to us become totally united in one covenant. 
Edwards later postulates a second covenant to highlight the active participation 
of the elect. The two covenants are ‘the covenant that God makes with Christ and 
with his church or believers in him, and the covenant between Christ and his church 
or between Christ and men.’29 The first is the covenant of redemption. The second is 
a marriage covenant between Christ and his people. For Edwards, this scheme allows 
both the passivity and the agency of human beings to be understood correctly: 
 
So that those things that are promises in one of these covenants, are conditions in 
another. Thus regeneration and closing with Christ, is one of the promises of the 
covenant of the Father with Christ, but is the condition in the covenant of Christ with 
his people. So, on the other hand, the incarnation, death and sufferings of Christ, are 
promises in Christ’s covenant with his people, but they are conditions of the 
covenant of the Father with his Son.30 
 
Edwards provides an original and interesting solution to the perennial Reformed 
theological question: how does one balance the unilateral offer of grace and bilateral 
relationship between God and his people? Since our concern is the aesthetic theory of 
Edwards, we shall not pursue this topic further.31 The importance of this discussion 
for us is that Edwards has put the covenant of redemption into the center of the work 
of redemption. The majority Puritan view, as represented by the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, uses the covenant of grace as the central concept in the work of 
redemption. In order to understand the beauty of the Redeemer, we need to 
understand the nature of the covenant of redemption in Edwards’ theology. 
Besides focusing on the covenant of redemption, Edwards is unique among the 
Puritans in pushing for a theology of intra-Trinitarian covenant. Edwards asks a 
question ignored by his predecessors: what is so unique about the work of 
redemption that it requires an intra-Trinitarian covenant? The orthodox tradition of 
the Church has for a long time believes that creation is also the work of the whole 
Trinity, yet there is no covenant of creation. What is the difference between creation 
and redemption? Why does the latter alone require a covenant?  
To answer the question, Edwards makes the crucial distinction between the 
economic work of Trinity in general and the work of redemption in particular. The 
                                                 
29 Misc. 617, Works 18:148. 
30 Ibid. 18:149. 
31 See Bush, Jesus Christ, 102-108, for further discussion on the covenant theology of Edwards. 
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economy of the Trinity in general refers to all their actings towards creatures. 
Aspects of the general economy of the Trinity can be demonstrated from ‘pretty plain 
reasons.’32 The work of redemption, on the other hand, can only be known through 
revelation. 
What may reason tell us about the economic Trinity? First, there is 
subordination within the Trinity. ‘So that the Father in that affair acts as Head of the 
Trinity, and Son under him, and the Holy Spirit under them both.’33 Second, ‘the 
persons of the Trinity are not inferior one to another in glory and excellency of 
nature.’34 Third, ‘the other persons’ acting under the Father don’t arise from any 
natural subjection.’35 Fourth, and crucially,  
 
Though a subordination of the persons of the Trinity in their actings be not from any 
proper natural subjection one to another, and so must be conceived of as in some 
respect established by mutual free agreement, whereby the persons of the Trinity of 
their own will have as it were formed themselves into a society for carrying on the 
great design of glorifying the Deity and communicating its fullness, in which is 
established a certain economy and order of acting; yet this agreement establishing 
this economy is not to be looked upon as merely arbitrary, founded on nothing but 
the mere pleasure of the members of this society… ’Tis fit that to the order of their 
subsisting: that as the Father is first in the order of two persons are from the Father 
in their subsistence, and as to their subsistence naturally originated from him and 
dependent on him, … so he should be the fountain in all the acts of the Deity.… 
decency requires it.36 
 
Here Edwards launches into an explicit social model of the Trinity. There is a 
‘mutual free agreement’ between the persons of the Trinity to form ‘themselves into a 
society’ for carrying out the economic work of the Trinity. Why does Edwards need 
such a model at this point? The reason, as stated by Edwards, is that the immanent 
model fails to explain how there can be subjection within the Trinity. In the 
immanent model, as discussed in our last chapter, the persons of the Trinity are equal 
in nature and excellency. They are elements within a single subjectivity. It does not 
make sense to talk about one element of subjectivity being under the authority of 
another element of the same subjectivity. Therefore Edwards extends his model by 
talking about a free agreement between the persons. While the structure of the 
                                                 
32 Misc. 1062, Works 20:430. This long (20:430-443) and important Miscellanies is examined in Bush, 
Jesus Christ, 98-102. Bush only addresses this note from the perspective of the history of redemption. 
33 Ibid. 20:430. 
34 Ibid. 20:430. 
35 Ibid. 20:430-1. 
36 Ibid. 20:431. 
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immanent Trinity reflects the essence of the Godhead, the structure of the economic 
Trinity is a product of the free choice of the persons of the Trinity.37  
Though the economic Trinity is a decision of free will, Edwards emphasizes that 
this is a reasonable decision. First, the work of the economic Trinity is ‘glorifying the 
Deity and communicating its fullness.’ The immanent Trinity necessarily glorifies 
itself by loving itself. The economic Trinity extends this divine love into beings other 
than God. As we have shown in a previous chapter, creatures glorify God by 
knowing and loving the beauty of God. The glorifying of God through creatures is 
the end of creation. The goal of the economic Trinity is harmonious with the inner 
life of the immanent Trinity: 
 
For God’s determining to glorify and communicate himself must be conceived of as 
flowing from God’s nature; or we must look upon God, from the infinite fullness and 
goodness of his nature, as naturally disposed to cause the beams of his glory to shine 
forth, and his goodness to flow forth.38 
 
Second, the way of subjection in the economic Trinity is also harmonious with 
the inner life of the immanent Trinity. Since the Father is the source of the immanent 
Trinity, ‘decency’ requires that any subjection should be on the part of the Son and 
the Spirit. God is the head of the Trinity, so it is reasonable that the Son and the Spirit 
are under the direction of the Father. Going beyond Edwards, we may say that the 
economic Trinity is a beautiful extension of the immanent Trinity because it agrees 
with the inner dynamics of the immanent Trinity. For such an extension, only a 
mutual agreement is needed. 
The work of redemption is a different case. While God is naturally inclined to 
magnify divine glory, God is not naturally inclined to save sinners: 
 
Therefore this particular invention of wisdom, of God’s glorifying and 
communicating himself by the redemption of a certain number of fallen inhabitants 
of this globe of earth, is a thing diverse from God’s natural inclination to glorify and 
communicate himself in general, and superadded to it or subservient to it.39 
 
                                                 
37 Does it make sense to say that elements of one’s own subjectivity can enter into a mutual free 
agreement? ‘It is a question whether there is not a significant tension between Edwards’s (Amesian) 
version of Trinitarianism and his (Olevianian) version of Federalism. It is not clear that the triunity 
constituted of God, God’s (Lockean) self-reflexive idea, and God’s perfect self-love can readily be 
conceived as a “society of persons” capable of negotiating and concluding a covenant. Is it possible to 
speak meaningfully of a perichoretic relationship among God, God’s Idea, and God’s Love?’ (Bush, 
Jesus Christ, 112) Edwards, like all great theologians, has his moments of inconsistency. 
38 Ibid. 20:432. 
39 Ibid. 20:432. 
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Redemption means saving sinners from their just condemnation. This is just one 
particular way of glorifying God. While it is difficult to imagine God extending his 
beauty beyond the Godhead without creation of creatures distinct from God, we can 
easily imagine the God of Edwards glorifying Himself without redeeming sinners. 
For example, God could have annihilated all creatures in this sinful world and create 
a new world. That God does choose to save sinners in this world is an arbitrary 
decision of the Trinity. It is one of the many means in which God could have 
followed the natural inclination to extend divine glory: 
 
We must distinguish between the covenant of redemption, that is an 
establishment of wisdom wonderfully contriving a particular method for the 
most conveniently obtaining a great end, and that establishment that is 
founded in fitness and decency and the natural order of the eternal and 
necessary subsistence of the persons of the Trinity.40 
 
The latter establishment, the ordering of the economic Trinity for extending God’s 
glory beyond the Godhead, is prior and fundamental to the former establishment, the 
covenant of redemption.  
Not only is the goal of redemption an arbitrary decision, the kind of subjection 
that Christ has to go through in the work of redemption is also arbitrary. Decency 
does not require Christ to go through the humiliation of incarnation. The incarnation 
is 
 
the Son undertaking and engaging to put himself into a new kind of subjection to 
Father, far below that of his oeconomical station, even the subjection of a proper 
servant to the Father and one under his law – in the manner that creatures, that are 
infinitely below God and absolutely dependent for their being on the mere will of 
God, are subject to his preceptive will and absolute legislative authority – engaging 
to become a creature, and so put himself in the proper circumstances of a servant.41 
 
In the incarnation, the Son goes beyond the subjection proper to his status as the 
Son. Proper subjection merely requires the Son to obey the Father as one of similar 
honor. Christ undergoes the subjection of a creature. For Edwards, there cannot be a 
lower subjection. A creature is completely dependent on the Father for every moment 
of its existence. The creator owes nothing to the creature, but the creature owes 
everything to the creator. This kind of asymmetrical relationship is radically different 
from the equal status of persons within the immanent Trinity. According to decency, 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 20:432. 
41 Ibid. 20:437 
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the Father cannot ask the Son for such a kind of subjection. It requires something 
stronger to validate such humiliation:  
 
The Father, merely by his economical prerogative, can direct and prescribe to the 
other persons of the Trinity in all things not below their economical character. But all 
those things that imply something below the infinite majesty and glory of divine 
persons, and which they can’t do without as it were laying aside the divine glory, and 
stooping infinitely below the height of that glory, those things are below their 
oeconomical divine character, and therefore the Father can’t prescribe to other 
persons anything of this nature, without a new establishment by free covenant 
empowering him so to do.42 
 
In the covenant of redemption, the Son voluntarily gives the Father the authority 
to send him into the world in the form of a creature. In exchange for such voluntary 
humiliation, the Son acquires an authority that is different from the order in the 
immanent Trinity: 
 
That the place and station that the Son attains to by this establishment is entirely 
distinct from that which he stands by the economy of the Trinity, insomuch that by 
the covenant of redemption the son of God is, for a season, advanced into the 
economical seat of another person, viz. the Father, in being by this covenant 
established as the Lord and Judge of the world in the Father’s stead, and as 
vicegerent, and as ruling in the Father’s throne, the throne that belongs to him in his 
economical station. For by the economy of the Trinity it is the Father’s province to 
act as the Lawgiver and Judge and Disposer of the world.43 
 
In the covenant of redemption, the Son promises the Father to be sent as servant; 
in return, the Father promises to institute the Son as Lord and Judge of the world. 
Neither the status of the servant nor the status of the Lord is equivalent to the status 
of the Son within the immanent or economic Trinity. Therefore, there must be a free 
and new covenant established in which the Father and Son both agree to such 
subversions of roles. Creation does not require an intra-Trinitarian covenant because 
there are no subversions of roles in the work of creation. A covenant within the 
Trinity is necessary only when the roles of the Triune persons go against the order 
within the economic Trinity. 
For the same reason, there is no covenant of redemption between the Father and 
the Holy Spirit. In the work of redemption, the Spirit is indeed subject to a new kind 
of subjection: 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 20:436. 
43 Ibid. 20:435. 
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That whereas by the economy of the Trinity the Spirit acts under the Son as God or a 
divine person, he now acts in like manner under the same person in two natures 
united, or as God-man, and in his two natures the husband and vital head of the 
church.44 
 
In other words, the person to whom the Spirit submits is transformed. Whereas 
previously the Son is only divine, now he is a God-man. However, the manner of 
subjection is not changed: 
 
The Spirit’s subjection to the Son as God-man (though the human nature in its union 
with the divine be a sharer with the divine in this honor and authority) implies no 
abasement of the Spirit, i.e. is no lower sort of subjection, than that which the Holy 
Spirit is in to the Son by the economy of the Trinity… The Holy Spirit is not thus 
subject to the Son by any abasement he submits to, by any special covenant, but by 
the gift of the Father, exercising his prerogative as Head of the Trinity, as he is by his 
economical character.45 
 
In the work of redemption, the Spirit submits to the God-man as one divine person 
submitting to another divine person. There is no difference from the submission 
within the economic Trinity. Though the Spirit submits to the God-man now, he does 
not submit to the human nature of the Son intrinsically. The human nature of the Son 
becomes sharer of the honor of the divine nature. The Spirit submits to the human 
nature in the Son only inasmuch that the human nature is united to the divine nature. 
The Spirit suffers no abasement in the work of redemption, neither is he exalted 
beyond his economic status in this work. Therefore there is no covenant of 
redemption between the Father and the Spirit. The Father is free to assign the role of 
the Spirit in the work of redemption by exercising his prerogative as Head of the 
Trinity. 
For Edwards, the concept of abasement also helps to explain why Christ’s 
obedience is meritorious for us. It is meritorious because it goes beyond what is 
proper to the economic role of the Son: 
 
Hence it comes to pass that that obedience that Christ performs to the Father even as 
Mediator, and in the work of our redemption, before his humiliation and now in his 
exalted state in heaven, is no part of that obedience that merits for sinners. For ’tis 
only that obedience which the Son voluntarily and freely subjected himself to from 
love to sinners, and engaged to perform for them in the covenant of redemption and 
that otherwise would not have belonged to him, that merits for sinners; and that is 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 20:440. 
45 Ibid. 20:441. 
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only that obedience that implies an humiliation below his proper divine glory.46 
 
The Incarnation is a humiliation below the Son’s proper divine glory. It is precisely 
this willingness to go beyond the proper order that allows the Son to earn merits for 
sinners.47 These merits are sufficient to cover all the debts of the sinners. Saving 
sinners is not a natural inclination of the Triune God; therefore the achievement of 
that goal requires the Son to commit unnatural abasement. On the other hand, the 
Spirit’s subjection to the God-man is not below the proper divine glory; so the 
obedience of the Spirit is not meritorious for us.48  
Despite the emphasis on unnatural abasement in the covenant of redemption, 
Edwards also believes that subjection of the Son  
 
is not contrary to their economical order, but in several respects agreeable to it, 
though it be new kind… That the Father should be servant to the Son would be 
contrary to the economy and natural order of the persons of the Trinity.49 
 
Moreover, in the covenant of redemption, the Father acts in the natural role of the 
first mover and Head.50 It is the Father who initiated the covenant and decided to 
send the Son. Though the work of redemption may be extraordinary, the 
establishment of the covenant is itself in harmony with the order in the immanent 
Trinity. 
What is the significance of this distinction between the general work of the 
economic Trinity and the covenant of redemption in particular?51 We suggest that, at 
the beginning of our discussion, Edwards tries to give reasons for a covenant of 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 20:438. 
47 The talk about merit makes Edwards close to the Catholic concept of salvation. Unfortunately, 
Morimoto (Catholic Vision of Salvation) concentrates the question of virtues within the saints and 
ignores the question of Christ’s merits for us. Reformed tradition has understood Christ’s active and 
passive obedience as righteousness earned by the human nature of Christ. Here Edwards suggests that 
the Son (as the divine Son) needs to earn merits before the Father in order to purchase salvation for us. 
This comes closer to the Anselmian transaction theory than the Reformed imputation theory. It would 
be worthwhile to explore further the atonement theology of Edwards and Catholic theories of 
atonement. 
48 Ibid. 20:441. 
49 Ibid. 20:437. 
50 Ibid. 20:435. 
51 Bush recognizes that this distinction is important to Edwards, but Bush is unaware of the 
significance of this distinction. Bush thinks that Edwards may be motivated mostly by polemical 
reason. ‘It is probable, however, or at any rate typical for him, that Edwards gave such attention to the 
question because someone had argued the contrary.’ (Jesus Christ, 100). Bush cannot point out any 
author that had argued the contrary. I do not know of any either. The general theme of Bush’s 
dissertation is that Edwards’ Christology such be understood within the almost Neoplatonic 
framework of the End of Creation. The failure to recognize the difference between the work of 
creation and the work of redemption in Edwards’ theology is a serious gap of his dissertation. 
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redemption. While his predecessors are satisfied with acknowledging that there is a 
covenant of redemption at the foundation of the covenant of grace, Edwards presses 
the question further by inquiring why a covenant of redemption is needed at all. 
Could the Triune God have saved sinners without first establishing a covenant of 
redemption? In answering the question, Edwards goes into the question about the 
natural inclinations of God. For Edwards, order and beauty are central to the acts of 
God. God is the essence of beauty, and his acts should reflect his essence. Edwards 
finds a way to explain creation as an extension of God’s beauty. However, in the act 
of redemption, he finds divine acts that do not readily fit into his conception of God. 
The forgiveness of sinners and the Incarnation involve an abasement of God that is 
not congruent with the natural inclinations of God. For Edwards, that is the reason 
for the covenant of redemption.  
For our purpose, the importance of this discussion is that Edwards has blocked 
the possibility of reading the Incarnation back into the life of the immanent Trinity. 
The work of the economic Trinity in creation reflects a natural inclination of the 
immanent Trinity. The covenant of redemption, on the other hand, is an ad hoc 
covenant that establishes both the goal (justifying sinners) and the means (the 
Incarnation and subsequent exaltation of the Son) of the work of redemption. This 
covenant does not express the natural inclinations of the immanent Trinity. Given 
that Edwards regards the life of the immanent Trinity as the essence of beauty, this 
would suggest that the saving of sinners and the Incarnation are not inherently 
beautiful acts. Edwards never explicitly denies that these acts are beautiful, but that 
would be the logical conclusion of his reasoning. Redemption is glorious in the sense 
that God is glorified through the divine love of the saints; but the method of 
redemption is not, strictly speaking, a manifestation of God’s beauty. Edwards is 
indeed insistent that the saints recognize the beauty of the Redeemer. In what sense 
can the Redeemer be beautiful? That is the theme of our next section. 
 
5.2. Excellency of Christ 
A. Edwards 
In August 1736, Edwards preached an important sermon The Excellency of 
Christ.52 We shall base our exposition on this sermon, supplemented by various 
                                                 
52 Works 19:560-594. The sermon is No. 406 among Edwards’ dated sermon (see Works 19:805). Both 
Bush (Jesus Christ, 184-196) and Louis J. Mitchell (Jonathan Edwards on the Experience of Beauty, 
33-41, provide an exposition of the whole sermon. In Bush, this forms one section of a whole chapter 
on the beauty of Christ (Jesus Christ,182-212). Bush has provided the most detail exploration of this 
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Miscellanies.53 The text of the sermon is from Revelation 5:5-6: 
 
And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, 
the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seven seals 
thereof. And I beheld, and, lo, in the midst of the throne and of the four beasts, and 
in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain. 
 
As is common with Edwards, the verse serves more as a pretext for the content of the 
sermon. Edwards seizes on the contrast between the Lion and the Lamb in the verse, 
and the theme of the sermon is that ‘there is an admirable conjunction of diverse 
excellencies in Jesus Christ.’54 The sermon is a meditation on several contrasting 
excellencies in Jesus. 
First, Edwards claims that ‘there is a conjunction of such excellencies in Christ, 
as, in our manner of conceiving, are very diverse one from another.’55 There are two 
cases of such conjunction. The first one is that ‘there do meet of infinite highness & 
condescension.’56 Christ, as God, has infinite highness. Yet he condescends to 
become a person of the lower rank. He takes notice of beggars and children. The 
second case is that ‘there meet in Jesus Christ, infinite justice & infinite grace. As 
Christ is a divine person he is infinitely holy just, infinitely hating sin, and disposed 
to execute condign punishment for sin.’57 Yet he suffers the tormenting of people 
and the wrath of God in order to bring us salvation.  
Second, Edwards claims that ‘there do meet in the person of Christ, such really 
diverse excellencies, as otherwise would have seemed to us utterly incompatible in 
the same subject; such as are conjoined in no other person whatever, either divine, 
human or angelical.’ Edwards gives seven instances of such conjunction. First, there 
is the conjunction of infinite glory and lowest humility. No creatures can have the 
divine glory of Christ. Then Edwards explains why Christ is the only divine person 
who can have humility 
 
For though the divine nature be infinitely abhorrent to pride, yet humility is not 
properly predicable of God the Father, and the Holy Ghost, that exist only in the 
divine nature; because it is a proper excellency only of a created nature; for it 
consists radically in a sense of a comparative lowness and littleness before God, or 
                                                                                                                                          
theme yet. Nonetheless, Bush does not address the issue whether the process of incarnation itself can 
be beautiful. 
53 Misc. 791, on the example of Christ, is especially important. 
54 Works 19:565. 
55 Ibid. 19:565 
56 Ibid. 19:565. 
57 Ibid. 19:567. 
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the great distance between God and the subject of this virtue; but it would be a 
contradiction to suppose any such thing in God.58 
 
We shall return to this crucial passage later. Our task now is to complete the 
summary of his sermon. The second case is that in Christ there meet ‘infinite majesty, 
and transcendent meekness.’ Again, Edwards emphasizes that meekness is a virtue 
‘proper only to the creature.’59 The third instance is that there is ‘the deepest 
reverence towards God, and equality with God.’60 The fourth case is that there is in 
Christ ‘infinite worthiness of good, and the greatest patience under sufferings of 
evil.’ Indeed, he is ‘worthy of the infinite love of the Father’ and ‘infinitely worthy of 
all possible esteem, love and service from all men.’61 The fifth instance is that in 
Christ are conjoined ‘an exceeding spirit of obedience, with supreme dominion over 
heaven and earth.62 The sixth case is the conjoining of ‘absolute sovereignty and 
perfect resignation.’63 The last example is the meeting together of ‘self-sufficiency, 
and an entire trust and reliance on God.’64 As a divine person, Jesus lacks nothing. 
Yet he entirely trusted in God while he walked on earth. 
Third, there are in Christ: 
 
Such diverse excellencies are exercised in him towards men, that otherwise would 
have seemed impossible to be exercised towards the same object; as particularly 
these three, justice, mercy and truth. 
 
He manifested an infinite regard to the attribute of God’s justice, and that when he 
had a mind to save sinners, he was willing to undergo such extreme sufferings, rather 
than that their salvation should be to the injury of the honor of that attribute. 
 
Though he be the just judge of a sinful world, yet he is also the Savior of the 
world …  
 
So the immutable truth of God … for there never was any other so great a trial of the 
unalterableness of the truth of God, in those threatenings, as when sin came to be 
imputed to his own Son.65 
 
In these three excellencies, Edwards highlights both the active and passive roles of 
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59 Ibid. 19:568. 
60 Ibid. 19:569. 
61 Ibid. 19:570. 
62 Ibid. 19:570. 
63 Ibid. 19:571. 
64 Ibid. 19:571. 
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Christ in our salvation. Christ manifests justice and truth by willingly suffering the 
wrath of God. In his nature, Christ suffered death and condemnation. Christ 
manifests mercy by taking the initiative to save the world. It is the prerogative of the 
divine Son to initiate such kind of work. 
Edwards continues to expound how these excellencies are exhibited in Christ’s 
life. These excellencies are exhibited in his Incarnation, virtuous acts and miraculous 
acts in his public ministry, but most clearly in his last week of life.66 His meek 
submission to the abuse of people and the wrath of God is the climax manifestation 
of his excellencies. These excellencies apply to the Christ who is now sitting at the 
right hand of the Father: 
 
Though Christ be now at the right hand of God, exalted as King of Heaven, and Lord 
of the Universe; yet he still is in the human nature, he still excels in humility. 
Though the man Christ Jesus be the highest of all creatures in heaven, yet he as 
much excels them all in humility, as he doth in glory and dignity; for none sees so 
much of the distance between God and him, as he does.’67 
 
Even now Christ is carrying his human nature. So he treats saints with condescension 
and meekness; he remains to be their friends and brethrens. Lastly, these excellencies 
are manifested in the eschaton. Christ will be a lion to his enemy and a lamb to his 
saints.68 
The sermon concludes with a series of applications of the foregoing discussions. 
The incomparable excellencies of Christ are meant to draw us to him, so that we may 
choose him to be our savior: 
 
If Christ accepts of you, you need not fear but that you will be safe; for he is a strong 
lion for your defense: and if you come, you need not fear but that you shall be 
accepted; for he is like lamb to all that come to him, and receives them with infinite 
grace and tenderness.69 
 
 Similarly, his glorious divine nature and humble human nature should draw us 
to choose Christ to be our Lord, and our lover.70 He concludes by claiming that the 
excellencies of Christ are especially tailored to the human mind: 
 
                                                 
66 Ibid.19:576-80. Cf. ‘The time of Christ’s last suffering, beginning with the night wherein he was 
betrayed, till he expired on the cross, was in almost all respects more [excellent] than all the rest of his 
life.’ Misc. 791, Works 18:488. 
67 Ibid. 19:581. 
68 Ibid. 19:582. 
69 Ibid. 19:584. 
70 Ibid. 19:588. 
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Christ has no more excellency in his person, since his incarnation, than he had 
before; for divine excellency is infinite, and can’t be added to: yet his human 
excellencies are additional manifestations of his glory and excellency to us, and are 
additional recommendations of him to our esteem and love, who are finite 
comprehension.71 
 
Since Christ has the infinite glory of God dressed in the perfection of a human person, 
we have every possible reason to adore and love him. 
As Bush observed, Edwards is working with a ‘Christological maximalism,’ 
where every possible importance is to be ascribed to Christ.72 Edwards wants to 
maximize the attractiveness of Christ for pastoral reasons. He conveniently grosses 
over the agony of Gethsemane or some of the harsh announcements of Christ. For 
Edwards, the man Jesus is the epitome of creaturely virtue. As God is essentially the 
infinite being, human beings are essentially finite and dependent beings. As 
dependent beings, the highest virtue for human beings is to acknowledge their 
complete dependence and to submit unconditionally to God.73 Christ manifests 
perfectly such absolute dependence. ‘It is fit that he that is the most excellent of all 
creatures, that is nearest and that is to be set highest by him in eternal honor and 
happiness, should be the greatest instance of obedience.’74 Due to this perfection in 
the manifestation of humility, Christ is worthy to become the king of all kings. Even 
in heaven, Christ is still aware of the infinite distance between the Father and his 
human nature. His perfect humility persists in eternity. His humility is the perfect 
example for all the saints and the most excellent person ever.75 The excellency of 
human beings lies in their perfect submission to God.76  
                                                 
71 Ibid. 19:590. 
72 Bush, Jesus Christ, 180.  
73 From Edwards’ first published work, a sermon preached in 1730 called God Glorified in Man’s 
Dependence (Works 17:196-216), this emphasis on the greatness of God and our need for obedience 
permeates the whole corpus of Edwards’ works. As another example, in the first sermon of Charity 
and its Fruits, Edwards emphasizes that divine love flows from a sense of the greatness of God. This 
love ‘will dispose to all acts of obedience to God.’ (Works 8:134). 
74 Misc. 664b, Works 18:203. 
75 Moreover, Christ’s humility is an example to angels too. ‘CHRIST’S HUMILATION many ways 
laid a foundation for the humiliation of all elect creatures… It tends to humble the ELECT ANGELS, 
and to set ’em forever at an immense distance from any thought that anything that God can 
require ’em can be too great an abasement.’ (Misc. 941, Works 20:199) Thus Christ is a 
counter-example of Lucifer for the angels. 
76 While acknowledging and expounding the role of Christ as an moral example, Bush also notes that 
Christ does not play a very significant role in the ethics of Edwards (Jesus Christ, 197). He cites 
Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’ Moral Thought and its British Context (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1981) as an indication that one can write an important monograph on 
Edwards’ moral thought without referring to Christ at all. A better definition of ethics is needed here. 
Fiering’s work is a study of the moral philosophy of Edwards, which means (in the vocabulary of 
Edwards’ time) the theory of the human psyche in Edwards. Edwards indeed develops his 
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Edwards magnifies the humility by stressing the divine origin of the person of 
Christ: 
 
To be sensible of the greatness of the trial of those virtues in Christ that were 
exercised under his sufferings, two things must be considered: (1) the infinite height 
and dignity of his person and state, and (2) the degree of suffering and humiliation 
that he was subject to.77 
 
In The Excellency of Christ, the repeated conjunctions of so-called incompatible 
excellencies are meant to make these two points sensible to the audience. On the one 
hand, Christ has the infinite glory of the divine nature. On the other hand, Christ has 
the glory of humility proper to his human nature to its highest degree. For Edwards, 
the humility of Christ is made all the more remarkable by his status as the Son of 
God. The application section exhorts us to trust in his divine power as well as his 
human humbleness. The first guarantees that he can help us; the second guarantees 
that he will not refuse to help us. 
 
B. Edwards and Barth on the Beautiful Christ 
How does Edwards’ understanding of the excellencies of Christ relate to his 
general theory of beauty? In particular, what is the relationship between the beauty of 
the incarnate Son and the Trinity? When the question is posed this way, we find that 
there is a strict dichotomy of human and divine beauty in Edwards’ exposition. This 
dichotomy is crucial to Edwards’ conception of the beauty of Christ. As we have 
indicated, the main human virtue exhibited by Christ is his humility. However, as 
indicated above, Edwards also believes that humility is a virtue only proper to 
creatures. Humility means humble submission to someone. There is no one to which 
God should or would submit to. The divine Son, properly speaking, cannot be 
humble. In the section on the covenant of redemption, we have seen that the 
Incarnation does involve a kind of humility for the Son. He has to humble himself to 
the status of a creature. We also indicate that this is foreign to the intra-Trinitarian 
life of God; thus this is not a natural extension of the beauty of God. When Edwards 
limits the virtue of humility to the human nature, he is consistent with his exposition 
                                                                                                                                          
anthropology quite separated from his Christology. On the other hand, if we understand Christian 
ethics as the study of the moral principles for actions for the saints, then Christ’s example is an 
indispensable element. We can affirm this by studying how the moral ideal of Charity and its Fruits, 
Edwards’ most comprehensive work on Christian ethics, is mirrored in Edwards’ depiction of the 
virtues of Christ. This is an area for future work. 
77 Misc. 791, Works 18:489. 
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on the covenant of redemption. The human beauty of the Redeemer is demonstrated 
in the man Jesus being humble to God and people. The divine Son cannot and should 
not be humble to people. 
What is the divine glory in Christ? Most of the time, it is veiled in humility.78 
Yet it shines forth when the shepherds come to adore the infant Jesus, when the 
teenage Jesus disputes with the doctors in the temple, when Jesus is transformed at 
Mount Tabor.79 The Cross is the supreme manifestation of humility. Yet after the 
Resurrection, Christ’s divine glory shines forth brilliantly in the heavenly council, as 
recorded in the fifth chapter of the book of Revelation.80 In other words, the divine 
glory of Christ is manifested only when he no longer acts as a humble servant, but as 
judge and king. The divine glory and human glory are manifested in different 
moments in Christ’s life, as divine virtue is incompatible with creaturely virtue. For 
Edwards, it is virtuous for God to judge and rule; it is indecent for God to be weak 
and humble. It is virtuous for human beings to be meek and humble; it is a 
manifestation of pride for human beings to exalt themselves as judge and king.  
What is the theological importance of this separation of divine and human glory? 
The importance is that, like his discussion on the covenant of redemption, Edwards 
has essentially blocked any attempt to interpret the glory of God through the gospel 
story. Edwards indicates that the Incarnation and Crucifixion do not add anything to 
the glory of God. Indeed, they are not even natural manifestations of divine. Rather, 
they are divine glory veiled in human humility with the purpose of drawing our heart 
to God. While the weak may be dazzled and frightened by naked divine glory, they 
may be attracted and encouraged by the gentle glory of the incarnate Son. The 
Incarnation does not reveal another dimension of divine beauty. It is God manifesting 
himself in human glory. The life of Christ makes proper human glory sensible to us 
in ways impossible without the Incarnation. For Edwards, sensing our proper glory 
will draw us to our Redeemer. We are naturally drawn to someone who epitomizes 
our situation as mere creatures. 
According to Edwards’ aesthetic theory, the beauty of spiritual beings is 
                                                 
78 ‘Now such is the nature of all creatures, that the seeing of this [Christ being made a curse before 
God and men] would have tended to have diminished that humble adoration of Christ’s infinite 
highness and glory and awful majesty. It would have tended to take off the awe of their mind, and to 
have made the object to appear more cheap, and less adorable.’ (Misc. 944, 20:202) According to 
Edwards, this implies that God revealed to angels during the time of Incarnation the great 
eschatological misery of those who reject Christ. Only then will the angels maintain a proper respect 
for Christ. 
79 Excellency of Christ, Works 19:574-5. 
80 Ibid., 19:576. 
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proportional love according to the scale of being. The metaphysical gap between God 
and creatures means that there is a radical difference between divine beauty and 
creaturely beauty. The beauty of God is his infinite love for the God-self. The 
Incarnation is definitely not a manifestation of God’s self-love. The Incarnation is a 
mystery that lies beyond the explanation of Edwards’ aesthetic theory. Christ 
manifests divine glory only to the extent that he asserts the authority and power of 
the Creator. On the other hand, the beauty of human beings lies in loving God 
unreservedly. Christ is the supreme example of such absolute dependence on God. 
Though the two kinds of excellencies are placed together the one God-man, they 
remain separate without mixing. Edwards’ theory of aesthetics will not allow such 
mixing. 
To further understand the significance of Edwards’ aesthetic theory, we may 
contrast it with Barth’s understanding of divine beauty. Barth defines divine beauty 
as follows: 
 
If we can and must say that God is beautiful, to say this is to say how He enlightens 
and convinces and persuades us… Or rather, He has it as a fact and a power in such a 
way that He acts as the One who gives pleasure, creates desire and rewards with 
enjoyment… God loves us as the One who is worthy of love as God.81 
 
For Barth, to say that God is beautiful is to say that God’s revelation is totally 
pleasant and enjoyable. God’s proclamation is not only majesty, but also lovely. Yet 
Barth refuses to give a formal definition of such loveliness. A formal definition of 
divine beauty will lead us into aestheticism.82 We can only perceive this beauty 
when God’s revelation speaks to us and creates joy in us. For Barth, the triunity of 
God is one example of divine beauty. Why is triunity beautiful? ‘It is radiant, and 
what it radiates is joy. It attracts and therefore it conquers. It is, therefore, 
beautiful.’83 In other words, the triunity of God is beautiful not because it 
corresponds to some preconceived idea of beauty, but because it has the capacity to 
kindle joy in our heart. 
Barth also believes our Redeemer is beautiful, but in ways radically different 
from Edwards. For Barth, the condescension of God in the act of Incarnation is 
precisely the manifestation of divine glory: 
 
                                                 
81 Church Dogmatics II.1, The Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 650-1.. 
82 Ibid., 652, 656. 
83 Ibid., 661. 
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God could not be more glorious as God than in this inconceivable humiliation of 
Himself to man and the no less inconceivable exaltation of man to Himself. He is 
glorious in this very differentiation, this renunciation of Himself. And this, His 
supreme work towards what is outside Him, is the reflection and image we see Him 
as He is in Himself.84 
 
For Edwards, the Incarnation is an ad hoc act of the Trinity that requires a special 
intra-Trinitarian covenant as its foundation. For Barth, the Incarnation is a reflection 
of what ‘He is in himself.’  
What does the Incarnation tell us about the essence of God? 
 
He is One, and yet not imprisoned or bound to be merely one. He is identical with 
Himself, and yet free to be another as well; simple and yet manifold; at peace with 
Himself, yet also alive.85 
 
The essence of God is that while always remaining God, God is free to become 
another and bring the other into the Godhead. This is the beauty of God revealed in 
Christ. For Barth, there are no separate moments in which divine and human glory 
are alternatively displayed. The whole life of Christ is the story of the divine 
condescension and the exaltation of humanity. This capacity for the communion with 
the other is the beauty of God. 
To elaborate his point, Barth claims that the glory of Solomon’s temple is not 
real beauty: 
 
…in Solomon’s glory as such we are not really dealing with beauty but rather with 
its preconditions: riches, brilliance, magnificence, inexhaustible possessions and the 
lavish development of material means for it.86 
 
For Barth, Solomon represents cold magnificence. It is the beauty of Athens, the 
splendor of this world. In contrast, the beauty of Jerusalem is ‘the divinely human 
beauty of its God in the form of its Messiah.’ For Barth, it is either the beautiful 
forms of this world or the personal beauty of God. If true beauty is the person and 
revelation of God, and God is radically different from any objects of this world, then 
true beauty is radically different from the beauty of this world. We cannot come to 
understand divine beauty if we start from the meaning of beauty in the secular world. 
There are many questions we can pose to Barth. If divine beauty is so radically 
different from other kinds of beauty, does it mean anything to call God beautiful? Or, 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 663. 
85 Ibid., 663. 
86 Ibid., 664 
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putting it the other way, does it not make beauty of this world irrelevant or even 
demonic to the saints? With his emphasis on beauty as communion between God and 
another, does it not make God’s beauty correlative to something external to God? In 
other words, can God be beautiful without human beings? More crucial to Barth’s 
project, is his interpretation of the Incarnation just another conceptual interpretation? 
Has not Barth just substituted one formal definition of beauty (communion between 
the divine and the human) for other definitions? Why should the Incarnation serve as 
the exclusive standard for understanding divine beauty?87 However, Barth is not our 
concern here. We shall return to some of these questions in our concluding chapter. 
We bring in Barth here merely to demonstrate an alternative theological aesthetics 
with a radically different methodology. For Barth, divine beauty is an event that 
cannot be given any definition. Barth wants the story of Jesus to be the controlling 
factor in understanding divine beauty. The meaning of the Christ-event is the 
manifestation of divine beauty 
Edwards starts with a general theory of aesthetics and applies it to discover the 
excellencies of Christ. In particular, his concept of spiritual beauty finds a perfect 
example in Jesus. The strength of Edwards’ approach is that we can readily relate 
divine beauty to other kinds of beauty. Edwards clearly demonstrates how God can 
be the source and norm of all beauty. On the other hand, Edwards also indicates how 
God is beautiful in himself without reference to any external things. The danger of 
this approach is that every general theory must be selective. Significantly, Edwards 
does not give an explanation for the Son entering into a covenant of redemption. In 
his writings, Edwards often reminds us that Christ’s love for his brothers and sisters 
motivates him to bear his sufferings. Yet, this already assumes that Christ regards 
human beings as his brothers and sisters. Why should the divine Son regard sinners 
as his brothers and sisters in the first place? This issue will become more prominent 
when the question of hell is brought into discussion. Edwards applies all aspects of 
his theological aesthetics in the defense of the doctrine of hell. This will be the topic 
for our next chapter. 
                                                 
87 ‘… we not only may but must say also that even in His glorification through creation God wills to 
be and actually is God and glorious, that it is not too small a thing of His glorification through creation. 
But we must keep strictly to Jesus Christ. It is indeed only of Him that we can speak when we dare to 
say such extravagant things about ourselves and the rest of creation.’ Ibid., 668. 
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Chapter Six: Eschatological Beauty 
For Edwards, the eschaton is the final and supreme manifestation of divine 
glory: 
 
And when the Creator takes the world in hand the second time, it will be as a Creator, 
not only bringing to pass some external change of the order and situation of the more 
gross parts, but will cause a most inward change in the nature of things, and bring all 
in that respect into a much more perfect state (it being their last and eternal state), 
more fit to show forth the glory of his perfections.1 
 
Since the eschaton is the eternal state, Edwards deduces that it must also be the 
perfect state. God will have finished perfecting his creation by that time. Therefore 
the eschaton is the end or telos of creation and providence. The eschaton is the 
fulfillment of the work of redemption, and the work of redemption is the greatest 
work of God: 
  
We see that all revolutions in the world are to subserve to this grand design, so that 
the Work of Redemption is, as it were, the sum of God’s works of providence. This 
shows us how much greater the Work of Redemption is than the work of creation, 
for I have several times observed before that the work of providence is greater than 
the work of creation because ’tis the end of it, as the use of house is the end of the 
building of an house. 
 
And so all the decrees of God do some way or other belong to that eternal covenant 
of redemption that was between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the 
world; every decree of God is some way or other reducible to that covenant.2 
 
Edwards’ vision is purpose-driven. The God of Edwards does everything 
according to his final purpose. The end guides the beginning and the middle. 
Creation is the beginning; providence is the middle; and fulfillment of the work of 
redemption in the eschaton is the end. Since redemption is the last end temporally, it 
must also logically be the ultimate end. Since the work of redemption is founded 
upon the covenant of redemption, Edwards can claim that ‘every decree of God is 
some way or other reducible to that covenant.’ For Edwards, every decree of God is 
ultimately directed towards the final end. We may question whether the temporal end 
must necessarily also be the logical end of all of God’s work. We may think that 
alternatively, that all works of God are glorious in and of themselves. It may be 
questionable that all of God’s decrees should be or can be explained by the eschaton. 
                                                 
1 Misc. 929, Works 20:172 
2 History of Redemption, 29th sermon, Works 9:513. 
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However, the importance of eschatological beauty in Edwards’ thought is 
unquestionable. 
What is the final end of the work of redemption? It is the arrival of heaven and 
hell: 
 
The glorious issue of this whole affair, this has been discoursed this day in this 
sermon in the perfect and eternal destructionof the wicked, and in that 
consummate gloryof the saints.3 
 
For Edwards, the redeeming of the elect to heaven and the casting of the 
enemies of the elect to hell are two parts in the one work of redemption. The church 
will ‘enter the harbor and landed in the highest heavens, in complete and everlasting 
glory,’ with ‘all the church’s enemies fixed in endless misery.’4 The promise of the 
Father to the Son in the covenant of redemption includes both the joy of heaven and 
the triumph over the Son’s enemies.5 For Edwards, both heaven and hell are the 
glorious promises of the Father in the covenant of redemption. 
This chapter will explore the glories of heaven and hell. There are different 
questions that the doctrines of heaven and hell address; we shall concentrate on the 
question of the beauty or glories of heaven and hell. We shall argue that the glories 
of heaven and hell basically, though not exclusively, reflect two different kinds of 
glories. These two kinds of glories actually permeate much of Edwards’ theology, 
giving it unresolved tensions as well as remarkable richness. Edwardsian scholars in 
the past have overlooked this diversity and tension. We shall begin on a more 
hopeful note – the beauty of heaven. Then we shall discuss the beauty of hell. Finally, 
we address the question of theological consistency between the two kinds of glory. 
 
6.1. Beauty of Heaven 
A. Background 
The Reformed scholastic traditions do not spend a lot of time speculating on the 
beauty of heaven. They all agree that heaven must be a most blessed place, but they 
usually do not speculate on the nature of that joy. They also agree that the souls of 
the saints immediately go to heaven after death. Regarding the intermediate state (the 
stage between our death and our final bodily resurrection), the Westminster 
Confession of Faith categorically rejects the theory of soul-sleep. It says that: 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 9:512. Words in bracket are added by the editor (John Wilson) to the manuscript. 
4 Ibid. 9:508. 
5 Ibid. 9:509. 
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The bodies of men, after death, return to dust, and see corruption: but their souls, 
which neither die nor sleep, having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to 
God who gave them: the souls of the righteous, being made perfect in holiness, are 
received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and 
glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies.6 
 
Regarding the final glory, the Confession has only this short statement: 
 
At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead 
shall be raised up, with the self-same bodies, and none other (although with different 
qualities), which shall be united again to their souls for ever.7 
 
The focus of the confession is on the fact of bodily resurrection, rather than the 
nature of the joy in heaven. The phrase ‘self-same bodies’ emphasizes the continuity 
between our bodies in this world and our eschatological body. The focus of the 
confession is in harmony with Calvin. His chapter on the final resurrection in the 
Institutes8 defends the belief of bodily resurrection against the pagan idea of 
immorality. For Calvin, we need to meditate on the glory of heaven so that we shall 
not be overcome by trials and temptations in this world. He said little about the 
nature of heavenly glory. 
The Continental Reformed scholastic tradition gives a similar story. It rejects 
the theory of soul-sleep.9 It does not enter into extensive discussion about the nature 
of the glory of heaven. It does believe that bodily resurrection and bodily glory are 
part of the picture. ‘There will be added the clarification of their bodies, supreme 
beauty and majesty, by which they will be made like to Christ’s glorious body.’10 
Our heavenly beauty will be Christocentric: 
 
Life eternal is the glorious state in which, after the coming resurrection of the dead, 
the elect, united most fully to Christ their Head, are to know God in heaven along 
with the angels, to enjoy His presence and to celebrate it eternally, to obtain the 
highest good acquired for us by Christ, to be conformed in body and the soul to His 
image, so far as he is man.11 
 
Besides the image of Christ, the greatest beauty in heaven is the vision of God: 
 
                                                 
6 WCF 32.1. 
7 WCF 32.2. 
8 Institutes of Christian Religion, Bk. 3, ch. 25. 
9 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 696. 
10 Ibid., 707-8. 
11 Ibid., 706-7. 
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The form of eternal life consists in (1) the clearest vision of God, which is the 
intuitive awareness of God; and the mental [vision] if God’s spiritual essence is in 
view, the ocular [vision] in God incarnate such as the angels have.12 
 
Therefore, we shall see the beauty of God both with our bodily eyes and with our 
mind. There are both spiritual and bodily sensibilities in heaven, and they will both 
rejoice in the beauty of the vision of God. 
As for the Puritans, they build their picture of heaven around Christology. ‘In 
Puritan theology the extra calvinisticum serves as the foundation for heaven’s 
christological focus.’13 In a nutshell, it means that the divinity of the Son is not 
circumvented by the humanity of the man Jesus. The infinite life of the Godhead is 
beyond the comprehension of the human spirit. We cannot approach God directly; 
we must approach God through the mediation of Christ. In heaven, saints will behold 
the glory of God only through the glory of Christ. 
Among the Puritans, Owen provides some of the most detail theological 
speculations about the glory of heaven. In his work Meditations and Discourses on 
the Glory of Christ, Owen speculates on the difference between the glory of Christ 
enjoyed by saints on earth and that enjoyed by saints in heaven. The key Scripture 
verse is 2 Cor. 5:7: ‘We walk by faith, not by sight.’ For Owen, this spells out the 
difference between our joy on earth and our joy in heaven. While on earth, we can 
only behold Christ’s glory by faith through the gospel. Christ’s glory in itself is 
always perfect. However, the means we use to behold it is imperfect. ‘This is our 
faith, which, as it is in us, being weak and imperfect, we comprehend the 
representation that is made unto us of the glory of Christ as men do the sense of a 
dark saying, a riddle, a parable.’14 The limitation lies within our capacity. We have 
no capacity to comprehend Christ’s glory directly. Even if Christ were to stand 
before us in his full glory, we would not be able to apprehend the glory.15  
By contrast, ‘in the vision which we shall have above, the whole glory of Christ 
will be at once and always represented unto us; and we shall be enabled in one act of 
the light of glory to comprehend it.’16 First, we shall behold the substance of Christ’s 
glory. ‘There are three things to be considered concerning the glory of Christ, three 
degrees in its manifestation, — the shadow, the perfect image, and the substance 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 707. 
13 Carl R. Trueman, ‘Heaven and Hell: (12) In Puritan Theology’ Epworth Review 22/3 (1995), 77. 
14 Meditations and Discourses on the Glory of Christ, ch. 12, p. 485. 
15 Ibid., 489. 
16 Ibid., 526. 
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itself.’17 The Old Testament is the shadow, the gospel is the perfect image, and 
heaven is the substance. Second, our faculties will be perfected to view Christ’s glory. 
Our mind will be cleansed from all sins and weakness. In particular, we shall learn 
spiritual truth in ways exceeding the capacity of the bodily faculties.18 Moreover, ‘in 
heaven there shall be a superadded light of glory, which shall make the mind itself 
“shine as the firmament,” Daniel 12:3.’19 Just as the natural light of the mind cannot 
comprehend the gospel, so the gospel light that makes us Christian is not sufficient to 
comprehend Christ’s glory directly. A new kind of light of grace will supplement the 
natural light and the gospel to enable saints in heaven to behold Christ’s glory 
face-to-face. Lastly, our bodily faculties will be perfected so that we can see the 
glorious Christ with our eyes. For Owen, the glorious Jesus that Stephen beheld at 
his martyrdom (Acts 6) is the prototype of what we shall see with our eyes in heaven.   
Besides the different instruments (faith and vision), Owen also differentiates the 
effect of Christ’s glory on earthly saints and on heavenly saints. In heaven, the glory 
of Christ will transform us into the perfect image of Christ. On earth, the image of 
Christ in us is never perfect.20 In heaven, the glory of Christ will also give us perfect 
rest and blessedness.21 
In summary, both the Puritans and the Reformed schoolmen look upon heavenly 
glory mainly as a consolation for our earthly trials and a motivation to persevere in 
holiness. They do not usually speculate on the nature of heavenly glory. When they 
do enter into such speculations, they portray a Christocentric glory. The glory of 
heaven is the glory of Christ made manifest in a way that is impossible for earthly 
saints to comprehend. The tradition is insistent that the saints’ physical body will be 
resurrected at the eschaton. The body will be beautiful in that it is incorruptible and it 
will have superadded ability to behold divine glory. 
 
B. Christ and the Saints 
Turning our attention to Edwards, we find that his speculations move mostly 
within the Puritan and Reformed tradition. On points of detail about heavenly joy, he 
goes beyond his tradition. Most of Edwards’ musing about heaven are scattered in 
various Miscellanies. For our exposition, we adopt the framework of True Saints, 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 498. 
18 Ibid., 491. 
19 Ibid., 492. 
20 Ibid., 526. 
21 Ibid., 530. 
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When Absent from the Body, are Present with the Lord.22 This is a funeral sermon, 
and its theme is the blessedness of the saints who have passed from this world into 
the presence of the Lord. Strictly speaking, the theme is not the glory of the 
eschatological heaven. However, there is much continuity between the glory of the 
intermediate state and the eschatological heaven. This sermon represents the most 
systematic exposition of the glory of heaven among Edwards’ writings. We shall 
quote mostly from Miscellanies to illustrate various important concepts. 
Edwards lists five kinds of glory enjoyed by separated souls.23 The first is that 
they dwell ‘in the same blessed abode with the glorified human nature of Christ.’24 
Edwards does not explicitly discuss the relationship between the heaven of the 
intermediate state and the eschatological heaven. We do know that Edwards believes 
in a physical heaven analogous to our physical world. Edwards occasionally 
speculates about the physics of heaven.25 The glory of the saints is incomplete 
without bodily glory. In the eschatological heaven, the resurrected bodies of the 
saints will be beautiful in look and in manners.26 Its appearance shall reflect the 
beauty of the souls. Our bodies will be the heavenly suns, filling the heaven with 
light.27 Our bodies will experience exquisite bodily pleasures that amplify our 
spiritual pleasure.28 While on earth, our bodily pleasures may be harmful to our 
spirit (e.g. fornication). In heaven, our body and soul will be in perfect harmony, so 
that bodily pleasures will complement spiritual pleasures perfectly.29 Edwards is 
insistent that the spiritual beauty of saints is superior to their bodily beauty.30 
However, his speculations center on how the heavenly body helps us to experience 
the beauty of heaven. Edwards is insistent that the body exhibits and enjoys the 
                                                 
22 Works (BT) 2:26-36. Edwards preached the sermon at the funeral service of David Brainerd in 
October, 1747. 
23 A term employed by Edwards to describe the soul in the intermediate state, after the death of the 
physical body but before the bodily resurrection at eschaton.  
24 Ibid. 2:27. 
25 In Misc. 154 (Works 13:303), Edwards argues that the resurrection of Jesus requires the reassembly 
of every atom that has ever belonged to the body of Jesus. The accomplishment of such daunting 
logistics obviously proves the divinity of Christ. Edwards is not timid in laying out heavenly physics! 
By implication, our bodily resurrection would require some kind of reassembly of scattered atoms. 
Edwards never considers what would happen if the same atom belongs to two or more saints. In Misc. 
182 (Works 13:328-9), Edwards argues that even the color and sound in heaven are beautiful than 
those on earth. In Misc. 263 (13:369-70), Edwards states that in heaven we will be able to discern 
variation in sound much better, and so will our eyes be much more sensible to light. 
26 Misc. 149, Works 13:301. 
27 Misc. 263, Works 13:369-70. 
28 Misc. 233, Works 13:351. 
29 Misc. 95, Works 13:263. 
30 Misc. 149, Works 13:301. 
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beauty of heaven, along with the mind.  
Why is Edwards so interested in the bodily aspect of heavenly beauty? First, the 
Puritan tradition has always emphasized the fact of bodily resurrection. Second, the 
young Jonathan Edwards is fascinated with speculations about natural sciences. The 
speculations about the nature of the heavenly body are extension of his early 
scientific speculations. Third, and theologically most important, it is motivated by his 
Christology. Edwards emphasizes that we dwell in the abode of the human nature of 
Christ. If Christ’s body is in heaven, then his body is part of the glory of Christ. If 
Christ’s body is part of heavenly glory, then our body must also be part of heavenly 
glory too. Even in heaven, when we are not confined to surviving and 
communicating through the body, the body adds a further dimension of beauty to the 
beauty of the mind. The creativity of Edwards lies in relating the spiritual dimension 
to bodily dimension through the concepts of harmony and representation. In heaven, 
as in earth, the body is an outward representation of spiritual beauty. In heaven, the 
representation and substance (the mind) will be in perfect harmony. 
The second glory of the heavenly saints is that they ‘go to be with Christ, to 
dwell in the immediate, full, and constant view of him.’31 While on earth, saints can 
only behold the glory of Christ in a dark glass. In heaven, they  
 
see the glory of his divine nature, consisting in all the glory of the Godhead, the 
beauty of all his perfections; his great majesty, almighty power, his infinite wisdom, 
holiness, and grace, and they see the beauty of his glorified human nature, and the 
glory which the Father hath given him, as God-man and Mediator.32 
  
When we depart from this world, we do not need the material world as the 
medium for beholding Christ’s glory. We shall see divine glory immediately. We 
may use human communication as an analogy. In this world, we can communicate 
only through language or other forms of symbols. Our communication is always 
through a medium. I can never be sure that my understanding of your words is 
identical to your own understanding. Therefore, my understanding of your thoughts 
and feelings are always incomplete and subject to misunderstanding. If your thoughts 
and feelings can actually enter my mind directly, then I shall understand you in a 
much better way. Edwards speculates that, in heaven,  
 
there will [be] immediate views of minds, one of another and of the supreme mind, 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 2:28. 
32 Ibid. 2:28. 
143 
more immediate, clear and sensible than our views of bodily things with bodily 
eyes. … a clear and sensible apprehension of what is in [another] mind should be 
raised in our minds constantly, according to such and such laws.33  
 
Just like a person on earth can see the rainbow according to some physical laws, 
so saints in heaven can see the mind of one another according to some heavenly laws. 
We will have the faculty to receive sensible knowledge of the thoughts and feelings 
of another person. We will truly understand each other. Moreover, we will have 
sensible knowledge of spiritual beauty in a way impossible for people on earth. We 
can see, in a sensible way, the harmony between my love for you and your love for 
me. The harmony of minds shall give us a beauty more excellent and pleasurable 
than any harmonies in music.34 
Likewise we shall have a much better view of the beauty of Christ. On the one 
hand, our bodily organs shall be perfected. Our joy from the external senses will be 
great indeed: 
 
It will be in a sight of Christ’s external glory. And it will be so ordered in its degree 
and circumstances, as to be wholly and absolutely subservient to a spiritual light of 
that spiritual glory, of which this will be semblance and external representation.35 
  
However, the spiritual beauty of Christ will outshine his external glory. The 
saints will have a sensible knowledge of the spiritual beauty of Christ – the supreme 
mind. We shall see both the beauty of his divine nature and human nature. Edwards 
will elaborate the implications of such intimate knowledge in the next three points. 
The third glory is that ‘the souls of true saints, when absent from the body, go to 
be with Jesus Christ, as they are brought into a most perfect conformity to, and union 
with him.’36 As we have indicated, Edwards comes from traditions where the beauty 
of heaven is Christocentric. For Edwards also, union with Christ is the heart of the 
glory of heaven. One may say that heaven is possible only because of Christ: 
 
The external heaven surrounds Christ not merely as an house surrounds an 
inhabitant, … but rather as plants and flowers are before the sun, that have their life 
and beauty and being from that luminary, or as the sun may be encompassed round 
with reflections of his brightness, as the cloud of glory in Mt. Sinai surrounded 
Christ there.37 
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Christ does not merely happen to dwell in heaven; Christ sustains the very life 
and beauty of heaven. We can compare it to the relation between God and the world. 
God does not dwell in the world; God sustains the very existence of the world. Since 
Christ is the life-giving power in heaven, we can go to heaven only if we participate 
in the life of Christ. Edwards believes that, had Adam not sinned, he still could not 
go to heaven without Christ: 
 
Adam, our first head, was a native of this world; he was of the earth, earthly. And if 
he had stood he would have obtained eternal happiness here in his own country for 
himself [and] all his earthly posterity. But Christ, our second head, is one that 
properly belongs to heaven, and the happiness he obtains by his obedience for 
himself and his spiritual posterity is eternal blessedness in his country, even 
heaven.38 
 
Christ, by becoming our head, brings us a higher glory than what is possible 
under the covenant of works. In fact, with this Christocentric glory bestowed on us, 
we have a higher glory than even the angels: 
 
In the gradation of ends among the creatures, man is the highest step; the next 
immediate step is to God. Man was not created for any other creature, but it cannot 
be said so of the angels; for they are created for this end, to minister to the 
creatures. … I answer, that the angels will indeed evermore excel the saints in 
strength and wisdom, for their office requires [them] to be the universal ministers of 
God in the universe, but not in grace and sweet holiness and love to God; which 
excellencies are the highest, and the end of the order of power and wisdom: and only 
for the exercise of these it is that man is made, and these are the highest end of 
creatures in general. Therefore the children of God and the spouse of Christ, is more 
nearly related and more closely united to God than the angels; for whom God has 
done more than ever [he has] for angels, and who in may respects shall be advance 
above them in glory, and shall be objects of the dearer love of God.39 
 
Saints have a higher glory than angels for two different reasons. First, angels are 
made to serve us; we are not made to serve angels. Angels are made to serve Christ 
and all who belong to him. Second, though the angels are superior in their nature 
(power and wisdom), we are closer to God in a loving relationship. God’s love to 
Christ and Christ’s love to God is stronger than that between God and angels. Since 
saints are united to Christ, the loving relationship between Christ and God also 
applies to them. Since spiritual beauty lies not in nature but in affections, saints in 
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heaven are more beautiful than angels. 
The union between Christ and saints is a union of hearts and affections: 
 
The relative union is both begun and perfected at once, when the soul first being 
quickened by him closes with Christ by faith. The real union, consisting in the vital 
union and that of hearts and affections, is begun in this world, and perfected in the 
next.40 
 
The perfect union of hearts and affection will purge the saints of any deformities and 
sins: 
 
[I]t is impossible the least degree of sin and spiritual deformity should remain with 
such a view of the spiritual beauty and glory of Christ, as the saints enjoy in heaven, 
when they see that Sun of righteousness without a cloud.41 
 
Edwards is more emphatic than his predecessors in locating the union exactly in 
affections. This readily follows from the dispositional metaphysics of Edwards. By 
his understanding of human nature, union of affections is the real union of persons. 
Owen, for example, lays more emphasis on superadded grace in heaven. Owen does 
not venture to give a metaphysics of that grace. While Edwards has a most 
interesting metaphysics underlying his discussion about union with Christ, his 
doctrinal teachings on this point are mostly conservative. 
The fourth glory of saints in heaven is that ‘they enjoy a glorious and immediate 
intercourse and converse with him.’42 Edwards indicates by this that Christ is our 
closest friend in heaven. ‘For he is thus exalted, not only for himself, but for them; he 
is instated in this glory of head over all things for their sakes, that they might be 
exalted and glorified.’43 This friendship is one of the purposes of the Incarnation: 
 
Christ took on him man’s nature for this end, that he might be under advantage for a 
more familiar conversation than the infinite distance of the divine nature would 
allow of; and such a communion and familiar conversation is suitable to the relation 
that Christ stands in to believers, as their representative, their brother, and the 
husband of the church.44 
 
Since Christ was incarnated, we can have a more intimate relationship with him. 
It is not merely the relationship of creator and creatures, but also the relationship of 
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brothers and friends. Since we are brothers with Christ, we shall have the same kind 
of glory as his: 
 
Christ will conform his people to himself: he’ll give them his glory, the glory of his 
person; their souls shall be made like his soul, their bodies like to his glorious body; 
they shall partake with him in his riches, as co-heirs in his pleasures.45 
 
We shall have minds and bodies like Christ. This is similar to the concept of 
deification in the Easter Orthodox tradition. Of course, there is no evidence that 
Edwards is even acquainted with that tradition. Edwards is building on the Reformed 
and Puritan tradition of union with Christ, with distinctive emphasis on glorification 
of both body and mind. Since beauty is the agreement of being to being, this 
duplication of glory between Christ and the saints brings another dimension of 
beauty to heaven. Part of the beauty of heaven is the matching of the glory between 
Christ and the saints. 
 
C. The Trinity and the Saints 
The fifth glory is that ‘they are received to a glorious fellowship with Christ in 
his blessedness.’46 What is this blessedness? Edwards list three aspects. 
First, we share the blessedness of intra-Trinitarian life: 
 
The saints, by virtue of their union with Christ, and being his members, do in some 
sort partake of his child-like relation to the Father; and so are heirs with him of his 
happiness in the enjoyment of his Father; …47 
 
The saints being united to Christ, shall have a more glorious union with and 
enjoyment of the Father, … for being members of God’s own natural Son, they are 
partakers of his relation to the Father, or of his sonship.48 
 
As Christ is the Son of God, the saints also become the children of God through 
union with Christ. This gives the saints a higher glory than the angels.49 As we have 
shown in a previous chapter, intra-Trinitarian relationship is beauty itself. The saints 
participating in the intra-Trinitarian life discover the enlargement of beauty, or the 
enlargement of glory of God. In heaven, God will love the saints with a love similar 
to God’s love to his Son. God will love them as part of the family of God: 
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Being members of the son, they are partakers of the Father’s love to the Son and his 
complacence in him. … In this family or household, God [is] the Father, Jesus Christ 
is his own natural and eternally begotten Son. The saints, they also are children in 
the family; the church is the daughter of God, being the spouse of his son. They all 
have communion in the same spirit, the Holy Ghost.50  
 
Since we are members of God’s Trinitarian family, God loves us with the love 
he has for Christ – complacent love: 
 
He hath a real delight in the excellency and loveliness of the creature, in his own 
image in the creature, as that is a manifestation, or expression, or shining forth of his 
own loveliness. God has a real delight in his own loveliness, and he also has a real 
delight in the shining forth or glorifying of it.51 
 
As the Father loves the Son as his own image, so God loves his saints as his 
own image. ‘God’s love to the saints is real and proper love.’52 Since love is the 
beauty of spiritual beings, we can say that there is an increase of the glory of God in 
the heavenly companionship of saints. God has expanded the reach of his love. 
Edwards does not hesitate to say that there is a real relation between the Creator and 
creatures.53 The love of creatures to God and the love of God to creatures is part of 
the beauty of God. The beauty of heaven is simultaneously an outflow and an 
enlargement of the beauty of God. Edwards makes the bold move of incorporating 
the love of saints into the divine beauty. 
Yet Edwards also insists that this is not a real increment to the being of God: 
 
There is no proper addition to the happiness of God because ’tis that which he 
eternally and unalterably had. God, when he beholds his own glory shining forth in 
his image in the creature, and when he beholds creature made happy from the 
exercises of his goodness, because these and all things are from eternity equally 
present with God this delight in God can’t properly be said to be received from the 
creature, because it consists only in a delight in giving to the creature. … 
 
But yet in one sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight for the 
loveliness and happiness of the creature, viz. as God would be less happy if he were 
less good, or if it were possible for him to be hindered in exercising his own 
goodness, or to be hindered in exercising his own goodness, or to be hindered from 
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In these enigmatic remarks, Edwards tries to assert simultaneously that there is 
an increase in the delight of God and there is no increase in the glory of God (‘no 
proper addition to the happiness of God’). Why is there an increase of delight in God? 
If spiritual beings did not actually exist, God cannot love them as actual beings. 
Were God to be hindered in the work of creation, he would have less opportunity to 
exercise his delight. Compared with the scenario where (by some incomprehensible 
reasons) God was hindered from exercising his goodness by creating the world, the 
actuality of creation is an increase of God’s delight. The increase in delight is not a 
temporal change (God is happier now than he was before the temporal existence of 
the world), but it is an increase over a counter-factual situation.  
Why is there no proper addition to the happiness of God through the creation of 
the world? If the world is truly an extension of the intra-Trinitarian life, why is the 
world not an enlargement of God? Edwards offers two reasons: ‘these and all things 
are from eternity equally present with God’ and ‘it consists only in a delight in giving 
to the creature.’ The second reason is easier to understand, but is a weaker reason. 
Since we live and move and have our beings in God, our love to God cannot be said 
to be something outside God. There is nothing outside God that can give God a love 
that God does not already possess within him. So God’s delight in creature is only a 
delight of giving, not a delight of receiving something new. However, even if it is 
only a delight of giving, is there not an increase in God’s being in the sense that he 
can now exercise his power and love in a new way? Where previously there were no 
creatures to receive God’s love, now God has objects to receive his generosity. Is not 
an expansion of God’s field of activity an enlargement of God?55  
Edwards’ answer is that ‘these and all things are from eternity equally present 
with God.’ What does it mean to say that everything is eternally present with God? 
What does it mean to say that Socrates is present with God in the year 3,000 B.C.? 
Does Edwards mean that, similar to Aquinas, the idea of Socrates is present with 
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God in eternity? Given the different interpretations of this idea in Aquinas and 
Edwards, this is probably the wrong answer. For Edwards, the idea of Socrates in 
God is constitutive of the being of Socrates.56 Here we have to be speculative. Given 
the importance of the infinity of God in Edwards’ thought, we believe that things are 
all equally present with God with respect to their ontological weight. Socrates might 
not actually exist in 3,000 B.C., but God already knew at that time (and from eternity) 
that Socrates would come into existence. That knowledge and determination on the 
part of God is the ontological weight of Socrates. When Socrates actually came into 
existence, he did not actually add any ontological weight to the totality of beings. He 
is already included in God. In the same way, the ontological weight of God’s love for 
Socrates and Socrates love for God (assuming that he truly loved God) are already 
included in God from eternity. Its actual happening in time is not a proper addition to 
the happiness of God. 
The engrafting of the saints into divine beauty begins on earth, and reaches its 
fulfillment in the eschatological heaven. In the chapter on spiritual beauty, we have 
already shown how all true saints participate in the intra-Trinitarian life of God even 
while they are on earth. In heaven, this process is brought into completion. The 
divine glory shall reach its eternal climax. 
Second, the saints share the fellowship dominion that Christ exercises over his 
kingdom: 
 
As the glorified spouse of this great King reigns with and in him, in his dominion 
over the universe, so more especially does she partake with him in the joy and glory 
of his reign in his kingdom of grace; which is more peculiarly the kingdom wherein 
she is more especially interested.57 
 
Since the saints are members of Christ’s kingdom, they share in the glory of the 
victory of Christ’s kingdom. This implies the saints in the intermediate state are 
aware of affairs on earth. The saints in heaven watch the drama of the church on 
earth with greater joy than earthly saints. Christ reveals to them the meaning of every 
act in the drama:  
 
Thus Moses with great joy saw the promises of God fulfilled in bringing the children 
of Israel into Canaan, with far greater satisfaction than he would have seen it on 
earth; because he much better could see the glorious ends God proposed by it, and 
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his wonderful wisdom in that work.58 
 
Edwards argues in various Miscellanies that the saints in intermediate state 
know and rejoice in the progress of the gospel on earth.59 Edwards emphasizes that 
the saints in heaven and the saints on earth are one family. Saints in heaven will 
regards saints on earth as their friends and family members. We shall also recognize 
our earthly Christian friends in heaven.60  
 
D. The Humble Saints 
At this point, we shall bring in a dimension of heavenly glory that is not 
explicitly mentioned in Absent from Body. We have seen in the last chapter that there 
are two kinds of glory in Christ. The divine glory of Christ lies in its dominion over 
nature and Satan. We have seen that saints have fellowship with this glory of 
dominion. On the other hand, the human glory of Christ is his humility. Christ the 
man is most humble before God the Father, even in heaven. Edwards believes that 
saints in heaven will participate in this kind of glory too. This is important because 
there is a gradation of glory among saints in heaven. If saints are not perfectly 
humble, this will lead to jealousy. The gradation of glory is according to the capacity 
for glory of the saints, and this capacity is determined by God arbitrarily: 
 
The saints are like so many vessels of different sizes cast into a sea of happiness, 
where every vessel is full: this is eternal life, for a man forever to have his capacity 
filled. But after all, ’tis left to God’s own sovereign pleasure, ’tis this prerogative, to 
determine the largeness of the vessel; and he may determine how he pleases (Eph. 
4:7). Christ’s death and righteousness meddled not with this, but left in God’s 
prerogative to determine according to his pleasure; … nevertheless for what Christ 
has done, he may either dispense without condition or upon condition, and upon 
what condition he pleases to fix.61 
 
Our union with Christ implies that we shall all be filled to our capacity in 
heavenly joy. The saints in heaven truly participate in the joy that God enjoys 
himself (as part of the intra-Trinitarian life). The difference is the quantity. While the 
joy of God for the God-self is infinite, the saints can have only finite joy. God shall 
assign to each saint his capacity for joy according to the divine prerogative. We are 
not sure why Edwards insists on this particular prerogative. Does our heavenly 
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capacity bear no relationship to our earthly faithfulness? Perhaps Edwards thinks that 
this prerogative accentuates the distance between God and the saints. 
The difference in the capacity of joy means that humility is essential to the 
complete joy of saints in heaven. With perfect humility, the joy of the saints is not 
tainted by jealousy. For those that have less capacity (we shall call them the lower 
ones), their love for those with more capacity (we shall call them the higher ones) 
will make them rejoice in for others: 
 
For most certainly there is a pure, ardent, even inconceivably vehement mutual love 
between the glorified saints; and this love is in proportion to the perfection and 
amiableness of the object loved. Therefore, seeing their love to them is 
proportionable to the amiableness, it must necessarily cause delight when they see 
their happiness proportionable to their amiableness and so to their [own] love to 
them.62 
 
In other words, the saints in heaven will love one another in intensity in exact 
proportion to the loveliness of the other saints. Those higher ones, because of their 
greater joy, will have more loveliness. Heavenly joy is nothing but the love for God, 
and love for God is the essence of spiritual beauty. Therefore, those with more joy 
will have greater spiritual beauty or loveliness. The lesser ones will love the higher 
ones more intensely than they love themselves. Therefore, they will only rejoice in 
the fact that the higher ones have more joy than themselves.   
On the other hand, the higher ones will have simultaneously more humility 
when they behold more clearly the perfection of God: 
 
… as they see further into the divine perfections than others, so they shall penetrate 
further into the vast and infinite distance that is between them and God, and their 
delight of annihilating themselves, that God may be all, shall be greater.63 
 
The phrase ‘their delight of annihilating themselves’ is striking. For Edwards, 
the saints in heaven are intensely aware of the difference in beauty between God and 
creatures. This makes them quite aware that they are nothing when compared with 
God. The higher ones see deeper into the beauty of God; therefore they see deeper 
into their nothingness. The larger capacity actually implies that they are more humble 
than the lower ones can ever be. The higher ones and the lower ones all dwell 
together in perfect love for one another and in perfect contentment with their allotted 
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joy. 
We shall amplify the role of humility in heaven by making a small digression 
into the role of angels. Edwards occasionally speculates on angelology.64 His most 
distinctive thesis is on the trial for angels. Like human beings, angels are confirmed 
in their election by trial. The trial is based on ‘the creature’s principle of affectation 
of its own dignity and honor.’65 God use this affection as a test for the angels: 
 
God may give the angels a command which obedience to would really be no 
degradation to them, that yet might be of such a nature that nothing but a great and 
transcendent regard to God, and honor to him, and high exercise of it at that time, 
would make ’em think it not a degradation.66 
 
The first test is God’s decision that angels should minister to human beings, 
who are inferior to angels in their intellect and power.67 God revealed to the angels 
that one among the humankind will be their head and king. Lucifer the archangel 
refused to accept such degradation. He led the fallen angels in rebellion, and they 
were cast into darkness.68 God let Lucifer fell in order to teach a lesson of 
humiliation to the elect angels and the elect people: 
 
God in his providence was pleased thus to show the emptiness and vanity of the 
creature by suffering the insufficiency of the highest and most glorious of all 
creatures, the head and crown of the whole creation, to appear by his sudden fall 
from his glorious height into the lowest depth of hatefulness, deformity and misery.69 
 
This show that even the elect angels have their eternal life in a way of 
HUMILIATION and also dependence on sovereign grace, as well as elect men, 
though not the same sort of humiliation and dependence in all respects.70 
 
Having learned a first lesson of humility in the fall of Lucifer, their ultimate test 
is to behold the Son in the form of the lowly Jesus.71 Will they despise their Lord in 
this miserable form?  
 
They saw him in the human nature – its mean, defaced, broken, infirm, ruined state – 
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in the form of sinful flesh. And not only so, … but they saw him in much lower and 
meaner circumstances than the generality of those in that nature, in beggarly 
circumstances of mean birth, … And not only so, but they saw [him] under his last 
and greatest humiliation, standing as a malefactor, mocked and scourged and spit 
upon, and at last put to a most ignominious and accursed death, and continuing 
under the power of death for a time.72 
 
The angels who do not despise to serve such a wretched Lord are confirmed in 
their holiness and humility. They were judged and rewarded at Christ’s ascension, 
but their full reward comes only after the Day of Judgment. In that date, the angels 
are judged along with the saints. In that day, God will be exalted and all creatures 
will love him with perfect humility.73 
We shall conclude the exposition of Edwards’ sermon by pointing out the third 
dimension of the fifth aspect of heavenly glory: 
 
The departed souls of saints have fellowship with Christ, in his blessed and eternal 
employment of glorifying the Father. The happiness of heaven consists not only in 
contemplation, and a mere employment, but consists very much in action. And 
particularly in actively serving and glorifying God.74 
 
The glory in heaven is not static. It consists in everlasting and active praises 
from the saints. Moreover, they shall praise God with ever increasing knowledge of 
his excellency: 
 
That the glorified spirits shall grow in holiness and happiness to eternity, I argue 
from this foundation, that their number of ideas shall increase to eternity. …For as 
they increase in the knowledge of God and of the works of God, the more they will 
see of his excellency; and the more they see of his excellency, cæteris paribus, the 
more will they love him; and the more they love God, the more delight and 
happiness, cæteris paribus, will they have in him.75 
 
There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing 
communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, 
love to him, and joy in him.… For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that 
strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son.76 
 
Even in heaven, the saints will be growing in their true knowledge (i.e. by the 
                                                 
72 Misc. 664b.§8, Works 18:208. 
73 ‘Because God’s design was to show the emptiness of the creature and its exceeding insufficiency, 
therefore God suffered both angels and men quickly to fall, and the old creation quickly go to ruin.’ 
Misc. 936, Works 20:194. 
74 Absent from the Body, Works (BT), 2:31. 
75 Misc. 105, Works 13:105. 
76 End of Creation III, Works 8:443. 
154 
number of ideas) of God’s mercy. As their knowledge increases, so will their love 
and praises for God increase. As their love for and delight in God are forever 
increasing, their beauty will be forever increasing. It will get closer and closer to, but 
never reaching, the perfect union between the Father and the Son. Saints in heaven 
are contemplative in their knowledge of God and active in their praise of God. The 
beauty of heaven is dynamic and increasing all the time. 
 
E. Summary 
Let us do some recapitulation. Edwards believes that the eschatological glory of 
the saints has five aspects. First, the saints will dwell with Christ in the heavenly 
abode. Second, they have a constant view of the beauty of Christ. Third, they have a 
most perfect union and conformity with Christ. Fourth, they have intimate discourse 
with Christ. Fifth, they have fellowship with the blessedness of Christ. Under the 
fifth aspect of glory, there are three subdivisions. First, saints share in the 
blessedness of the fellowship between the Father and the Son. Second, they share in 
the dominion of Christ as king of the universe. We point out that saints also share in 
the humility of Christ as the perfect creature. We go into a digression about angels to 
show that even angels are followers of Christ in humility. Third, the saints will be 
increasing forever the ideas of divine glory in their mind. 
If we have to use one word to summarize Edwards’ picture of heavenly glory, it 
would be Christocentric. This is true in three different senses. On the simplest sense, 
every creature is heaven only because of the grace of Christ.77 Saints and angels 
become the inhabitants of Christ if and only if they are engrafted into the life of 
Christ. Heaven is the body of Christ. 
The second aspect is the intra-Trinitarian life of the Son of God. The glory of 
the saints in heaven is a participation in the love between the Father and the Son. The 
beauty of the saints is an emanation of the beauty of the Triune God. Saints possesses 
the same divine beauty of the Son, even if their finite beauty can never compare with 
the Son’s infinite beauty. 
The third aspect is that saints reflect the glory of the incarnate Son. Christ, in his 
incarnated form, is an embodied being. Likewise, saints in heaven are embodied 
beings. Their bodily beauty is part of the beauty of heaven. The incarnated Christ 
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possesses both divine and human glory. His divine glory is his perfect humility. 
Likewise, the saints in heaven are beautiful in their perfect humility. Christ is more 
aware of the Father’s perfection, so his humility is deeper than any saints or angels. 
Nonetheless, all saints and angels in heaven are perfectly humble to the extent made 
possible by their knowledge of God. 
In associating the beauty of heaven with the beauty of Christ, Edwards stands 
within the mainstream of the Reformed and Puritan traditions. Compared with his 
predecessors, Edwards has developed a richer theology of the glory of Christ. 
Consequently, Edwards can also give a richer theology of the glory of heaven. In 
particular, Edwards seems to stand alone in his tradition in emphasizing that saints in 
heaven exhibit both the divine and the human glory of Christ. In the area of divine 
glory, Edwards goes beyond the tradition in joining divine and human glory in the 
intra-Trinitarian dynamics. Owen, as we have discussed above, believes that saints in 
heaven will conform perfectly to the holiness of Christ. However, Owen does not 
equate the Holy Spirit unequivocally as the holiness of God. As a consequence, he 
does not speculate on the relation between the glory of heavenly saints and the glory 
of the Trinity. Edwards follows the Puritan tradition in stressing that saints conform 
perfectly in the holiness of Christ. He goes beyond the tradition in associating this 
holiness with the intra-Trinitarian life of God. In the human aspect, Edwards put 
humility as essential part of the beauty of saints and angels in heaven. In contrast to 
their humility, the greatness of God is magnified. This greatness of God is also the 
glory of God. However, this glory is different from the glory of the Trinitarian life of 
God. As we turn to the doctrine of hell, we find that this is the controlling concept of 
divine glory in Edwards’ theology. 
 
6.2. Beauty of Hell 
‘Edward was the most famous fire and brimstone preacher in the eighteenth 
century, and possibly the most famous in the entire history of Western civilization.’78 
His sermon Sinners in the Hand of the Angry God79 is probably the most well known 
and reprinted among the writings of Edwards. Edwards used to be perceived as a 
hellfire preacher, though the overall significance of hell in Edwards’ thought has 
been distorted by the bias of the editors of his writings.80 Some modern writers have 
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gone to the other extreme to minimize the importance of hell in Edwards’ thought.81 
We believe that his doctrine of hell is an integral part of the theology of Edwards. 
For our purpose, his polemics on hell helps us to understand better his understanding 
of the glory of God. 
 
A. Background  
Reformed scholasticism believes that the damned will actively suffer in hell. It 
distinguishes between the negative punishment of abandonment by God (poena 
damni) and the positive punishment of sensual suffering (poena sensus). The active 
suffering can be described in graphic terms. ‘The positive evils are manifold, being 
adumbrated by pains and tortures, by racks etc. and other things of the kind, which 
usually import evils of every sort, as much to soul as to body.’82 The main 
controversy at that time was the annihilationism of Socinianism. Thus the emphasis 
of the schoolmen is on the culpability of the damned and the eternity of hell. The 
sufferings of the damned will be proportional to the depth of their guilt. The 
schoolmen use forensic languages to defend their teaching on hell; it seems that they 
do not use aesthetic categories in their defense.  
Among the Puritans, Trueman discerns a certain asymmetry of their teachings 
on heaven and hell: ‘heaven has a christological reference, while hell has none.’83 
Hell is marked by the absence of God. On the other hand, the Puritans also 
emphasize the positive punishments of God in hell. This is sometimes described in 
graphic terms: 
 
Fire is that which of all things is the most insufferable, and insupportable. Wherefore, 
by fire, is shewed the grievous state of the ungodly, after Judgement. Who can eat 
fire? Yet this must the wicked do. Again, not only fire, but everlasting fire.84 
 
Is it not a terrible thing to a wretched soul, when it shall lie roaring perpetually in the 
flames of hell, and the God of mercy himself shall laugh at them; when they shall 
cry out for mercy, yea, for one drop of water, and God shall mock them instead of 
relieving them; when none in heaven or earth can help them but God, and he shall 
rejoice over them in their calamity.85 
 
                                                                                                                                          
(before the launch of the Yale edition) belong to the imprecatory type.  
81 See Fiering (Ibid., 200-1) and Stephen Holmes, God of Grace, 246. 
82 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 710. 
83 Trueman, ‘Heaven and Hell,’ 80. 
84 John Bunyans, Works III, 286-7, cited in Holmes, God of Grace, 206. 
85 Richard Baxter, Works 22, 419, cited in Holmes, God of Grace, 205. 
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Trueman points out another asymmetry between heaven and hell in Puritan 
writings: ‘while heaven is discussed using the language of the visual, hell is 
discussed using the language of the physical suffering of the flesh.’86 Heaven is 
described mainly in terms of the vision of God and Christ in order to avoid any 
suggestion of lust in heaven. Hell is described in physical terms to increase the sense 
of dread. This difference in language reflects the Bible’s own language, as well as 
medieval vocabulary of heaven and hell. 
In preaching hellfire, the Puritans are mainly concerned to convert sinners. They 
describe the terror of hell in graphic language in order to shake people out of their 
indifference. Baxter describes his own mission as: 
 
I am a messenger of the saddest tidings to thee, that ever yet thy ears did hear.… 
This sentence I am commanded to pass on thee, from the word: take it as thou wilt, 
and escape it if thou canst.87 
 
Trueman points out that a secondary concern of the Puritans is social discipline. 
They believe that the fear of hell is necessary for the restraint of lawlessness in the 
society.88 Beyond the Puritans, the belief of hell is widely perceived by people of the 
seventeen century as a necessary deterrent of evil.  
On the other hand are writers who find the doctrine of eternal punishment 
unacceptable. ‘By the fourth decade of the 18th century the doctrine of eternal 
torment for the damned was being challenged openly, though seldom.’89 The 
Socinians believe the eventual annihilation of the wicked. Locke, Newton and 
Samuel Clarke also believe that the punishment of the wicked is temporary. They 
believe that eternal torment is not compatible with a loving God. William Whiston is 
one of the few writers who openly write in opposition to eternal torment. Whiston 
proposes that the wicked will be offered a chance while waiting for the Last 
Judgment. The unrepentant ones will be judged and tormented for a period of time 
after the Last Judgment, and then they will be annihilated. These writers do not reject 
                                                 
86 Trueman, ‘Heaven and Hell,’ 80. 
87 Baxter, Works 22:361-2, cited in Holmes, God of Grace, 204. 
88 Trueman, ‘Heaven and Hell,’ 82. 
89 D.P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 1. We depend on Walker for our survey of the various views against 
hell. Fiering (Edwards’ Moral Thought, 225-38) provides excellent summary of the debate between 
Edwards and his opponents (including William Whiston, Shaftesbury, Tillotson and Samuel 
Richardson). They are widely read at Edwards’ time and they provide important arguments against 
eternal punishment. It is far more difficult to know if Edwards is writing in response to a specific 
author. See also Chris Morgan, Jonathan Edwards & Hell (Fearn: Mentor, 2004), 101-112. 
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the doctrine of hell completely. It is the eternity of torment that arouses their 
opposition. Shaftesbury has a more radical approach in denying the reasonableness 
of any kind of hell. For Shaftesbury, a person is virtuous only if she commits good 
for its own sake. If she does good out of fear of punishment, then she is not truly 
virtuous. Virtue, as a form of beauty, must be disinterested. 
To respond to these criticisms, one can show that somehow eternal torment is 
harmonious with the beauty or glory of God. If one can show that hell is of itself 
beautiful to the saints and God, then one takes away the strength of those opposing 
arguments that argue for hell’s incompatibility with divine mercy. Even if we reject 
hell as a deterrent for evil, we may embrace hell as a manifestation of divine glory. 
Edwards carries this line of defense further than any other Puritans. 
 
B. The Glory of Damnation 
Like other Puritans, Edwards’ preaching on hell has the pastoral function of 
urging people to accept Christ immediately. This is the purpose of his famous 
sermon Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God. He concludes the sermon with these 
words: 
 
The wrath of almighty God is now undoubtedly hanging over a great part of this 
congregation: let everyone fly out of Sodom. Haste and escape for your lives, look 
not behind you, escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed [Gen 19:17].90 
 
Edwards assumes that many in his congregation were in fact in danger of falling 
into the hands of the angry God; the sermon is an urgent plea to escape from this 
wretched fate. This pastoral purpose helps us to understand why Edwards preaches 
much more on hell than on heaven. The sermons on heaven are meant to be a 
comfort to Christians facing the problem of death. The sermons on hell are meant to 
be a call for hypocrites in the congregation to repent. For Edwards, the latter was a 
much more pressing problem.91 Most of Edwards’ teachings on heaven are 
theological speculations recorded in the Miscellanies. They tend to be more abstract 
and theological. The hell sermons are meant to scare people out of their complacency. 
Their language is much more graphic and vivid than the musings in the Miscellanies. 
                                                 
90 Works 22:418. 
91 This concern for hypocrisy gradually led Edwards to oppose Stoddardeanism (open admission to 
the Lord’s Supper), and consequently his dismissal from Northampton. For the laity, church 
membership is political and familial affairs, as well as spiritual affairs. Edwards was afraid that easy 
access to sacrament would encourage complacency among the people. See David D. Hall, 
‘Introduction’ in Ecclesiastical Writings, Works 12:51-62. 
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It may be questionable for modern people whether hellfire preaching is conducive to 
conversion. Nonetheless, the impact of these hellfire sermons on Edwards’ 
contemporaneous audience is indisputable.92 We shall not evaluate the pastoral 
merits or liabilities of such preaching.  
Moreover, Edwards intends to defend the belief in eternal punishment against 
theological attacks on this doctrine in the seventeenth century. Edwards’ substantive 
arguments for an eternal hell are regarded as definitive by at least one contemporary 
theologian.93 We shall not repeat the effort of Fiering and Morgan by entering into 
the details of this debate. We shall concentrate on a third question: in what sense can 
we say that hell is a manifestation of the glory of God?94 
In a nutshell, hell manifests the glory of God’s infinitude. Hell makes it clear 
that God is everything and everything else is nothing. To Edwards, a sensible 
knowledge of this truth is the manifestation of God’s glory. Hell manifests this 
majestic glory to both the damned and the saints. We shall begin with the experience 
of the damned. 
Although Edwards does not go into extremes in describing the horror of hell,95 
he insists that the extreme horror of hell is itself a manifestation of God’s glory: 
 
As God’s favor is infinitely desirable, so ’tis a part of his infinite awful majesty that 
his displeasure is infinitely dreadful; … If God’s majesty were not infinite, and his 
displeasure were not infinitely dreadful, he would be less glorious.96  
 
God’s wrath, which they shall experience, will doubtless be at least in the 
compounded proportion of that manifestation of majesty and or abhorrence of their 
sins, which they shall then see. … God’s wrath will be according to the 
manifestation or glory of God’s power, at the day of judgment.97 
 
                                                 
92 George Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, 220-224, describes the impact of the sermon Sinners in the 
Hand of an Angry God. 
93 Chris Morgan remarks, ‘In essence, Edwards’ theological approach annihilates the theological 
arguments of the annihilationists in contemporary evangelicalism.’(Ibid., 137). Morgan expounds 
Edwards’ theology of hell (113-127) and uses it to refute annihilationist teachings within 
contemporary British and American evangelicalism. However, Morgan’s brief exposition of Edwards’ 
theology hardly does justice to the sophistications of Edwards.  
94 Among contemporary Edwardian scholarship, Holmes, God of Grace, ch. 6, is the most relevant 
for our discussion. Edwards focuses his discussion the danger of hell and the glory of hell. There is 
little concern in Edwards for the social function of hell. In general, Edwards says little about the social 
function of religion in his apologetics (McClymond, Encounters with God, 105). 
95 ‘When Edwards’ sermons on the subject are read alongside the descriptions [of hell by Baxter and 
Bunyan] quoted earlier, what is striking is actually his reticence in graphic description of hell.’ 
Holmes, God of Grace, 211. 
96 Misc. 288, Works 13:381. 
97 Misc. 545, Works 18:90. 
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The infinite horror of hell is the reverse image of the infinite bliss of heaven. 
Both are the manifestation of the God’s infinite power. To be in heaven is to be 
engrafted into infinite joy of God’s internal life. To be in hell is to have God’s 
infinite being turned against the damned. To make things worse, the sense of God’s 
majesty will make them absolutely abhor themselves. There will be no heroic stand 
before God. Even their will shall be crushed, so that they have to swallow their 
sufferings in shame. For Edwards, the manifestation of displeasure must be 
consummate with the power of the displeased. If God’s wrath has not infinitely 
terrible, crushing both body and mind, then God is not infinite.  
If God is the sole source of life, then the wrath of God must be eternal death. 
The opposite of eternal life is not annihilation; it is eternal death. For Edwards, 
eternal death means something worse than annihilation: 
 
Without doubt the misery of the least of sinners that are damned is as terrible or 
more terrible than no existence, and such that those that endure it would choose 
rather to cease to be, and be in a state of eternal nonexistence.98 
 
Hell will be so horrible that the damned will prefer eternal non-existence to existence 
in hell. The reality of absolute death is ‘utterly to undo the subject of it. … The soul 
will be, as it were, utterly crushed; and the wrath will be intolerable.’99 In heaven, 
the glory of the Lord will bring the saints to such humility that they delight in their 
annihilation. In hell, the wrath of God will be so powerful that the damned will wish 
for their annihilation. In either case, God’s infinity is experienced by the creatures as 
a desire for nothingness. God’s glory is manifested in both heaven and hell. 
Edwards believes that the main source of sufferings in heaven will be the 
infinite wrath of God itself. Of course, there will be hellfire and the fire will hurt 
intensively.100 However, hellfire pales in comparison to the wrath of God: 
 
                                                 
98 Misc. 418, Works 13:477 
99 Wrath upon the Wicked to the Uttermost, Works (BT) 2:123. 
100 In parallel to the joy in heaven, Edwards emphasizes that the agony in hell will be both spiritual 
and sensible. ‘As the faculties of the souls of both saints and sinners will be greatly enlarged, and to 
no other end but to be capable of enjoying more happiness and receiving more misery, so, since the 
bodies of each are to be raised to the same ends, viz. in their manner to be the subjects of happiness 
and misery, there is no reason to suppose any other than the faculties of the body in each will be 
greatly enlarged, i.e. its sense, to be the inlets of more happiness or misery.’ (Misc. 921. Works 20:167) 
To the damned, ‘God enlarges their capableness of receiving misery or being made miserable, but he 
don’t make ’em strong to bear misery.’ (Misc. 656, Works 18:197) Edwards speculates on the physical 
nature of the eschatological conflagration and how the hell fire affects the damned (Misc. 863, 901, 
906, 924, 929-31, 1097), but discussion of this theme will be a digression from our focus on the glory 
of hell.  
161 
The spiritual misery of [the] damned will very much consist in the sense of the 
immense hatred and displeasure of God. I speak not of feeling or fearing the effects 
of God’s displeasure, but of the apprehension of that displeasure simply considered. 
Such is the nature of the soul, that simple apprehension of the hatred of another is 
unpleasant to it.101 
 
Edwards believes that the unpleasantness of the apprehension of hatred 
increases according to the four following criteria: the hater is close to us physically; 
the hater is a great being; the liveliness of that hatred to our sense; the paucity of 
good available to compensate for the hatred. In hell, there is no good left to comfort 
the damned.102 In hell, God will be maximally present. The damned will be 
devastated by the immense presence of God: 
 
They shall then see that he is, doubtless in a more full and clear manner, and with 
vastly more perfect apprehension, than we now see one another to be, or than we see 
the sun to be; and also shall see how great a being God is, and shall have the most 
quick and strong apprehensions of his greatness;… shall see that he is the great all, 
and all without him are nothing;…103 
 
Implicit in this account is that hell is the reverse image of heavenly joy. Beauty, 
according to Edwards, is agreement of being to beings. Beauty, according to 
Edwards again, is enjoyable. In hell, the damned experience is infinite antagonism 
(the opposite of agreement) of the primal Being to their beings. ‘How dreadful is it to 
be under the wrath of the First Being, the Being of beings, the great Creator and 
mighty possessor of heaven and earth!’104 Extending the terminology of Edwards, 
we may say that the damned experience maximal ugliness in hell. If beauty is 
enjoyable, then this ugliness must also be insufferable agony.105 
Does that turn God into a deus ex machina?106 Even if the wrath of infinite 
                                                 
101 Misc. 592, Works 18:125 
102 In Misc. 427 (Works 13:480), Edwards argues that our souls are created with a great need for the 
good. Merely the complete absence of good is insufferable agony.  
103 Misc. 592, Works 18:127. 
104 Natural Men in a Dreadful Condition, in The Wrath of Almighty God: Jonathan Edwards on 
God’s Judgment Against Sinners, ed. Don Kistler (Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria, 1996), 13-14. Wrath 
of Almighty God is a collection of the Edwards’ sermons on the theme of hell. 
105 ‘Again, the ill will and hatred of any being, though the meanest absolutely and in itself 
considered – is ungrateful and contrary to the disposition of nature, whether we in the least fear any 
injury as the effect of it or no. (And this will appear by what has been said under the head of 
excellency and love in our Discourse on the Mind.)’ (Misc. 232, Works 13:348-9) Edwards argues in 
the same note that, therefore, the just anger of the mighty God must be terrible suffering to the 
damned. 
106 ‘Thus, the salvation of a few may be exceptional, but in Edwards’s eyes it was not arbitrary, and 
the meaning of both election and reprobation was to be understood in terms of the inherent 
relationship of congruity between sin and punishment and between holiness and reward even more 
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being is automatically infinitely terrible, does God necessarily have to let his wrath 
run his full course? Does it not seem incredible that God should make any creature so 
miserable? Edwards answers that God has chosen not to give any second thought to 
the welfare of the damned, letting his wrath automatically fall fully on the damned: 
  
… for God will have no respect or consideration at all of the welfare of those that are 
damned, nor any concern lest they should suffer too much – they are the godly only, 
that God afflicts in measure (Is. 27:8, Jer. 30:11) – but only justice should take 
place.… The creature will be utterly lost and thrown away of God.107 
 
Following the Reformed tradition, Edwards divides people strictly into the 
saints and the damned. The division is based on God’s free and eternal foreordination. 
While on earth, both enjoy the blessings of God. In eternity, God will have no regard 
whatsoever to the damned. They will be punished according to strict justice. Two 
questions arise from this answer: is this bifurcation really just? Does this bifurcation 
enhance the glory of God?  
We shall briefly examine the question of justice, since it shows again the 
importance of aesthetic categories for Edwards. As a first answer, ‘it was the 
enormity of sin that justified hell.’108 The severity of sin justifies the severity of hell. 
Even trivial sin is utterly horrible because we are sinning against the infinite God: 
 
Sin is a thing of a dreadful nature, and that because it is against an infinitely great 
and infinitely holy God.… Sin rises up as an enemy against the Most High.… This 
will be very clear if we consider the difference between God and the creature, and 
how all creatures, compared with Him, are as the small dust of the balance, are as 
nothing, less than nothing, and vanity.109 
 
In other words, all sins are enmity against God. The greater is the person against 
                                                                                                                                          
than in terms of God’s self-glorification. A lawful God could have it no other way.’ Fiering, 
Edwards’s Moral Thought, 212-3. Here Fiering confuses reprobation with damnation. Once God has 
decided to cast away the damned, then damnation in hell is indeed the lawful and inherent 
consequence. However, the real question is why God chooses to cast away some and save others. Why 
is a bifurcation needed at all? As I shall argue, Edwards insists on the arbitrariness of the division as a 
manifestation of his glory.  
107 Misc. 545, Works 18:91. 
108 Fiering, Edwards’s Moral Thought, 260. 
109 Natural Men in a Dreadful Condition, in Wrath of Almighty God, 8. In Misc. 713 (Works 
18:343-344), Edwards argues that ‘the sin of the creature against God is ill-deserving in proportion to 
the distance there is between God and the creature.’ But ‘’tis the reverse with respect to the worthiness 
of the respect of the creature to God.’ While our sin is infinitely guilty, our obedience to God is 
practically worthless to God. So we can never balance our sins with our merits. Some may question 
how sins can have degrees of severity and yet all are infinitely guilty. Edwards gives the analogy of 
cylinders of infinite length. They all have infinite volume, yet one can be larger than another in 
diameter. 
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whom we rebel, the greater is the hideousness of our rebellion. Since God is 
infinitely great, our sins are infinitely guilty. 
If we think the above argument is unconvincing, Edwards argues that it comes 
from our insensitivity towards sin: 
 
When I read some instances of the monstrous and amazing cruelty of some popish 
persecutors, I have such a sense of the horridness of what they did, that the extremity 
of hell torments don’t seem too much for them.110 
 
Someone may object that petty sins are not really so horrible. Edwards believes 
that the insensibility to the horridness of sin is itself the consequence of our wicked 
nature. In other words, if we are not sensible of the horridness of our own sins, we 
are so much guiltier for it.111 The fairness of hell can be fully justified only by 
sensible knowledge, by applying the aesthetic category of horridness. 
However, this answer is inadequate. Given Edwards’ brand of Calvinism, God 
is ultimately responsible for all events on earth. Even sin is part of the will of God.112 
It is God who ordains that the damned are born with a sinful nature. Edwards still has 
to explain why God creates reprobates at all. As Holmes put it: ‘Can it ever be just 
for God to create human beings for no purpose other than to glorify Himself by 
damning them, as, according to Edwards, He does?’113 Edwards put it more 
elegantly: 
 
… doubtless they [the damned] will spend their eternity in blaspheming.… Why did 
God give me a being, when he knew I must perish forever? Why did he decree my 
damnation, and decree my sin in order [to] it? Why was I born with a corrupt nature, 
and under a necessity of sinning?114 
 
The answer given by Edwards is again a matter of sensible knowledge: 
 
Though wicked men, after they have been guilty of so much sin, do deserve it; 
though it must be acknowledged that there is a proportion between their sin and their 
punishment, yet why would he make men that he knew would be so wicked, and 
would deserve and must suffer such things?…it is much to be suspected that, 
notwithstanding the plausibleness of such an objection, the very principal reason of 
such thoughts arising in the mind is a want of a sense of the horrible evil of sin. This 
disposes us to pity the damned wretch, and that disposes to look back and reflect 
                                                 
110 Misc. 527, Works 13:70. 
111 Ibid., 13:71. 
112 Holmes, God of Grace, 223-233 gives an good account of this issue. 
113 Holmes, God of Grace, 232. 
114 Misc. 470, Works 13:511. 
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upon the Author of his being and orderer of his misery, because we han’t sense 
enough of the evil of sin to stir up indignation enough in us against it, to balance the 
horror that arises from a sense of the dreadfulness of his suffering. This makes us 
pity the sufferer, and this raises objections against God. For I don’t observe that, 
when I read the history of Antiochus Epiphanes and his sorrowful end, and so of 
other such cruel persecutors, the horribleness of whose practices I have a sense of, 
any such thought arises.115 
 
Edwards recognize that he cannot give a rational answer to the question of 
justice.116 Yet he suggests that the problem actually lies with the questioner. Why do 
we demand rational answers to the creation of reprobates? Edwards suggests that our 
motivation is pity.117 When we pity the damned, we begin to question the right of 
the Creator. Edwards believes that pity is the wrong response to the damnation of 
sinners. When we think of monstrous sinners such as Hitler, we do not feel any pity 
for them. Edwards claims that this shows that, when we have a sufficient sense of the 
monstrosity of sin, we will not feel any pity for the damned. Our sensibility of the 
ugliness of sin will convince us where rational argument fails: 
 
There are but two ways of the soul’s being convinced and silenced and stilled with 
respect to such things as these, either (1) by explaining of them to his understanding, 
untying the knots and unfolding the mysteries, so as to make the reason and justice 
of the things comprehensible by his reason: as probably the wicked will be 
convinced when they come to be judged; they will have their understandings so 
enlarged that they will be able to comprehend these things, and their Judge will set 
clear light before them, to convince them of the justice of their condemnation. And 
(2) the other way is by giving of the soul a sense of the glorious, holy and excellent 
nature of God. That gives it true humility and assures it that God must right and just 
in all things, and even in those things that it cannot comprehend.118 
 
We have to wait till the eschaton, when our understandings are enlarged, before 
we can have a full rational understanding of God’s justice in condemning sinners to 
hell. What we can have on earth is a sufficient sense of the glory of God that 
convinces us of the justice of God. The question of justice is ultimately answered by 
Edwards as a matter of aesthetic experience. If we have a sufficient sense of God’s 
                                                 
115 Misc. 866, Works 20:107 
116 Thus both Holmes (God of Grace, 232-3) and Fiering (Edwards’s Moral Thought, 213, 260) 
rightly reject Edwards’ defense as inadequate. Yet they do not recognize that Edwards’ final defense 
is based on aesthetic argument. 
117 Edwards claims that pity is not a true virtue in Nature of True Virtue ch. 6 (Works 8:605-8). 
Fiering (Edwards’s Moral Thought, 247-60) discusses the debate between Edwards and his opponents 
on the relevance of pity to the question of hell. 
118 Misc. 470, Works 13:511-2. 
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infinitude and our nothingness, then the question will melt away.119 
 
C. The Glory of Reprobation 
We now turn to the question of the glory. In what sense does the bifurcation of 
people into the elect and the damned increases the glory of God? If God were to 
bring everyone to heaven, would there be any loss to the glory of God?  
In his sermon The Wicked Useful in their Destruction Only,120 Edwards 
distinguishes two ways in which people are useful in bringing glory to God. Some 
bring glory to God by actively bringing forth fruit to God. Others can be useful 
passively, in being destroyed; ‘just as a barren tree, which is no way useful standing 
in the vineyard, may be good fuel.’121 There are different ways in which the 
destruction of the wicked is useful for the glory of God: they are useful for the glory 
of God’s justice; they are useful to display the majesty of God;122 and they are useful 
to give the saints a greater sense of their happiness. We have discussed the first two 
uses before. We shall discuss the third use below. Here we want to point out that 
Edwards believes both the saints and the damned are equally useful for God’s glory. 
The saints are useful as willing agents; the damned are useful as a passive objects.123 
However, both manifest the glory of God. In what sense is a bifurcation of people 
into the elect and the damned a manifestation of God’s glory? A first answer is that it 
shows the richness and the strictness of God’s glory. It is displayed both through 
willing agents and unwilling agents. No agents can refuse to further the glory of God. 
A second and ingenious answer of Edwards is the claim that saints in heaven 
need to see the greatness of God in order to fully appreciate the true glory of God: 
 
                                                 
119 Fiering (Edwards’s Moral Thought, 224) puts it somewhat sarcastically, ‘God’s goodness and 
beauty were self-evident in many things in this world, and one did not have to be a Christian to see 
them and love them.… The test of faith for Edwards was whether a person could love difficult parts of 
God’s creation and thus take delight in the beauty and order of the whole, including hell and 
damnation. It was a true test because no act of willpower, no conscious effort, could bring about the 
requisite change in the soul.’ Actually Edwards claims that even a sensible knowledge of the goodness 
of God is beyond human willpower. Moreover, as we shall argue below, Edwards claims that an 
adequate knowledge of God’s goodness entails embracing God’s terribleness. 
120 Works(BT) 2:125-9. 
121 Ibid. 2:127. 
122 ‘A sense of the majesty of an earthly prince is supported very much by a sense of its being a 
dreadful thing to affront him.’ (Ibid. 2:127) Therefore God’s majesty is manifested in the dreadful 
punishment on the damned. 
123 ‘Although a wicked man may, by being serviceable to good men, do what will be advantage to 
them to their bring forth fruit to God; yet that serviceableness is not what he aims at;… He is not 
useful as a man, or as a rational creature, because he is not so designedly. He is useful as things 
without life may be.’ Ibid., 126. 
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The terribleness of God is part of his glory; and that a sense of it should be kept up 
in the minds of creatures is needful in order to their right and just apprehensions of 
his greatness and gloriousness… That awful and reverential dread of God’s majesty 
that arises from such a sense, is needful in order to the proper respect of the creature 
to God, and the more complete happiness in a sense of his love.124 
 
According to Edwards, this sense of awful glory has always been part of God’s 
redemptive work. The flood of Noah is the image of the terror of hell.125 The 
thunder at Sinai is a shadow of the terribleness of God:  
 
God made his terribleness to appear, when he descended on Mount Sinai; and so he 
gives us an idea of it in thunder, not in any real works of terribleness executed upon 
any, but only by the appearances and sounds gives a shadow of it:… but we can’t 
think that God will think it sufficient, to manifest this part of his glory to the 
immortal spirits he has made, to all eternity, only in such shadows or noises and 
appearances.126 
 
The Israelites became aware of God’s glory of terribleness through the thunder 
of Sinai. However, Edwards argues, such shadows will not suffice for eternity. 
Shadows will lose their meaning if the reality behind them never comes true. If God 
wants the saints on earth to know the shadows of terribleness, surely God wants the 
saints on earth to know the reality. Hell is the reality of his terribleness. 
The awful glory of God is displayed in the world of nature and ordinary history 
too: 
 
There are innumerable calamities that come to pass in this world through the 
permission and ordination of Divine Providence,…which, if they were only 
proposed in theory as matters of faith, would be opposed as exceedingly inconsistent 
with the moral perfections of God.… such as the innumerable calamities that have 
happened to poor, innocent children, through the merciless cruelty of barbarous 
enemies, their being gradually roasted to death, shrieking and crying for their fathers 
and mothers; …127 
 
In its original context, the message quoted above is an answer to those who 
claim that hell is too cruel for God. Edwards objects strongly to freethinkers of his 
days who believe only in the compassion of God. For Edwards, God is also a 
majestic God. There is no reason to believe that God cannot let human beings suffer. 
For us, the importance of the passage lies in its implication for the glory of nature 
                                                 
124 Misc. 407, Works 13:469. 
125 Misc. 985, Works 20:309. 
126 Misc. 407, Works 13:469; cf. Misc. 505, Works 18:52.  
127 Concerning Endless Punishment, in Wrath of Almighty God, 335. 
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and other providential works of God. In chapter three, we have shown that the beauty 
of nature is a poem of God. There we emphasize that the harmony and power of life 
in nature is an image of God and of Christ. However, nature also has its cruel side. 
For Edwards, the cruelty of nature is also a manifestation of the glory of God. It is 
the manifestation of his terribleness. If we truly experience the glory of the infinitude 
of God, we also experience our nothingness. Our welfare depends on the sheer 
pleasure of the almighty God, who is not obliged to bless us. We come to appreciate 
this glory of God’s transcendence through the sufferings in this world. We come to 
appreciate it fully in heaven through the sufferings of the damned. 
Not only is this glory of terribleness anticipated in redemptive history and 
ordinary providence, but redemptive history also positively demands a final 
manifestation of such glory. As we have said in the previous chapter, Edwards 
divides the glory of Christ into his divine and human glory. His human glory is his 
humiliation. God cannot be humble. For Edwards, even the appearance of humility is 
detrimental to the glory of God. In the Incarnation, the Son appears to be weak and 
humble. This distracts the angels from appreciating the full divine glory of the Son: 
 
Now such is the nature of all creatures, that the seeing of this would have tended to 
have diminished that humble adoration of Christ’s infinite highness and glory and 
awful majesty. It would have tended to take off the awe from their mind, and to have 
made the object to appear more cheap, and less adorable. It was needful, therefore, 
that together with such manifestations of the grace and condescension and love of 
Christ that were so amazing, so beyond all that could ever have entered into the 
hearts of angels, there should be at the same time proportionable manifestations of 
the awfulness of his majesty and the terribleness of his wrath, and how infinitely 
dreadful a thing it is to slight him. This is represented in the infinitely aggravated 
punishment of gospel sinners, those that neglect so great salvation and despise so 
glorious a person.128 
 
The Incarnation tends to degrade the terrifying aspect of the divine glory of 
Christ. Even though the angels may know notionally that the man Jesus is divine, 
they have no sensible knowledge of that glory. As we have seen, the Son manifests 
humility even in heaven. To counteract any tendency for angels to despise such 
humility, Edwards believes that it is important that the Son should also manifest his 
terrible wrath. The human glory of humility must be balanced by the divine glory of 
awfulness. 
Not only does the terror of hell manifests the glory of hell, but the very 
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arbitrariness of the bifurcation of the saints and the damned is the manifestation of 
divine glory: ‘For he is not seen to be the sovereign rule of the universe, or God over 
all, any otherwise than he is seen to be arbitrary.’129 Edwards believes that the 
arbitrary will of God is prior and fundamental to any laws of nature: 
 
Of the two kinds of operation, viz. that which is arbitrary and that which is limited 
by fixed laws, the former, viz. arbitrary, is the first and foundation of the other,… 
Even the fixing of the method and rules of the other kind of operation is an instance 
of arbitrary operation.… Therefore arbitrary operation, being every way the highest, 
it is that wherein God is most glorified.130 
 
Edwards claims that the laws of nature are based ultimately on the arbitrary will of 
God. Those laws, whether in the physical realm or in the moral realms, are true laws 
only because God ordains them to be laws. It is the prerogative of the Creator to 
ordain such laws. Only God can be arbitrary in deciding what laws are true. 
Therefore arbitrary operation is the higher manifestation of God’s glory than the laws 
of nature.  
For Edwards, this glory of arbitrariness is part of our divine image: 
 
So in those that are the highest order of God’s creatures, viz. intelligent creatures, … 
they have an image of this. They have a secondary and dependent arbitrariness. They 
are not limited in their operations to the laws of matter and motion, so but that they 
can do what they please.131 
 
The human will is not subject to any laws of matter. Within its own domain, human 
beings can act in a God-like arbitrariness. In other words, human freedom is an 
image of divine freedom. 
Extending Edwards’ argument, we may actually apply the analogy backwards. 
If we believe that freedom is the glory of human beings, so much more we should 
ascribe absolute freedom to God as God’s divine glory. In this sense, human freedom 
is an indispensable tool for understanding the glory of God. Edwards is well-known 
for his polemics against free will. Here we find him actually advocating freedom, at 
least with respect to secondary causes, as the image of glory. Perhaps, as we shall 
discuss in the next chapter, freedom has a more important role in his theology than 
Edwards recognizes. 
For now, we shall ask how arbitrariness helps us understand the beauty of hell. 
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In its original context, Misc. 1263 is mainly a piece of polemic against the Deists. 
The Deists believes that the glory of God lies in the clockwork accuracy of the laws 
of nature. Edwards claims that the arbitrary work of God is even more glorious. For 
us, the importance lies in its application to redemptive history. The note is interesting 
in that this is the only place where he grades the glory of creatures according to the 
arbitrariness of divine operations among such creatures:  
 
… the higher we ascend in the scale of created existence, and the nearer we come to 
the Creator, the more and more and more arbitrary we shall find the divine 
operations on the creature, or those communications and influences by which he 
maintains as intercourse with the creature. And it appears beautiful and every way fit 
and suitable that it should be so.132 
 
The material world is governed by physical laws, and God usually rules the 
physical world with those laws as instruments. Even in the material world, the divine 
operation is totally arbitrary in its creation at the beginning and its consummation at 
the end.133 When we come to the category of human beings, the laws of the human 
mind ‘are so high above such a kind of general laws of matter, and are so singular, 
that they are altogether untraceable.’134 When we rise higher yet to the angels, God’s 
intercourse with them is immediate. There is no need of any laws of nature. 
God’s providential operation among higher beings is also arbitrary. The time of 
birth and death of any individual person is totally arbitrary. Even more arbitrary are 
the divine operations in redemptive history, such as the calling of Abraham. The 
climax is Christ: 
 
Then the greatest things were done by arbitrary power, and most out of and beyond 
the course of nature: as the incarnation of Christ, … the rising of Christ from the 
dead to everlasting life, the alteration made in the human nature of Christ at his 
ascension into heaven, …135 
 
As Christ’s work on earth is arbitrary work, so is the work of the Holy Spirit in 
saints: 
 
Thus in their beginning or creation – I mean their beginning as saints or their 
conversion – commonly at the time of that, God’s sovereign, arbitrary interposition 
and influence on their hearts is much more visible and remarkable than ordinarily 
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they are the subjects of in the course of their lives.136 
 
For Edwards, the electing of saints is totally arbitrary. In fact, the whole 
covenant of redemption is arbitrary. We have seen in the last chapter that Edwards 
makes a clear distinction between the ontological Trinity and the economic Trinity of 
the covenant of redemption. The work of redemption is totally arbitrary with respect 
to the inner life of God. It breaks through and surpasses all the laws of nature. For 
Edwards, this arbitrariness is the glory of the work of redemption. It is the 
prerogative of the Creator to save freely and arbitrarily. If all people finally go to 
heaven, the saints will not have any sensible knowledge of this arbitrariness. There 
will be no sensible evidence that in fact perdition could quite easily been their fate.137 
With this perspective, we can appreciate better the purpose of Edwards’ famous 
sermon Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God. The sermon is not so much a graphic 
description of hellfire as it is a compelling portrayal of the terrible glory of God’s 
sovereignty.138 Edwards reminds the sinners that they are kept out of hell by the 
mere pleasure of God: 
 
By the mere pleasure of God I mean His sovereign pleasure, His arbitrary will, 
restrained by no obligation, hindered in no manner of difficulty any more than if 
nothing else but God’s mere will had in the least degree or in any respect whatsoever 
any hand in the preservation of wicked men one moment.139 
 
Therefore, the wicked have absolutely no security before an angry God: 
 
Unconverted men walk over the pit of hell on a rotten covering, and there are 
innumerable places in this covering so weak that they will not bear their weight; and 
these places are not seen.… God has so many different, unsearchable ways of taking 
wicked men out of the world and sending them to hell …140 
 
Their guilt makes their existence depend desperately on the mere pleasure of 
God: 
 
Your wickedness makes you, as it were, heavy as lead and to tend downwards with 
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great weight and pressure towards hell. And if God should let you go, you would 
immediately sink and swiftly descend and plunge into the bottomless gulf, … and all 
your righteousness would have no more influence to uphold you and keep you out of 
hell than a spider’s web would have to stop a falling rock.141 
 
The sermon aims to bring the audience face to face with the infinite might and 
right of God to punish them. A sinner is like ‘a spider, or some loathsome insect’142 
before God, liable to be dropped into the eternal inferno at any moment. For Edwards, 
this is not just a tactic to scare people. To portray the infinite might of God to punish 
is to describe the majestic beauty of God. To be sensible of God’s beauty is to 
become a true Christian. 
 If hell is the manifestation of God’s beauty, and if beauty is pleasurable, then 
the sight of hell must be pleasurable. This is the thesis of Edwards’ sermon The End 
of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous. He uses Rev. 18:20 as his text 
(‘Rejoice over her [Babylon], thou heaven, and ye holy apostles and prophets; for 
God hath avenged you on her.’). His thesis is certainly provocative: ‘When the saints 
in glory shall see the wrath of God executed on ungodly men, it will be no occasion 
of grief to them, but of rejoicing.’143  
To defend this startling assertion, Edwards delineates carefully the nature of that 
joy. Negatively, ‘It will not be because they delight in seeing the misery of others 
absolutely considered.’144 The saints in heaven do not take delight in sufferings per 
se. Positively,  
 
they will have no love nor pity to the damned as such… for the heavenly inhabitants 
will know that it is not fit that they should love them, because they will know then, 
that God has no love to them, nor pity for them; but that they are the objects of 
God’s eternal hatred. And they will then be perfectly conformed to God in their wills 
and affections. They will love what God loves, and that only.145 
 
We have seen in the section on heaven that the affections of the saints in heaven 
will conform to Christ completely. We have also shown that, according to Edwards, 
God has no regard whatsoever for the welfare of the damned. If we accept both these 
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premises, Edwards gives us the only logical conclusion: the saints in heaven will 
have no regard for the welfare of the damned. If we want to reject the conclusion, we 
have to reject one of the two premises. In particular, we shall examine the second 
premise more carefully in our concluding chapter. 
Returning to the sermon, Edwards argues that the saints will love God perfectly. 
Therefore, ‘they will greatly value the glory of God, and will exceedingly delight in 
seeing him glorified.’146 How does hell manifest the glory of God? First, the justice 
of God is glorified. ‘The sight of this strict and immutable justice of God will render 
him amiable and adorable in their eyes.’ Presumably all rational doubts about the 
justice of the foreordination of the massa damnata will be removed. Second, ‘the 
power of God will gloriously appear in dashing to pieces his enemies as a potter’s 
vessel.’147 Third, when the saints see the agony of the damned, they ‘will heighten 
their sense of blessedness of their own state, so exceedingly different from it!’ But if 
we should think that our joy depends on sensing the sufferings of others, Edwards 
immediately explains: 
 
When they will see the dreadful miseries of the damned, and consider that they 
deserved the same misery, and that it was sovereign grace, and nothing else, which 
made them so much to differ from the damned, … O how will they admire that 
dying love of Christ, which has redeemed them from great a misery, …148 
 
The saints do not rejoice in the contrast between sufferings and joy per se. It is 
the arbitrariness of God’s choice, or the beauty of God’s absolute sovereignty, that 
they rejoice in. If the saints do not have the damned to continually remind of the 
arbitrariness of their position in heaven, they may lose the sense of the sheer 
gratuitousness of God grace. Any loss of such sense of gratuitousness is a diminution 
of God’s glory and a loss to the joy of the saints.  
 
D. Summary   
Let us recapitulate Edwards’ teaching on the glory of hell. For Edwards, hell 
manifests the infinity of God. This manifestation is the glory of God. First, the 
damned agonizes upon this glory as the experience of maximal ugliness. Second, the 
saints rejoice in this glory when they behold hell from heaven. This enjoyment of the 
greatness of God has three aspects. First, hell shows that both obedient and rebellious 
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people are tools of God’s glory. God’s infinity is manifested in that all must serve his 
purpose. Corresponding to this glory, the saints will rejoice in God’s justice 
manifested. Lawlessness has no place in God’s creation; every being must be servant 
to the glory of God. Second, the saints behold in the extremity of the sufferings in 
hell the infinite power of God. Corresponding to this glory, the saints will rejoice in 
God’s power in annihilating all his enemies. Third, hell manifests the absolute 
sovereignty of God in disposing the fate of any creature. Corresponding to this is the 
saints’ joy in the sovereign grace in redeeming them. Through the existence of hell, 
God is exalted as the infinite being. The saints are made sensible of their nothingness 
and they rejoice in it. The damned are made sensible of their nothingness and they 
agonize in it. Either way, God’s glory is manifested. 
Reading Edwards against his Puritan and Reformed background, he emerges as 
the most systematic thinker on the question of hell. His themes are common stock of 
his tradition: the greatness of God, the extremity of sufferings in hell, the justice of 
the damnation of the reprobate, God’s sovereign passing over of the reprobate. 
However, Edwards holds all these themes together in a metaphysical system all of 
his own. In his system, the other themes are natural outworking of his greatness. 
They become means through which God’s greatness becomes sensible to all spiritual 
beings. By building these themes into a metaphysical system, Edwards provides a 
formidable rational defence for these traditional doctrines. 
How persuasive are the rational arguments of Edwards? We may follow the 
common procedure of dividing the question further into questions of logical 
consistency and the credibility of the premise. First, if we accept the premises of 
Edwards, does Edwards’ conclusion logically follow? If we believe that the 
manifestation of God’s greatness and our nothingness is the glory of God, and if we 
believe that the manifestation of God’s glory is desirable as well as pleasurable to 
spiritual beings, does it follow that Edwards has shown the necessity and the 
pleasantness of hell? Ivan Karamazov asks whether it is ever justified to let one 
innocent child suffers in order to bring happiness to all people.149 We may ask 
whether it is ever justified to let one soul suffers eternally in order to exhibit God’s 
glory. If we accept the premise of Edwards, I think that the answer is a qualified 
affirmative. The answer is affirmative in that hell does indeed proclaim divine glory; 
it is qualified in that the necessity of hell is questionable. On Edwards’ premise, all 
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beings naturally agree with beings. For spiritual beings, they naturally desire their 
existence. They naturally assume that they have a right to exist and enjoy their 
existence. If a continual sensible awareness of their contingency is necessary for 
them to enjoy the glory of God, then an eternal sensible image of utter destruction of 
existence will certainly do the job. If the joy of beholding God’s glory far exceeds 
our affections for any creatures, then it follows that the sight of hell will be pleasing 
to the saints. However, the question is whether hell is the only means to exhibit 
God’s majestic glory. If, as Edwards has claimed in his musings on heaven, merely a 
clear vision of the infinity will drive the saints to the desire of their own annihilation, 
is it necessary to supplant that desire with the image of utter destruction? If the saints 
in heaven will be deficient in humility without the vision of hell, does that not 
suggest something is lacking in even the heavenly vision of God? If God’s glory is 
perfectly manifested in the union of saints with Christ, is it necessary for God to 
manifest the divine glory in a terrible way? May not the power of God be also 
manifested in the turning all rebellious souls to repentance, rather than in punishing 
those souls? While Edwards provides many plausible reasons why hell is glorious, it 
is not clear that hell is the only way in which God can be glorified.  
In the end, the arbitrariness of God is the only glory for which hell is 
indispensable. It is logical that an undifferentiated crowd cannot exhibit the 
prerogative of God to differentiate unconditionally. Permanent residents are needed 
in hell in order that the saints will eternally have sensible knowledge of their 
alternate fate. Even if that glory is indispensable, there is no necessary reason for 
more than one such resident. Of course, there is no necessary reason why God cannot 
send most people to hell. But how important is the glory of arbitrariness? 
That question brings us to the question of the plausibility of Edwards’ premise. 
We need to find that answer in the context of a holistic understanding of Edwards’ 
theology. We can begin to answer that question by placing the glories of heaven and 
hell in the context of the totality of his whole theological aesthetics. 
 
6.3. Heaven, Hell and Divine Beauty 
We have indicated in the introduction to this chapter that the glories of heaven 
and hell are basically, though not exclusively, two kinds of glory. Heaven is mainly 
permeated with Trinitarian glory. In conforming perfectly to Christ, the saints 
participate in the intra-Trinitarian life of the Godhead. Since this intra-Trinitarian life 
is the glory of God, the saints become part of the glory of God. In hell, the damned 
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are consumed by the glory of divine majesty. However, saints in heaven also 
experience this majestic glory. The participation of intra-Trinitarian life gives them a 
clear image of the infinitude of God. Consequently, the saints both enjoy their life 
and delight in their extinction. Conversely, the damned in hell also experience the 
glory of the intra-Trinitarian life, though in the inverse image of the hatred of God. 
The intra-Trinitarian life is the agreement of Being to Being; the agony of hell is 
antagonism of Being to beings. Even though heaven and hell are most distinctly 
marked by two different kinds of glory, both kinds of glory are experienced in 
heaven and in hell.  
Looking back on our whole discussion of Edwards’ aesthetics, we see that the 
two kinds of glories are intertwined throughout. In discussing Edwards’ metaphysical 
aesthetics, we have seen that material or secondary beauty is the language for 
expressing spiritual or primary beauty. Our spiritual beauty is, in turn, a participation 
in the divine beauty. There is agreement of beings to Being in the sense that 
secondary and primary beauties are all types of divine beauty. There is greatness in 
the sense that the beauties are meant to lift us up into beauty of a higher ontological 
category. Thus material beauty is meant to lift us into the spiritual realm, and 
spiritual beauty is meant to lift us into divine beauty. Material beauty exists for the 
sake of spiritual beauty, and spiritual beauty exists for the sake of divine beauty. In a 
sense, both secondary and primary beauties have to be negated as empty without 
divine beauty. In the case of divine beauty, we have shown that the Holy Spirit is the 
glory of God and the bond of Being to Being. Yet this self-love within the Godhead 
is beautiful only because God is not one being among many. The infinity of God 
renders God’s self-love into a virtuous and glorious love. In Christ, we see the 
perfect union between Father and Son. We also see the perfect humility of the man 
Jesus. The human beauty of Christ is his exaltation of the divine beauty of majesty. 
Yet the divine and human beauties are held together in one person in Christ, even if 
they are conceptually distinct. There is an existential agreement of divine and human 
beauties in Christ. Standing alone, neither agreement nor greatness is a sufficient 
explanation of beauty for Edwards. Together, they express the religious sensibilities 
of Edwards in vivid pictures. 
For most of his theology, the two concepts of beauty work together. The infinite 
beauty of God is communicated to lesser beings through the participation in divine 
beauty. For this reason, Edwards does not need to acknowledge (perhaps even not 
conscious of) the fact that he is working with two different concepts. In chapter two, 
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we see that Edwards formally defines beauty as the agreement of being to being. This 
is also the definition that Edwardsian scholars usually seize upon.150 Edwards never 
formally defines greatness by itself as a form of beauty. This may be the major 
reason why its importance has been overlooked. 
Yet the two concepts of beauty do not necessarily work together. In the doctrine 
of hell, we actually find them working in opposite directions. On the one hand, if 
consent alone is beautiful, then antagonism is ugly. We have argued that the damned 
experience maximal ugliness in hell. Yet if there is ugliness, there is also a lack of 
divine beauty. If there is an eternal hell, then there is an eternal lacuna in the 
manifestation of divine glory. If participation in intra-Trinitarian life by creatures is 
the manifestation of divine glory, then only by bringing all residents of hell into this 
life will divine glory be manifested in all. On the other hand, if the polarization of 
divine infinitude and creaturely finitude alone is beautiful, then heaven is no more 
beautiful than hell. As long as God’s greatness is perceived, the manner of perception 
(union or antagonism) is irrelevant. If arbitrariness is a necessary attribute of 
greatness, then hell is also a necessary part of divine beauty.  
While the beauty of consent implies that hell is a lacuna, the beauty of infinitude 
suggests that hell is an essential part of divine glory. How can the tension be resolved? 
Is one perspective right and the other wrong? As we shall argue in our concluding 
chapter, the tension cannot be and should not be resolved. The tension is not a 
blunder of Edwards. It is a reflection of the tension found within the Bible and the 
church tradition.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
We have come to the conclusion of our dissertation. In the previous chapters, we 
have expounded how the concept of beauty underlies much of Edwards’ theology. 
We have pointed out ambiguities and tensions with Edwards’ theology. Now that we 
have given a systematic picture of his theological aesthetics, we are ready to ask 
questions about his theology within a larger context. His theology can be addressed 
either within his historical context or within our contemporary context. The first 
section of our conclusion tries to locate Edwards’ aesthetics within his Reformed 
tradition. How has Edwards adopted and developed his tradition to face the 
challenges of his time? In the second section, we move forward to look at Reformed 
theology after Edwards. Edwards’ aesthetics has little influence upon American 
Reformed theology after him. We suggest that this may be due to the shift in 
theological focus within the tradition. Then we cross the ocean to look at the Dutch 
Reformed tradition. Though it develops independently from the American Reformed 
tradition, its aesthetics offers some interesting comparisons with Edwards. In the 
third section, we move towards contemporary issues. We want to suggest questions 
for further studies. We pose the questions raised by philosophical aesthetics of the 
eighteenth century and seek for preliminary answers in Edwards’ theology. We also 
compare Edwards’ approach to other contemporary approaches to theological 
aesthetics. By posing questions that Edwards never intended to answer, we hope to 
draw out some implications of his theology for contemporary aesthetics.  
 
7.1. Edwards and Theological Traditions 
In this section, we gather the research of previous chapters by summarizing the 
ways in which Edwards has both preserved and modified his theological traditions. 
We shall employ medieval theology for comparison and contrast where it is helpful 
to do so. As we have mentioned in the introduction, the rise of the new sciences and 
rationalism present formidable challenges to the traditional doctrines inherited by 
Edwards. If the physical world is governed by mechanical laws, will God become a 
redundant hypothesis? If the human psyche also works according to predictable 
regularities, where do we find a place for the work of the Holy Spirit? The 
Cambridge Platonists, the Scottish moderate literati and other British thinkers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century offer a reasonable and gentle God. According to 
them, humankind should seek their salvation by using reason to guide them to live a 
virtuous life. These intellectuals would regard the Calvinistic God of Edwards as 
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tyrannical and archaic. On the pastoral level, the mission of Edwards is in kindling 
evangelical awakenings and defending them against excess and abuse.  
As McClymond1 has persuasively argued, Edwards uses the concept of spiritual 
senses and rational arguments to launch a two-pronged attack against his enemies. 
Against various forms of deism, Edwards argues that spiritual sense is the true mark 
of a Christian. A spiritual sense provides us with sure knowledge that is inaccessible 
by ratiocination alone. Against the various beliefs on the moral self-sufficiency of 
humankind, Edwards offers rational arguments supporting the need for grace and 
special revelation. In this dissertation, we have seen how Edwards develops a 
rational understanding of divine beauty and the role of sensibility in participating in 
divine beauty. 
The empiricism of Locke has argued that true knowledge starts from sensibility. 
Hutcheson and others enrich Locke’s account to include various kinds of inner senses. 
Edwards extends the inner senses to include spiritual senses. If, as argued by 
Hutcheson, people can sense the beauty of the world, then it is reasonable to claim 
that they can potentially sense the beauty of God too. The Reformed tradition has 
long claimed that faith consists in savoring the sweetness of God. Faith is never 
understood as merely knowing and acquiescing rationally that Christ has died for me. 
Faith involves a heartfelt trust of the Savior that comes from experiential tasting of 
the sweetness of God. Edwards joins the two traditions together by claiming that this 
sweet taste of God is the empirical idea of the beauty of God. This ingenious move 
allows Edwards to claim that faith is based on true knowledge, as well as putting 
saving knowledge of God beyond the reach of mere reason. Only the presence of 
God through his Spirit can give us an empirical idea of God’s beauty. On this point, 
we concur with Miller that Edwards has dressed up Calvinism in the vocabulary of 
the British Enlightenment. 
Theology, not philosophy, is the central concern of Edwards. However, the 
adaptation of traditional theology to a new philosophical language is bound to have 
ramifications beyond merely some changes in vocabulary. In emphasizing salvation 
as sensible knowledge of the beauty of God, Edwards has quietly shifted the focus of 
soteriology from the revulsion against sin to the beauty of the Christian life. On a 
personal level, this reflects the contemplative temperament of Edwards.2 Focusing 
on the beauty of God is not merely an apologetic move; it reflects the heart of 
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Edwards’ piety. For Edwards, the greatest joy of a Christian is ravishing in divine 
beauty. On a pastoral level, Edwards moves the focus for authenticating salvation 
from the conversion experience to virtuous Christian living.3 According to Edwards, 
those who have truly seen the beauty of the Lord will exhibit similar beauty in their 
lives. The genuineness of repentance can only be known through a transformed life. 
Unwittingly, Edwards has moved towards the Catholic understanding of piety.4  
Christian piety is a well-trodden field in the Puritan tradition. If Edwards has 
subtly shifted the focus of Puritan piety, he stays safely within the conventional 
boundary. As a faithful citizen of the patriarchal New England society, Edwards likes 
to stay within traditional boundaries. However, when he starts to address 
unconventional questions, he gets revolutionary answers (at least from the 
perspective of his own traditions). The Puritans have seldom asked metaphysical 
questions. Metaphysical questions seem irrelevant to the practice of piety. The threat 
of materialism challenges Edwards to fathom the nature of the material world. If the 
manifestation of divine beauty is the goal of creation, it follows that the world is 
created in order that it may be perceived as beautiful. For Edwards, the material 
world has no independence apart from the constant exertion of divine power in 
maintaining its regular laws. The physical laws are not brute facts, but poems of 
praise on the constancy of the Creator. The material is created for the sake of the 
appreciation by spiritual beings. Edwards develops an idealistic and a thoroughly 
theocentric metaphysics in defense of the active sovereignty of God.5 While the 
Reformed tradition has always believed that the universe proclaims the glory of the 
Lord, it does not formalize this belief in the form of a metaphysical system. Again, 
unwittingly, Edwards harks back to the medieval world of Aquinas. Edwards is not 
enslaved to the tenets of empiricism. Starting from his first principle (the world is 
created to exhibit divine glory), he does not hesitate to speculate beyond the 
confinement of empirical senses. 
When he applies the concept of sensibility and beauty to the Godhead, again the 
result is revolutionary. The Reformed tradition has developed a theology of the 
                                                 
3 On the Puritan’s emphasis and prognosis of a genuine conversion, see Edmund Morgan, Visible 
Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 67-75. 
4 Anri Morimoto, Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), argues in detail for this thesis. Unfortunately, Morimoto 
says little about Edwards’ doctrine of justification or predestination. Given the fact that Edwards 
subscribes to the Five Points of the Council of Dort, we need to be careful in extending this similarity 
of piety to the whole area of soteriology. 
5 See Encounters with God (ch. 3) for further discussion of Edwards’ theocentric metaphysics.  
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economic Trinity in the form of covenants of redemption and grace. It has usually 
refrained from speculations about the ontological Trinity. For Edwards, the joy of the 
Christian is beholding the beauty of the Lord. By Edwards’ definition, beauty is the 
agreement of being to Being. If God is one, in what sense can God agree with 
himself? How can God be beautiful? Edwards employs an Augustinian model of the 
ontological Trinity to solve the problem. Utilizing Lockean epistemology, Edwards 
argues that the Son is the idea of God within the mind of God. The Spirit is God’s 
delight in the idea of himself. Compared with the medieval model of Aquinas, 
Edwards’ model is more explicitly theocentric. In Edwards’ model, the Son is the 
idea of God-self; the Spirit is the willing of God towards God-self. Using this model, 
Edwards achieves a very tight integration between the ontological Spirit and the 
economic Spirit. The ontological Spirit is God’s delight in the beauty of God-self; the 
task of economic Spirit is to make the saints sensible of the beauty of God-self. The 
sensibility of beauty is the common identity between the ontological and economic 
Spirit. The Reformed tradition has always stressed the importance of the work of the 
Spirit in the covenant of grace. However, it has seldom joined the work of the 
economic Trinity to the nature of the ontological Spirit. 
If Edwards has formed a close tie between the ontological and economic Spirit, 
he has made a bigger wedge between the ontological Son and the economic Son. The 
Son is God’s idea of God-self. Why should the Son be incarnated? Why should the 
Son be concerned with creatures at all? The covenant of redemption is Edwards’ 
answer. In eternality, the Son has freely agreed to take on a task alien to his 
ontological identity. The Son has voluntarily chosen to humble himself and become 
submissive to the Father. There are two aspects of this submission. First, the Son 
becomes subordinate to the Father in the economy of salvation. Second, the Son 
becomes a creature in the Incarnation. In Edwards, the covenant of redemption has a 
subtle shift of function. In the Reformed tradition, the primary function of the 
covenant of redemption is to integrate the purchase and the application of salvation 
into a single act. In the one covenant of redemption, the Son promises to become the 
mediator and the Father promises to give the Son the elect saints as his reward. 
While concurring with this function of the covenant, Edwards has slightly shifted the 
focus to the humility of the Son in taking on the role of mediator. 
In continuity with this focus, Edwards stresses the humility of the incarnated 
Son. Christ is the apex of human glory. Christ was being totally humble before God 
and people. While the Reformed tradition naturally regards Christ as glorious, it is 
181 
not a major theme in the tradition. In the theology of Owen, Christ is glorious in his 
role as the mediator. He is the unique mediator between God and human beings. 
There is little attempt to connect the glory of Christ with the glory of humanity in 
general. In the medieval age, Christ is regarded as the embodiment of the highest 
theological virtues.6 In stressing the glory of Christ as perfect embodiment of the 
virtue of humility, Edwards has moved his tradition slightly towards the Catholic 
tradition.  
By focusing on the virtue of humility,7 Edwards is moving towards another 
dimension of divine glory. The Spirit is God’s delight in God-self, and this delight in 
God is shared by all the true saints. This delight in God is the spiritual beauty of 
saints. In this aspect, the spiritual beauty of the saints is an extension of divine beauty. 
However, the ontological Son and Spirit need not and cannot be humble before the 
Father. They are by nature co-equal. Humility implies subjection of one party to 
another. Humility can only be a creaturely excellency. By his Incarnation, Christ 
exhibits the beauty unique to creatures in a way impossible for the ontological Son. 
For Edwards, that makes Christ uniquely attractive to human beings. It is God’s 
gracious intention to draw us to him through the human beauty of Christ. It reveals 
another concept of divine beauty that is not captured by Edwards’ account of the 
person and work of the Spirit. For Edwards, the perception of the infinite greatness 
of God and (by comparison) our nothingness is the perception of divine beauty. This 
is the awful beauty of the Lordship of God over all creatures. 
This concept of beauty is developed fully in Edwards’ theology of hell. In the 
eschaton, both the Trinitarian beauty of harmony and the awful beauty of Lordship 
will reach its consummation. For the saints, life in heaven is mainly a continuation 
and magnification of their earthly Christian joy. While on earth, they already enjoy 
sensible knowledge of divine beauty through the Holy Spirit. In heaven, they will be 
sensible of divine beauty in new ways (they shall see the glory of Christ with their 
physical eyes as well as with their spiritual sense) and in much greater capacity. 
However, it is the same kind of divine beauty. For the reprobate, they will be 
surprised and forced to suffer divine glory in a negative way. The immensity of 
God’s wrath will be manifested for the first time to them. For Edwards, the extremity 
                                                 
6 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica III.7. 
7 Humility is a major part of medieval piety. However, nor the theological nor the cardinal virtues of 
Aquinas includes humility. Humility is subsumed under the cardinal virtue of prudence. In singling 
out humility as the primary virtue for human beings, Edwards leans towards the Franciscan focus on 
the will rather than the Dominican focus on the intellect.   
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of sufferings in hell is a natural consequence of the immensity of God. Antagonism, 
the opposite of beauty and harmony, is by nature painful to spiritual beings. Since 
God is infinite, his antagonism towards the reprobates is also infinite. When the 
reprobates are made sensitive to this infinite wrath in hell, it will be infinite agony 
for them forever. For the saints, hell will also manifest the awful beauty of Lordship. 
It shows them God’s sovereignty over the eternal fate of all spiritual beings. The fate 
of the saints and the reprobates is determined by the sheer pleasure of God. This 
sensible knowledge of the absolute sovereignty and sheer gratuity of God is different 
from the Trinitarian beauty of harmony. This will be another dimension of heavenly 
joy, in addition to the joy of beholding the Trinitarian beauty of God. 
The Reformed tradition has long defended the existence of hell as reasonable. 
The Puritan tradition often employs images of the suffering of hell as tools of 
evangelism. Edwards continues both these heritages in his preaching and writing on 
hell. However, the Puritans or the Reformed schoolmen seldom speculate on the 
nature of the joy of heaven or the agony of hell. By formulating the joy of heaven 
and the agony of hell as natural expressions of the glory of God, Edwards achieves a 
much tighter integration between eschatology and soteriology. 
Unintended by Edwards, the tightness of his theology reveals a deep tension 
within Reformed theology. In fact, it is a tension running through the whole history 
of Christianity. We may call it the tension between Neoplatonism and voluntarism. It 
can also be expressed as the tension between the universalism of creation and the 
particularism of election. The Reformed tradition has always believed in the 
goodness of the universe. Psalm 8:1 proclaims that ‘the heavens declare the glory of 
God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork.’ In what sense do the heavens 
declare the glory of God? In particular, the doctrine of the image of God teaches us 
that there is some continuity between the Creator and human beings. All creatures, 
and particularly human beings, must share in some way the goodness of the Godhead. 
We do not have time to survey this tension in Christian tradition. To summarize the 
story in the shortest way possible, we may say that the medieval tradition has focused 
the question of this shared goodness on the divine essence. As we have shown in the 
introductory chapter, the medieval schoolmen consider beauty and goodness as the 
transcendental qualities of beings. God, being Goodness itself, has the tendency to 
overflow in goodness. The creation is the overflowing of his goodness into 
something external to him. The danger inherent in this approach is that God may then 
seem to be correlative to the world. The distinction between the Creator and creatures 
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may be blurred in the general categories of being and goodness. 
For the Reformed tradition, the medieval account creates too much continuity 
between the Creator and creatures. Calvin has only reproach for Pseudo-Dionysius,8 
the source of much of medieval Neoplatonism. In general, the Reformed tradition has 
avoided speculations about the reason of creation in order to avoid the danger of 
infringing on the mystery of God.9 Edwards, in his effort to create a theocentric 
metaphysics to challenge the remote God of deism, has unwittingly brought the 
thread of Neoplatonism into the Reformed tradition.10 Rather than focusing on the 
divine essence, Edwards put the focus on the intra-Trinitarian relationship. Creation 
is not portrayed as an overflowing of the goodness of being of God; it is an 
overflowing of the self-appreciation of God in the Trinitarian life of God. By 
focusing on the glory of God rather than the being of God, Edwards is on safer 
territory within the Reformed tradition. Thus Edwards avoids divinization of beings 
per se. It is not the mere existence of beings that allows beings to participate in 
divine life. It is the appreciation of beauty that allows spiritual beings to participate 
in the divine life. We return to God through ethical vision rather than anagogical 
religious rites. Material beings participate in the divine life indirectly when they 
become metaphors for divine beauty to spiritual beings. Their divinization is 
inseparable from the interpretation of spiritual beings. In Edwards’ version of the 
process and return, the process of return begins and ends with the cognition of the 
singular beauty of God. 
This brings us back to the idealism of Edwards. In the discussion on the 
metaphysics of beauty, we have already addressed the issue of Edwards’ idealism in 
general. Here, we merely want to bring out that intentionality and sensibility become 
safeguards against pantheism in Edwards’ version of process and return. When I 
perceive an object as beautiful, that object is different from my self-consciousness. I 
am conscious of something that is different from the ‘I’ who is the subject of the 
                                                 
8 Institutes of Christian Religion I.14.4.  
9 Concerning God’s motive for creation, Calvin writes, ‘Let this admonition, no less grave than severe, 
restrain the wantonness that tickles many and even drives them to wicked and hurtful speculations. In 
short, let us remember that that invisible God, whose wisdom, power, and righteousness are 
incomprehensible, sets before us Moses’ history as a mirror in which his living likeness glows.’ 
Institutes, I.14.1 (Battles’ translation). Calvin contrasts how little creation by itself can teach us about 
God, as contrasted with the Bible. Reformed scholasticism also emphasizes creation as a free act of 
God. (Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 192-5. 
10 Delattre acknowledges the connection between Edwards and Neoplatonism. He believes that 
Edwards includes God within the category of being. This is contrasted with Plotinus, who makes God 
beyond being (Beauty and Sensibility, 28). 
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consciousness. In perceiving God as beautiful, God is essentially different from the 
‘I’ who does the perceiving. On the other hand, this is the same beauty that God 
perceives in God-self.11 So there is both continuity and discontinuity in the process 
and return. There is continuity in the object perceived (divine beauty), but difference 
in the subject (God vs. human beings) of the perception. Yet God remains a totally 
unique entity. Since God is a unique person, God cannot be grasped by reason in 
general. God can be grasped only insofar as God reveals himself. Not even in heaven 
can the saints have an exhaustive comprehension of God.12 Thus Edwards provides 
perhaps the most complete account of the relationship between divine and creaturely 
glory among the Puritans, without falling into the trap of pantheism.  
 We shall now turn our attention to the theme of voluntarism. The Reformed 
tradition is well-known for its emphasis on the will of God. This is particularly 
prominent in its soteriology, with its doctrine of double predestination. Edwards 
follows his tradition in endorsing limited atonement.13 The originality of Edwards 
lies in his desire to make this particularism reasonable. It is reasonable in the sense 
that particularism manifests the glory of the Creator. The Reformed tradition has 
always insisted on submission to God’s will. The difficulty is the motivation for such 
absolute submission. What is the difference between submitting to God and 
submitting to a tyrant? For Edwards, the answer is that the majestic beauty of God 
makes it enjoyable for us to show absolute obeisance to God. Whatever God wills, 
the sensible knowledge of God will make us happily acquiesce to it. Even the 
                                                 
11 Edwards’ theology of the intra-Trinitarian is important for avoiding another form of pantheism or 
panentheism. Like Edwards, Hegel conceives reality as a process through which spiritual beings come 
to the cognition of God. Hegel develops a form of Trinity in which the world is the objectification of 
the thinking process of God. God needs creation as much as thinking needs an object of thought 
(Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, v.3: The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter Hodgson (Berkerly: 
University of California Pres, 1985), 170-1, 191-8). For Hegel, the thinking of the finite spirits is the 
process through which the infinite Spirit comes to the self-consciousness of himself. By positing the 
Son as the perfect idea of God within the Godhead and the Spirit as divine self-love, Edwards 
envisions the objectification and reconciliation process as self-contained within God. Therefore, 
unlike Hegel, Edwards conceive creation as truly a free act of God. Secondly, the self-sufficiency of 
God means that God is a particular, unique entity, Unlike Hegel’s God, Edwards’ God cannot be 
reduced to concepts. As we shall see in the next section, this gives Edwards a much more robust 
theory of aesthetics than Hegel. The relationship between Edwards’ idealism and German idealism has 
unfortunately received hardly any attention from scholars so far. 
12 In the vocabulary of phenomenology, there is always ‘excess’ in our encounter with God because 
God always appears phenomenologically as gift. cf. Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated 
phenomena (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). Edwards confines himself to Lockean 
vocabulary by describing the knowledge of God as sensible. We can extend his insights by 
reinterpreting his theology with modern philosophical vocabularies. 
13 John Gerstner, The Rational Theology of Jonathan Edwards, v.2 (Powhatan, Berea Publications, 
1992), 435; Holmes, God of Grace, 157-9. 
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arbitrary and eternal condemnation of people will be pleasant to us. 
We shall raise two questions of Edwards’ account of voluntarism. First, there is 
an ambiguity in Edwards’ account of the majestic glory of God. On the one hand, 
God may be majestic in the sense that he is infinitely greater than us. God does not 
need us, while we are totally dependent on him. All that God gives us is based on the 
sheer divine gratuitousness. We may call this the glory of the metaphysical size gap 
between God and creatures.14 On the other hand, God may be majestic in the sense 
of being inscrutable. Rather than accentuating our dependence on God, here we 
emphasize the mystery of God. God is glorious because he is Deus absconditus, the 
hidden God. The distinction can be illustrated by two kinds of heavenly joy in 
Edwards’ theology. Edwards claims that when the saints behold the greatness of God 
in heaven, they will gladly desire for their own nothingness. This is the joy of 
exulting in the metaphysical size gap between God and creatures. Even Jesus beholds 
this kind of beauty in his human nature. Edwards claims also that when the saints 
behold the damned suffering in hell, they will rejoice in the arbitrary choice of God. 
God could equally have switched their places, sending the former group to hell and 
the latter group to heaven. This is the celebration of the will of the hidden God. 
Presumably Jesus will not celebrate this kind of divine glory in his human nature; 
Jesus in his human nature is the most suitable occupant of heaven. The two concepts 
are related: the greater the metaphysical size gap between two beings, the more the 
higher one will appear mysterious to the lower one. If ants can think, they will 
probably consider human beings as totally mysterious. Yet they are not identical. One 
may hold to both the greatness of God while denying the total inscrutability of God. 
The Old Testament emphasizes both the mysterious greatness of God and his 
knowability through the covenant (Deut. 29:29, 30:11-14). 
Edwards is following a long tradition in pointing to the hidden God. Both 
Luther and Calvin acknowledge the hidden God in their theology.15 Like Edwards, 
they need the hidden God to explain the fate of the damned. Is Edwards justified in 
glorifying in this hidden God? Do we really need him?16 Perhaps, in the context of 
                                                 
14 The phrase metaphysical size gap is borrowed from Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils 
and the goodness of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
15 Brian Gerrish, ‘“To the Unknown God”: Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God,’ in The Old 
Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 
131-149. 
16 For Karl Barth, this obscure God is a grave deficiency of Calvin. His theology of election is a 
valiant attempt to banish this obscure God from theology. See Bruce McCormack, ‘Grace and Being: 
The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology,’ in John Webster, ed. The 
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his polemics against the deists, Edwards has unfortunately chosen the vocabulary of 
arbitrariness. Freedom is more appropriate in this context. It seems more reasonable 
to claim that the freedom of God (rather than arbitrariness) is part of divine beauty. 
This is different from the beauty of the intra-Trinitarian life. While the Father 
necessarily loves the Son, God does not love the world necessarily. In particular, 
God’s love for sinners is both free and gracious. Moreover, God’s freedom towards 
creatures is undergirded by the metaphysical size gap. Since God is totally 
independent of creatures while creatures are totally dependent on him, his freedom 
regarding creatures is also perfect. This is captured by the traditional doctrine of the 
omnipotence of God. Yet freedom is not same as sheer arbitrariness. For example, no 
one compels me to pursue a doctoral degree in theology. It is a free decision. Yet it is 
not arbitrary. It reflects my temperament as well as my deepest convictions about 
reality. Similarly, we may claim that it reflects God’s own nature when God freely 
chooses to redeem sinners.17 Unlike Edwards, we can claim that the covenant of 
redemption and the economic Trinity somehow are the true images of the ontological 
Trinity. However, the exact relation between the ontological and economic Trinity 
cannot be laid out through reasoning; this is the glory of the divine freedom. 
Does that mean that we can banish the hidden God? If election to salvation is 
truly a free act of God, there will always be a hidden God.18 Even on a human level, 
freedom implies mystery and hiddenness. If our actions are totally rule-bound, then 
arguably they are not truly free. If our actions are totally random decisions, then our 
freedom is trivial. We act freely and significantly when we act according to our 
deepest convictions in a way that cannot be totally explained by rules. Similarly, God 
truly acts according to the divine nature when God redeems sinners; yet God is free 
                                                                                                                                          
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92-110. 
17 Exo. 33:19 ‘And he said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the 
name of the LORD before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy 
on whom I will shew mercy.’ Exo 20:5-6 ‘Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: 
for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto 
the third and fourth generation of them that hate; and shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love 
me, and keep my commandments.’ These and similar passages show that while it is God’s prerogative 
to punish, the Lord’s name is more closely associated with mercy than with vengeance. 
18 Barth repeats again and again in Church Dogmatics II.1 that God is the one who loves in freedom. 
Yet if, as insisted by Barth, we can only understand God through the story of Jesus, in what sense can 
we appreciate the Incarnation as a free act of God? According to McCormack, Barth argues that God 
made a primal decision to make the Incarnation and the outpouring of the Spirit constitutive of his 
eternal being (‘Grace and Being,’ 100). Besides the difficult questions about the coherence of the 
so-called active ontology (e.g. Can God freely choose its own constitution?), one can also ask whether 
there is still a Deus absconditus behind this primal decision (Paul Helm, ‘John Calvin and the 
Hiddenness of God’, paper presented at the Rutherford House Dogmatic Conference, 2005). 
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to condemn people to hell according to their desert.19 The existence of hell is a 
testimony to the glory of divine freedom. Grace will not be grace without the shadow 
of hell. 
However, will God rejoice at the sight of the damned in hell? Will saints in 
heaven rejoice at the sight of the damned? We enter into deep mystery in this 
question. On the one hand, the belief in the final victory of God seems to imply that 
God cannot have any regrets in the eschaton. On the other hand, if redemption is a 
reflection of the nature of God, then we cannot conceive God as being indifferent 
whether people are in heaven or in hell. We cannot follow Edwards in claiming that 
God and the saints will rejoice in the sight of the damned. Perhaps all we can claim is 
that, somehow, the shadow of hell will be overwhelmed by the heavenly beauty in 
the sensibility of the saints in heaven. While we may have the boldness to approach 
God through Christ, we shall not have the same boldness in condemning those who 
are without Christ, even in eternity.20 
Our main criticism for Edwards is that he has too neatly segregated the 
harmonic beauty of the creation account and the majestic beauty of the redemption 
account. Both creation and redemption should reflect both kinds of beauty. We have 
already argued that redemption should be considered as harmonious with God’s 
nature without denying the freedom of his grace. In creation, the majestic beauty is 
essential too. First, there is freedom on God’s side in that God has created each 
particular person individually. People are not mass produced as interchangeable parts 
in a praising machine. God has freely and specifically chosen to create each person 
with her unique character (cf. Psalm 139). The glory of creation includes God’s 
freedom in creating each individual in her uniqueness. I stand in awe of the Creator 
for creating the unique me. On the human side, there must be some autonomy in an 
appreciation of divine beauty. To avoid pantheism, the subjects who appreciate 
divine beauty must be independent subjects. They cannot be merely a mirage or 
                                                 
19 From the viewpoint of human freedom too, we cannot dispense with hell. There is always the 
possibility of a final rejection of God’s grace from the human side. See David Fergusson, ‘Will the 
Love of God Finally Triumph?’ Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of 
God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) 
20 Holmes addresses a similar problem in Edwards (God of Grace, 239-40, 268-70). He accuses 
Edwards in failing to be consistently Trinitarian in his doctrine of hell. Holmes prefers Barth’s 
doctrine of reprobation. I agree with Holmes that we cannot take the display of divine grace and 
divine justice as two equal and opposite ways. However, the gospels (pace God of Grace, 247-250) do 
not uniformly portray the glory of the Messiah in terms of grace and redemption. Jesus’ vehement 
denunciation of the Pharisees, the Olivet Discourse and other passages portray a glory of the sever 
judge. I have more sympathy towards Edwards in calling hell a display of divine glory. But this hellish 
glory cannot be on an equal footing with heavenly glory. 
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mechanical instruments through which God loves himself.21 This does not mean that 
human beings have the kind of freedom championed by Edwards’ opponents. We do 
not need to posit that people have absolute freedom to accept or reject God’s 
forgiveness in Christ. However, people should have an analogous freedom to divine 
freedom, to the extent that the choice to love God is truly the decision of the 
individuals. 
On the other hand, the redemption story must also demonstrate harmonic beauty. 
We have seen that Edwards is emphatic that the incarnated Christ is the archetype of 
the saints. In his humility and corporeality, he embodies the blessed life of the saints. 
However, Edwards consistently resists saying that the Incarnation and the 
humiliation of the Cross is a manifestation of divine beauty. Karl Barth takes the 
opposite position in proclaiming that only in the Incarnation and humiliation do we 
see the glory of God. We need both Edwards and Barth. We need a Spiritual beauty 
in which God, in communion with the redeemed reality, exults in the self-glory of 
God. We need a Christological beauty in which divine beauty is precisely manifested 
in God entering into the fallen world. Even in alienation and hopelessness we find 
the glory of God-self. The two kinds of beauty should not be harmonized, but be 
allowed to work in tension with one another. The working out of this tension will be 
a project for another day.  
We shall summarize our evaluation of Edwards’ relationship to the Reformed 
tradition. By focusing on the beauty of the Lord, Edwards provides an alternative and 
complimentary model to the forensic model of divine-human relationship. By 
developing complimentary models of intra-Trinitarian life and our spiritual life, 
Edwards provides a model where human beings can truly participate in divine beauty. 
By emphasizing the majestic glory of the Creator, he enriches the doctrine of election 
by relating election to the manifestation of the glory of God, rather than merely the 
stark will of God. His theology represents a genuine advance of the Reformed 
tradition in its philosophical sophistication. It integrates the work of the Holy Spirit 
in the saints with the role of the Spirit in the ontological Trinity and the purpose of 
creation. Its major deficiency is the lack of connection between the work of Christ 
and the role of the Son in the ontological Trinity. As a consequence, the glory 
manifested in election is exclusively the majestic glory of the Creator over the 
                                                 
21 In the extreme case of divine voluntarism expounded in Original Sin III.3 (God can arbitrarily 
constitutes Adam and his posterity as one person), one wonders if there is any meaningful and 
coherent subject left to do the loving of God. 
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creatures. We suggest that there can be a richer interaction between the Trinitarian 
beauty and the Creator’s glory in both the theologies of creation and of redemption. 
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What is the influence on Edwards’ on subsequent Reformed aesthetics? 
Unfortunately, the answer is really a study of negligence and ignorance. We’ll trace 
briefly the development of the American Reformed theology after Edwards to 
suggest some reasons for this sorry state. Then we shall examine briefly the 
aesthetics of the Dutch Reformed tradition to suggest points of difference. The 
repetition of briefly is deliberate: we can do no more than give some indications for 
further research. We shall conclude with some tentative suggestions on how Edwards 
can contribute to the contemporary Reformed aesthetics. 
We shall begin by looking at the American Reformed tradition. There are a 
multiple Reformed traditions in America: Old Princeton theology, Dutch schools 
New England theology, the Southern tradition and others.22 Among these traditions, 
only Princeton theology and New England theology explicitly claim to have inherited 
the mantle of Edwards. Even in these two traditions, the influence of Edwards’ 
aesthetics seems to be minimal. The influence of Edwards’ theology on other 
Reformed traditions is negligible until the twentieth century. We shall concentrate 
our survey on Princeton theology and New England theology. 
We begin with New England theology, which has the closest relation to 
Edwards through personal and geographical connections.23 The founders of New 
England theology, Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803) and Joseph Bellamy (1719-80), 
were students of Edwards. Hopkins was also the first biographer of Edwards. Though 
the personal ties are close, the faithfulness of New England theology to the theology 
of Edwards is a debatable issue.24 We claim that a shift from the theocentric vision 
of Edwards to a more anthropological concern is a major factor for the neglect of 
aesthetics in New England theology. 
We have claimed in this dissertation that Edwards’ vision is driven by a 
theocentric metaphysics. The material world is a giant metaphor for divine beauty, 
                                                 
22 See David Well, ed. Reformed Theology in America: A History of its Modern Development (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985). 
23 The standard history of New England theology is F.H. Foster, A Genetic History of the New 
England Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1907).  
24 See Well, Reformed Theology, 41-54, for the debate between Charles Hodge (a Princeton 
theologian) and Nathaniel Taylor (a New England theologian) on who has preserved true Edwardsian 
theology.  
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and the spiritual world is an extension of the beauty of the intra-Trinitarian life. Even 
hell is a manifestation of the divine beauty of majesty. Unfortunately, neither his 
writings on the metaphorical nature of the world nor those on the Trinity attracted 
much attention after his death. The fact that these notes are all unpublished (during 
his lifetime) private notes of Edwards helps to explain their fall into oblivion.  
The most important reason for such neglect is probably the fact that New 
England theology made a legalistic turn soon after Edwards.25 For Edwards, the 
perception of divine glory is a central theme. For Bellamy and Hopkins, their central 
concern is the justification of the divine economy under the name of 
reasonableness.26 Their quest led to significant modifications to the Calvinistic 
doctrines of Edwards. 
In the doctrine of atonement, New England theology soon adopted Grotius’ 
governmental theory.27 In this theory, Christ was crucified in order to demonstrate 
God’s hatred of sin. The death of Christ is not a vicarious substitution for our penalty. 
The death of Christ demonstrates the ultimate seriousness of the retributive justice of 
God. God did not spare even his Son in order to show the kind of punishment that 
should have befallen sinners. Christ did not literally suffer for our sins, nor is Christ’s 
righteousness imputed directly to us. God forgives us sinners individually. 
Forgiveness is the prerogative of the Governor of the universe. The death of Christ 
demonstrates that this forgiveness is not given in a light-hearted way. After sinners 
receive their forgiveness, they still have to work out their own righteousness. 
The quest for reasonableness in New England theory is most evident in its focus 
on the question of ability. In Freedom of the Will, Edwards makes a distinction 
between natural and moral ability in order to make sinners accountable for their sins. 
                                                 
25 ‘His [Edwards] disciples and later champions lacked either his profound piety, or his intellectual 
vigor, or both. They reverted to governmental and legalistic conceptions of Calvinism.’ (Joseph 
Haroutunian, Piety versus Moralism: The Passing of The New England Theology (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1970; originally published 1932), xxx) Haroutunian argues convincingly that New England 
Theology soon departed from Edwards and migrated to a humanistic paradigm. Recently Douglas A. 
Sweeney (Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology, and the Legacy of Jonathan Edwards (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003)) argues that, at least with respect to Taylor, New England did 
consciously build upon distinctive Edwardsian ideas. However, the two themes are not mutually 
exclusive. One can develop Edwards in ways that depart significantly from the piety of Edwards 
himself. 
26 ‘It was no longer possible to accept events as divine decrees unless they measured up to the ethical 
principle which had come to constitute the standards of righteous human intercourse, and to which 
even the Creator and the Ruler of the universe had to conform.’ Haroutunion, Piety versus Moralism, 
30. 
27 Bellany may be credited as the originator of this development. See Foster, New England Theology, 
113-117. See also Haroutunian, Piety versus Moralism, 166-176, for a general treatment of the 
governmental theory of New England theology. 
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In New England theory after Edwards, natural ability becomes both more and more a 
tool for the justification of the condemnation of sinners. Bellamy, for example, 
categorically denies the doctrine of limited atonement.28 God can justly condemn 
only those who deliberately rejects the mercy of God, not those who never have a 
chance to receive mercy. The fact that human beings have natural ability to do good 
means that, in some vague sense, they have the ability to voluntarily accept the offer 
of the gospel. Nathaniel Taylor (1786-1858), arguably the greatest theologian of the 
New England school, argues that natural ability means that a person could –  
hypothetically – have been sinless throughout her life.29 The reality is that no one 
has ever been able to do so, but the possibility as such should not be denied. 
Otherwise God would be condemning people unjustly. 
We do not need to go into the details of New England theology or its demise 
after Taylor.30 For our story, we need to recognize the importance of the motif of the 
moral government of God.31 Edwards claims that even heathens recognize the moral 
government of a supreme God over human affairs.32 Against deism, he argues that 
the providence of God is both reasonable and commonly recognized. However, the 
moral government of God is not the central motif in the theology of Edwards. In 
New England theology, the motif grew more and more important over time. It 
became the central organizing theme of Taylor’s theology.33 In New England theory, 
conversion is our voluntary submission to the moral governance of God. The heart of 
New England piety is the recognition of the justice of God and our sinfulness. The 
relationship between God and the world is seen through the image of the ruler and its 
subjects. The moment of conversion is the point in our life where we submit to the 
moral governance of God. Seen from this perspective, Charles Finney’s (1792-1875) 
theology of revival may be seen as a natural evolvement of New England theology.34 
Doctrinally, the Arminian Finney is far from the Calvinism of Edwards.  
When we turn to Old Princeton theologians, they also have ample reasons to 
neglect the theocentric vision of Edwards. Fundamentally, the idealism of Edwards 
                                                 
28 Foster, New England Theology, 116. 
29 For Taylor’s theology of original sin and the controversy around it, see Sweeney, Taylor, 73-90. See 
Foster, New England Theology, 224-72, for the whole debate about the freedom of the will. 
30 Foster, New England Theology, 543-553, and Sweeney, Taylor, 141-3, discuss its demise. 
31 It is called moral government because God rules over human beings through moral persuasion 
rather than coercion.  
32 Misc. 954, 963 etc., see especially Misc. 864. 
33 Sweeney, Taylor, 91-111. 
34 Sweeny, ibid., 150-1. 
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runs contrary to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy prevalent in both Princeton 
and New England theology.35 Common Sense philosophy advocates common sense 
as the foundation of reliable knowledge. Theologians who adopt this approach tend 
to avoid speculation about the metaphysical status of substance. For example, 
Edwards’ speculations about personal identity are rejected by both Charles Hodge 
(1797-1878) of Princeton and Taylor.36 Common sense suggests that personal 
identity is not an arbitrary entity. This aversion to metaphysical language makes 
these theologians avoided Platonic language of participation.   
This aversion to speculations is clearly demonstrated in the doctrine of the 
Trinity. As we have argued before, the aversion to metaphysical speculation is the 
main reason for the lack of sophistication in the Reformed doctrine of the Trinity. 
Edwards broke through this tradition by developing a psychological model of Trinity 
based on Lockean epistemology. New England theology, with its focus on the moral 
governance of the supreme God, has little to say about the Trinity.37 Hodge follows 
Turretin in strenuously avoiding any speculations into the nature of the Trinity. In his 
chapter on the doctrine of the Trinity, the major portion is devoted to the Christology 
of the Nicene Council. Even for the Nicene Council, there is ‘a distinction between 
the speculations of the Nicene fathers, and the decisions of the Nicene Council. The 
latter have been accepted by the Church universal, but not the former.’38 Hodge 
classifies the psychological model of Augustine as one of the philosophical forms of 
the doctrine. ‘It may be remarked in reference to them [philosophical forms] all that 
they are of little value. They do not serve to make the inconceivable intelligible.’ 
Allied with this anti-metaphysical stance is Hodge’s conception of theology. For 
Hodge, theology is the scientific study of the Scriptures. By definition, science is the 
inductive study of the laws laid within the facts. ‘In every science there are two 
factors: facts and ideas.’39 Theology is the application of the scientific method to the 
                                                 
35 For a short introduction to Scottish Common Sense philosophy, see Ahlstrom, Religious History, 
354-6. For its relationship to New England theology, see ibid. 418-420. For its relation to Princeton 
theology, see Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century 
Evangelicalsim 1870-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 15-6, 111. 
36 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, repr. 1989), 2:217-220. On Taylor, 
see Sweeney, Nathaniel Taylor, 83-7. 
37 However, Taylor wrote a significant essay defending the Trinity against Unitarian theologians such 
as Henry Ware (1764-1845). Taylor’s main point is that the common sense notion of the unity of God 
does not exclude the possibility of tripersonality within the Godhead. See Foster, New England 
Theology, 313-4. 
38 Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:471. 
39 Ibid., 1. T.D. Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science: The Baconian Ideal and Antebellum 




The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of science. It is his 
store-house of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the 
same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches. 
… the duty of the Christian theologian is to ascertain, collect, and combine all the 
facts which God has revealed concerning himself and our relation to Him. These 
facts are all in the Bible.40  
 
For Hodge, theology is the systematic presentation of the facts and the principles 
contained in the Bible. Just like physics or chemistry, it is an exercise in 
ratiocination. 
Hodge is partially reacting against what he perceived as the dangerous 
mysticism of Schleiermacher.41 For Hodge, modern theology wants to build its 
foundation on religious experience. He insists that the only solid foundation for 
theology is the Bible. Theology is either the inductive study of the facts in the Bible 
or the explication of religious experience. 
In summary, neither New England theory nor Old Princeton theology pays 
much attention to the question of how God can be perceived and experienced in a 
non-rational way. In New England theory, the dominant imagery of God is the moral 
governor. The dominant pastoral concern is revival preaching and the moment of 
conversion. In Princeton theology, the dominant concern is the defense of Calvinistic 
orthodoxy as a scientific system. Theological explorations based on religious 
experience or metaphysical speculations are both rejected as dangerous and 
unbiblical. With the demise of New England theory and Old Princeton theology 
engaged in a life and death battle with modernism at the end of nineteenth century,42 
Edwards’ theology was forgotten until Miller wrote him back to the attention of 
scholars. As we have seen in chapter one, aesthetics plays a central role in this 
twentieth century revival of Edwards.  
For Edwards, the perception of divine glory is a central theme of his theology. 
Not only should we assent to the notion that God is beautiful, but we must also 
perceive divine beauty directly. Only then do we have true knowledge of God, and 
only then are we truly the children of God. Being Christian means a transformed 
                                                                                                                                          
standard text on this issue. 
40 Hodge, Systematic Theology, 10-11. 
41 Ibid., 65-6. 
42 See George Marsden, Fundamentalism, 102-123, 212-221. 
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view of reality in which God’s glory shines through the world and Christian 
experience. His theology is in many ways an attempt to understand biblically and 
rationally such transformation of our perception. Though Edwards knew little about 
medieval mystical theology, his theology continues the best of mystical theology in a 
Protestant framework. 
Neither New England theory nor Princeton theology continues the spiritual 
vision of Edwards. From our perspective, this is a significant loss. While 
intellectually they are both impressive theological constructions, they seem to us to 
lack the spiritual vitality of Edwards’ theology. May it not be one of the reasons for 
the demise of New England theology after Edwards and the gradual decline of 
Princetonian theology? Perhaps one of the key function of theological aesthetics is to 
remind us that theology is never merely an intellectual exercise. It is also an attempt 
to capture notionally the ineffable glory of God. In this sense, theology is always an 
attempt to speak intelligently about what is ultimately unspeakable.  
From American Reformed traditions we shall turn now to Dutch Reformed 
tradition. Under the influence of Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), Dutch Reformed 
tradition pays much more serious attention to a theology of culture. Since art is an 
important aspect of culture, Dutch Reformed tradition has its distinctive theology of 
art. As we have indicated before, Edwards is not interested in a theology of art. His 
theology is about the nature of divine beauty and its manifestation in creation. Yet, in 
order to develop a theology of art, Dutch Reformed theology has to say something 
about the nature of beauty. We shall concentrate on the nature of beauty as 
understood by the Dutch Reformed tradition. Our goal is not to trace any historical 
connections. There is no evidence that Kuyper, Bavinck or other Dutch Reformed 
theologians knew anything about the aesthetics of Edwards. The comparison serves 
to illustrate the place of Edwards within the broad streams of Reformed tradition. 
We shall concentrate on the theology of Kuyper, the founder of the 19th century 
Dutch Reformed movement. Fundamental to Kuyper’s thought is the concept of 
sphere sovereignty.43 This means that different human activities have their own 
sphere and their own laws. Religion is one sphere, politics another sphere, art another 
and natural science yet another. Each sphere is governed by its own laws: 
 
                                                 
43 We are indebted to Jeremy S. Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise: Towards a Theology of the Arts 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 84-101, for his discussion of the sphere sovereignty, common grace 
and theology of art in Kuyper and Bavinck. Begbie give an survey of Dutch Reformed theology of art 
from Kuyper to Rookmaaker in part II of Voicing Creation’s Praise. 
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And even so there are ordinances of God in logic, to regulate our thoughts; 
ordinances of God for our imagination, in the domain of aesthetics; and so, also, 
strict ordinances of God for the whole of human life in the domain of morals.44 
 
For Kuyper, the main sin of the Roman church is the confusion of sphere 
sovereignty by imposing ecclesiastical authority over the other spheres: 
 
When therefore the first education of Northern Europe was completed, and the 
church still persisted in swaying her absolute scepter across the entire domain of life, 
four great movements were started from as many different sides, viz., the 
Renaissance in the domain of art, the Republicanism of Italy in politics, Humanism 
in science, and centrally, in Religion, the Reformation.45 
 
Along with politics and science, art has its own sovereignty independent of 
religion. Kuyper believes that Calvinism represents the highest development of both 
art and religion in that it recognizes the independence of the two spheres: 
 
And so, arrived at their highest development, both Relgion and Art demand an 
independent existence, and the two stems which at first were intertwined and seemed 
to belong to the same plant, now appear to spring from a root of their own.46 
 
In other words, art is inherently different from religion. It is only the immaturity 
of medieval Catholicism that led to synthesis of art and religion in the architecture of 
the medieval cathedrals. Some people have accused the spiritualism (the focus on 
spiritual realities) of Calvinism as inimical to art. They cite as evidence that no 
distinctive art style has risen in the land of Calvinism. Kuyper argues that this lack of 
a distinctive Calvinistic art form is necessitated by the liberation of art from religion.  
 
I maintain that for the very reason of its higher principle Calvinism was not allowed 
to develop such an architectural style of its own.47  
 
Kuyper appeals to Hegel to support his thesis. According to Hegel, the lower 
stage of religion is sensual religion, which depends on art for its expression. The 
                                                 
44 Cited in Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise, 85. It is interesting to note that the division into 
thoughts, imagination and morals sounds Kantian, though there is no evidence of any direct influence. 
Perhaps the concept of sphere sovereignty is more Kantian than Kuyper himself recognized. 
45 Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931). The book contains the 
six Stone lectures delivered by Kuyper at Princeton University in 1898. It is the main source for the 
theology of art of Kuyper. 
46 Ibid., 148. 
47 Ibid., 145-6. 
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higher form of religion liberates itself from the fetters of sensuality into the freedom 
of the spirit.48 For Kuyper, art is essentially sensual and symbolical, while worship is 
a spiritual and cognitive act. 
What is the purpose of the independent sphere of art? It is the reproduction of 
beauty. Kuyper is emphatic that beauty has an objective existence like rocks and 
trees: 
 
And all these because the beautiful is not the product of our own fantasy, nor of our 
subjective perception, but has an objective existence, being itself the expression of a 
Divine perfection.49 
 
Beauty, like truth and moral laws, is the creation of God. Just as natural sciences 
seek to discover the truth about nature, so art seeks to portray the beauty inherent in 
God’s creation. Since beauty is an objective reality, a gift of God to everybody by 
common grace, both Christians and non-Christians can and do appreciate beauty. 
 
But if, at the hand of experience and history, you become persuaded that the highest 
art-instincts are natural gifts, and hence belong to those excellent graces which, in 
spite of sin, by virtue of common grace, have continued to shine in human nature, it 
plainly follows that art can inspire both believers and unbelievers.50 
 
By the common grace of God, everyone can potentially perceive the beauty of 
the universe. It follows that everyone can potentially reproduce this beauty through 
art. While beauty is expressed through sensual objects (e.g. paintings appeal to our 
sight), beauty itself is not something sensual or material. Like moral laws or truth, it 
is a higher dimension of reality. Thus the pursuit of art has an uplifting effect on us: 
 
In this cold, irreligious and practical age the warmth of this devotion to art has kept 
alive many higher aspirations of our soul, which otherwise might readily have died, 
as they did in the middle of the last century.51 
 
Though art is independent of religion (understood as religious activities), it 
helps people to realize that materialism cannot be the final answer to our destiny. In 
that sense, art and religion are allies to one another. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 148. 
49 Ibid., 156. 
50 Ibid., 161. Kuyper calls the pagan Greeks ‘the primordial nation of art.’ (Ibid., 162). See Begbie, 
Voicing Creation’s Praise, 87-89, for Kuyper’s doctrine of common grace. 
51 Ibid., 143. 
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More fundamentally, both art and religion are rooted in our faith commitment. 
Besides sphere sovereignty, the concept of faith commitment is also a central theme 
of Kuyper. Kuyper believes that the cohesiveness of personal identity, as well as 
culture identity, comes from its spiritual center. This spiritual center, or the relation to 
the Infinite, determines the direction of whole culture. Art, being one element of a 
particular culture, finds its cohesiveness only in its relationship to the spiritual center 
of that culture: 
 
It is the central emotion, the central impulse, and the central animation, in the 
mystical root of our being, which seeks to reveal itself to the outer world in this 
fourfold [intellectual, ethical, religious, aesthetic] ramification. Art also is no 
side-shoot on a principal branch, but an independent branch that grows from the 
trunk of our life itself, even though it is far more nearly allied to Religion than to our 
thinking or to our ethical being. … Thus also no unity in the revelation of art is 
conceivable, except by the art-inspiration of an Eternal Beautiful, which flows from 
the fountain of the Infinite.52 
 
Divine worship furnished the tie that united the separated arts.53 
 
Thus, the religious center of a culture will be reflected in the art style of that 
culture. Only a culture with a coherent religious center can develop a coherent art 
style across the different arts. A Christian culture will develop its art in relation to 
commitment. It does not imply that there is one distinctive Christian art style. 
Christians, being members of a particular culture, cannot develop an art style 
independent from the art styles prevalent in the society in general. Art style is always 
a form of historical product. Nonetheless, when Christians become the majority in a 
society, that society will gradually develops great art styles which reflect Christian 
values.54 Kuyper does not elaborate on the process of such development. The art 
produced by the artists must ultimately  
As we have said before, Kuyper has different concern from Edwards. Kuyper 
wants to develop a comprehensive philosophy about all human activities. Edwards is 
interested in a theory of spiritual perception. From these different questions, they are 
led to different conceptions of beauty. For Kuyper, beauty is the goal of the activity 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 150-1. 
53 Ibid., 146. 
54 Kuyper develops this theme in the specific case of Dutch art. He extols Rembrandt as the Christian 
artist par excellence. Kuyper’s main concern is to refute the claim that Calvinism is inimical to art. 
Ibid., 166-170. 
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of art. Along with politics and morality, art is part of the culture mandate of God. It is 
primarily concerned with the divine command to Adam to have dominion over nature. 
The Eternal Beauty that flows from the Infinite is part of the creation of God. It is 
created by God and it expresses of divine perfection. Kuyper conceives beauty as a 
spiritual reality. It is different from both divine essence and the material world. It is a 
Platonic conception of beauty. Since beauty is a part of creation, both Christians and 
non-Christians can perceive and create true beauty. Beauty is divine in the sense that 
it (like moral laws) springs from divine perfection. Beauty is a gracious gift 
bestowed by God, but perceiving beauty is different from perceiving God.  
For Edwards, beauty is the essence for God. Insofar as God is essentially triune, 
God is essentially beautiful. To perceive true beauty is to perceive God. The beauty 
of this world lies in its possibility to serve as metaphor for divine beauty. Thus the 
production of beauty does not merely fulfill the culture mandate; it also serves as a 
sensual proclamation of divine beauty. This will be the implication of Edwards’ 
aesthetic theory. However, Edwards never develops his theory along this direction. 
He is not interested in a theory of art. We shall return to this implication in our last 
section. 
The Dutch tradition continues to develop in the theology of Herman 
Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), Hans Rookmaaker (1922-1977) and Calvin Seerveld 
(1930- ).55 Dooyeweerd, like Kuyper, is not a professional artist or art critic. His 
interest in art lies within a general theory of culture. According to Dooyeweerd, God 
gives human beings the cultural mandate to open up the hidden potentials of the 
created universe. Art has its own sphere of sovereignty within this opening process. 
However, Dooyeweerd is not clear on what set the aesthetic domain apart from other 
domains. Rookmaaker and Seerveld devote their professional life to the study of art 
and aesthetics. Rookmaaker emphasizes harmony as the defining character of beauty, 
a theme dating back Plato and earlier. Seerveld objects to Rookmaaker and others 
who make the creation of beauty the defining character of art. For Seerveld, the 
defining character of art is allusiveness – ‘an elusive play in its artifactual 
presentation of meanings apprehended.”56 Despite these differences, they all adopt 
the Kuyperian perspective in emphasizing the independence of the aesthetic sphere 
within the culture mandate. 
We do not need to go into the details of this story. As we have mentioned above, 
                                                 
55 Our discussion is based on Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise, 106-141.  
56 Cited in ibid., 135. 
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the Dutch Reformed school develops their aesthetics independent of Edwards. For us, 
the Dutch school illustrates that there is no single school of Reformed aesthetics. The 
fundamental belief in the absolute sovereignty of God (common to both Dutch and 
American Reformed tradition) does not determine how one should develop a 
theology of beauty. On the one hand, the Dutch school approaches beauty through 
the perspective of artistic activities. Their definition of beauty is motivated by the 
search for the essence of art. On the other hand, Edwards is motivated by a search for 
the vision of the Creator within creatures. It is not surprising that they develop 
different concepts of beauty. Even if Kuyper knew some of Edwards’ writings, he 
would probably fail to find any relevance for his own theology of art. 
However, the two approaches do have points of contact. In particular, Seerveld’s 
concept of allusiveness bears striking similarity to Edwards’ concept of image. 
Seerveld does not address the question whether true beauty should allude to specific 
objects. If we accept Seerveld’s thesis that beauty is not the only goal of art, we are 
still left with the question when art (or nature) can be said to manifest true beauty. On 
the other hand, Edwards does not have an epistemological theory of spiritual 
perception. Seerveld’s theory on the perception of allusion can enrich the theology of 
Edwards. Hopefully, other studies will pursue this dialogue in aesthetics among the 
Reformed traditions. 
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In this concluding section of our concluding chapter, we want to situate 
Edwards’ theology within contemporary scene. Our dissertation is an exercise in 
historical theology, and the significance of Edwards for constructive theology today 
lies beyond the scope of our study. However, we begin our dissertation with a short 
survey of the history of aesthetics. We want to return to some of the issues raised in 
that survey and ask some fundamental questions about the nature of aesthetics. In 
other words, we want to place Edwards within the history of philosophical and 
theological aesthetics. We believe that Edwards’ theology can yield a fruitful 
dialogue with the issues raised in those disciplines. We want to illustrate the possible 
directions of such dialogue, even though a proper dialogue will be the work of 
another study. We conclude with a few remarks on the implication of Edwards’ 
aesthetics for fine arts. 
As we have shown in our introduction, aesthetics gradually became a separate 
philosophical subject in the eighteenth century. While there is general agreement on 
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the importance of that period, there are different ways of understanding the most 
significant development of that time. One option is to emphasize the rediscovery of 
the concept of the sublime. Kant’s theory of the sublime is the culmination of 
eighteenth century discussion of the sublime.57 We shall cut short the discussion by 
going to Kant directly. 
Kant lists several contrasts between the beautiful and the sublime. The former 
concerns the form of an object; the latter is formless and limitless. The former 
satisfies by its quality, the latter by quantity. The former brings a feeling of the 
promotion of life, the latter a feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers of 
life. The most important difference, according to Kant, is that the former gives a 
sense of purposiveness, while the latter appears to be contrapurposive for our power 
of judgment.58 
The sublime is divided into two kinds: the mathematically sublime and the 
dynamically sublime. The former is related to our faculty of cognition. 
Mathematically, everything else is small in comparison with the sublime. Nothing 
perceived by us in the world can, strictly speaking, be sublime. Everything perceived 
by senses has form and limitations. Therefore, ‘that is sublime which even to be able 
to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the 
senses.’59 The faculty of reason surpasses every measure of the senses. We can 
apprehend or conceptualize the diameter of the earth, even if our sense can never 
comprehend it in its actual size. Some objects provoke reason to grasp for the totality 
of the magnitude. Such natural objects60 induce in us the feeling of sublimity. It is 
analogous to beauty in that sublimity is also a form of subjective purposiveness. This 
movement to grasp the totality produces ‘a feeling that we have pure self-sufficient 
reason, or a faculty for estimating magnitude, whose preeminence cannot be made 
intuitable through anything except the inadequacy of that faculty which is itself 
unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects).’61 Through the 
                                                 
57 ‘And just as eighteenth-century literature has as its unconscious goal, in the fullness of time, the 
literature of the early nineteenth century, so it may be said that eighteenth-century aesthetic has as its 
unconscious goal the Critique of Judgment, the book in which it was to be refined and re-interpreted.’ 
Samuel H. Monk, The Sublime, 6. 
58 Critique of the Power of Judgment. ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), §23, 5:244-5, hereafter cited as CJ. We give the pagination of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften 
(edited by the German Academy of Sciences), which is printed on the margin in Guyer’s edition. 
59 CJ §25, 5:250. 
60 For Kant, only natural objects can be sublime. Artificial objects are all made according to the forms 
in the artisan’s mind. One wonders if Kant would allow someone to call Jackson Pollock’s paintings 
sublime. 
61 CJ §27, 5:258. 
201 
mathematically sublime, we sense the limitation of our imagination. Through this 
negation, we sense the unlimited capacity of our faculty of reason. The sublime 
arouses in us the feeling of respect, which is ultimately a respect for the vocation of 
reason. 
The confrontation of the overwhelming power of nature arouses in us the 
feeling of the dynamically sublime. Kant gives examples such as thundering clouds 
and erupting volcanoes. Kant distinguishes the fearful from being afraid. Watching 
thundering clouds from a safe distance gives a fearful sight without making us afraid. 
If we are actually afraid that lightening might strike us, then we are in no mood to 
make the judgment of sublimity. Sublimity is a subjective aesthetic judgment, not an 
objective property of an object. The overwhelming manifestation of power in nature  
 
… makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness, but 
at the same time it reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of it and a 
superiority over nature on which is grounded a self-preservation of quite another 
kind than that which can be threatened and endangered by nature outside us, 
whereby humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the human being 
must submit to that dominion.62  
  
Paradoxically, the sense of powerlessness in facing the dynamically sublime actually 
arouses in us our sense of superiority over nature. We recognize that, in the realm of 
practical reason, we have freedom over nature. We are not bound to sensibility. This 
freedom makes us superior to nature. Why should the overwhelming power of nature 
cause us to reflect on our Stoic superiority? As evidence, Kant claims that ‘without 
the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime will 
appear merely repellent to the unrefined person.’63 If only morally developed people 
can appreciate the dynamically sublime, presumably the judgment of sublimity is a 
reflection of the ability to make moral judgment. 
In summary, both the mathematically sublime and dynamically sublime are 
purposive in that they evoke in us the vocation of pure and practical reason. They do 
so through evoking the sense of infinity and of freedom over nature. For our purpose, 
there is no need to go further into Kant’s theory of the sublime. 
We shall now turn to Edwards. Delattre denies that Edwards has a theology of 
the sublime God: 
 
                                                 
62 CJ §28, 5:261-2. 
63 CJ §29, 5:265. 
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The sublime is an aesthetic category appropriate to the awesome and even awful, 
while Edwards was very much concerned with recovering a sense of the “lovely 
majesty” of God, as opposed to the “awful majesty” of God so much emphasized by 
many of his contemporaries among evangelical Christians.… Beauty and light and 
joy rather than terror and darkness are what he found at the heart of God and 
being-in-general, whereas the sublime, unlike beauty, has about it always at least a 
touch of terror.64 
 
If our thesis is correct, then Delattre is totally mistaken. Can God be described with 
more awful majesty than Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God? Delattre depends on 
Edwards’ early musings on the definition of beauty, and totally ignores Edwards’ 
teaching on the glory of election and hell. We have shown that the awful majesty of 
God is equally important to Edwards as the lovely majesty of God. Moreover, the 
awful majesty of God in Edwards is similar to the sublime in Kant.  
First, the awesome God confronts us as the infinite being. This corresponds to 
Kant’s mathematical sublimity. Edwards would agree with Kant that physical senses 
can never comprehend infinity. Edwards, disagreeing with Kant, believes that we can 
sense (without comprehending it completely) divine infinity through other spiritual 
senses. For Edwards, infinity is not merely a construct of reason. It is a spiritual 
reality that God freely chooses to reveal to the saints (for their enjoyment) and to the 
damned (for their torment). Second, the awesome God of Edwards confronts us as 
the one who has absolute power over us. This corresponds to Kant’s dynamic 
sublimity, understood as power dominating over us. For Kant, sublimity can be felt 
only in safety from danger. True terror is contrary to sublimity. For Edwards, true 
terror can be part of the experience of sublimity. The arbitrary decision of election 
and damnation is the ultimate display of divine dynamic sublimity. The elect will 
enjoy the sublimity of the electing God in gratitude; the damned will encounter this 
sublimity in terror. Edwards asserts that there will be no tragic hero in hell; the 
damned will be crushed both physically and spiritually. This dynamic power will 
leave no space for human autonomy. While, for Kant, the dynamically sublime is an 
aesthetic judgment reflecting human freedom, for Edwards it is an aesthetic 
judgment reflecting divine freedom. In contemplating the thundering clouds, 
Edwards claims that we sense the sovereign power of God over us. 
If the experience of sublimity in Edwards and Kant bears striking similarities, 
the origin of such experience is radically different. For Kant, we do not literally 
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perceive a sublime object. Neither infinity nor freedom can be perceived in a 
space-time framework. Sublimity is a free-play of the imagination. Our imagination 
goes beyond our perception in a harmonious play with the faculty of reason. 
Sublimity is a totally subjective condition. For Edwards, sublimity is perception of a 
particular objective reality. Sublimity is a relationship between God and creatures. It 
is not objective in the sense of ‘being an object in space-time.’ God is not such an 
object. In Edwards’ theology, no spatial-temporal object can be sublime in the strict 
sense. They are neither infinite, nor do they have infinite power over us. Natural 
objects become sublime when they serve as metaphors for divine sublimity. The 
thunder clouds are just noisy without spiritual discernment. They become sublime 
when we see the power of God epitomized in the roaring thunders.65 For both Kant 
and Edwards, human imagination is engaged in going beyond sensible perception. 
For Kant, this going beyond is also a turning inwards into our subjectivity. For 
Edwards, this going beyond is reaching out through the spiritual sense to the divine 
reality undergirding spatial-temporal reality.  
Kant spends considerably more time in addressing the nature of beauty. To stay 
within our purpose, we can merely give a hint of how our discussion of sublimity can 
be extended to the issue of beauty. Both Kant and Edwards resist a merely 
psychological theory of beauty. We do not just happen to enjoy beauty; we enjoy 
beauty because beauty is the sensible presentation of our deepest convictions. Our 
delight in beauty reflects a deeper level of reality. Kant and Edwards diverge 
radically on the nature of that reality. For Kant, that reality is our vocation to impose 
self-legislated lawfulness upon the sensible world.66 For Edwards, that reality is the 
return to God through the sensibility of divine beauty. Edwards has a much richer 
account of the symbolic function of material beauty. It tells of God’s wisdom and 
                                                 
65 Delattre claims that ‘beauty provides the first and fullest and most adequate way of filling in the 
right-hand side of the equation “being is x ” or “being consists in x .”’ (Beauty and Sensibility, 28) In 
other words, beauty is a transcendental and objective property of being. Farley (Faith and Beauty, 49, 
fn. 15) claims that Delattre is ambiguous on this point. While claiming beauty is a property of beings, 
Delattre also insists that beauty is a disposition of the heart. Thus it is both objective and subjective in 
Delattre’s account. Our discussion of sublimity suggests the solution. The sublime in spatial-temporal 
phenomena is an attitude and interpretation of the human subject, but it is universal validity because it 
is based on divine interpretation. God intends whose phenomena to be a metaphor of himself. We may 
note here that Kant claims that while the sublime is a subjective judgment, it is universally valid 
because it is based on the universal structure of subjectivity. Thus he distances himself from the 
psychological theory of Burke (CJ ‘General remark’, 5:277-8)  
66 The way that beauty can symbolize the vocation of practical reason is a complicated story that we 
cannot go into now. See the helpful discussion in Paul Guyer, Value of Beauty: Historical Essays in 
Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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power, as well as sin and redemption. Kant’s account is limited to the principle of 
free lawfulness. However, they both agree that the significance of beauty lies in its 
symbolic function. Similar to the discussion of sublimity, the question of how 
symbols function and what they represent can become the channel for a dialogue 
between Edwards and Kant. 
We now turn to case of aesthetics in a specifically theological context. In our 
introduction, we present Aquinas’ theology as the epitome of medieval approach to 
theological aesthetics. In his theology, the Son is the source and archetype of all 
forms. Beauty is the perception of forms in all their integrity and clarity. For 
medieval theologians like Aquinas, the perception of forms is not merely a cognitive 
event. It is a perception of divine presence within creation. McGinn calls this 
paradigm of divine presence the metaphysics of flow.67 ‘Flow is the emanation of 
form from the First Source that is the font and origin of all forms.’68 God is not 
merely the efficient cause of the universe. The efficient cause can be categorically 
different from the effect (e.g. a cook and the hamburger she cooks.) In the 
metaphysics of flow, the effect bears resemblance to the cause because the effect 
participates in the nature of the cause. In this paradigm, the universe is a natural but 
freely-chosen emanation from God. Therefore we can behold the glory of the cause 
through the effect. For Aquinas, the beauty of the world is an exhibition of the beauty 
of the Son. 
The Thomistic vision is a creative integration of Neoplatonism and 
Aristotelianism. It is a compelling vision for the medieval age, but it is a foreign 
vision for the modern age. Yet we find attempts to construct a similar vision for 
modernity. For the twentieth century, Balthasar has resurrected in a large-scale theory 
of form. Roberts summarizes Balthasar’s aesthetic vision as following: 
 
Beauty is concerned with form (formosus, speciosus) and with the splendor that 
radiates faith. It is the form, the Gestalt, which is the expression of the artistic vision, 
and yet the glory that shines forth is nowhere present except in the form. 
 
Aesthetics, therefore, is concerned with form, shape, composition, expression, and 
seeing such forms as they are.… What is seen is the doxa of the form, but this glory 
is the glory of being.69 
                                                 
67 Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300-1500), v.4 of The 
Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 2005), 14-17. 
68 Alberti Magni: De Causi et processu universitatis a Prima Causa I.4.1, cited in ibid., 16. 
69 Louis Roberts, The Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs von Balthasar (Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1987), 234. 
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Balthasar does not subscribe to an Aristotelian theory of form; the form in his 
theory is not tied to some definitional essence of particular objects. However, his 
concept of form is similar to the Thomistic concept of clarity. It is based on both the 
objectivity of being and the subjectivity of perception. Being has an inherent 
splendor and integrity, which is called its form. When this form is perceived by 
people, they recognize it as the beauty of the world. Beauty is still a transcendental 
property of being. In Balthasar’s vision, all beings – insofar as they are existents – 
emanate the glory of form. 
In what sense is this vision a theological aesthetics? For Balthasar, being speaks 
of divine beauty because it proclaims the free love of God.70 In his account, the fatal 
turn of Western philosophy began with the deconstruction of metaphysics in Duns 
Scotus and the worship of being itself in Meister Eckhart. Instead, the study of 
metaphysics should tell us that being can never be a sufficient ground for itself. 
Being can be realized only through concrete existents, yet concrete existents 
presuppose the being as its ground. This mutual dependence suggests, for Balthasar, 
that neither being-in-general nor concrete existents are self-sufficient. They both 
depend on free love of the self-sufficient God. God freely creates in order that God 
may have the objects of love. Even the most hideous creature ‘has a shattering 
grandeur when it is the language of a love who wishes to perceive the reflected glory 
of the first miracle in all Being’s forms.’71 This miraculous love is God’s free 
creation of being. The fact that something – rather than nothing – exist suggests a 
self-sufficient Love as its a priori ground. The form is the concretization of this 
divine love in particular objects.72 
Richard Viladesau, building on the work of Rahner and Lonergan, takes an 
alternative approach to theological aesthetics. Viladesau accepts the Enlightenment 
critique that we cannot have unmediated knowledge of being. He begins with the 
structure of our knowing, and asks whether the very possibility of knowing implies 
                                                 
70 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, v.5, The Realm of 
Metaphysics in the Modern Age (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 613-656, the two sections entitled 
‘The Site of Glory in Metaphysics’ and ‘Love as Custodian of Glory.’ 
71 Ibid., 648. 
72 We present only one side of Balthasar’s aesthetics. The other side is his focus on Christ being the 
unique expression of the form of God. Balthasar is challenged by the theology of Barth to make 
Catholic theology more explicitly Christocentric. Whether he has successfully integrated the two sides 
of his aesthetics is an open question. See Roland Chia, ‘“Theological Aesthetics or Aesthetic 
Theology?” Some Reflections on the Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs von Balthasar’, Scottish 
Journal of Theology, 1996, 49(1):75-95. Our purpose here is to bring in Bathasar where he can serve 
as a contrast to Edwards. 
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an openness to the revelation of God. 
Viladesau believes such openness is implied because any knowledge is always 
implicitly an attempt to comprehend reality as a totality: 
 
When the mind grasps an object through understanding and judgment, in the very 
process it transcends that grasp: it is tacitly aware that the object is more than what is 
grasped, and at the same time it recognizes the provisional character of its own 
insights. This excusses points to the a priori condition of possibility for the mind’s 
knowing sensible objects as objects and of differentiating them from itself – namely, 
the pre-apprehension (Vorgriff) as “being” as such: the total horizon of knowledge 
and its dynamism.73 
  
When we grasp an object with our mind, it is always grasped as an 
object-within-the-world. Implicitly, we have an unthematical understanding of reality 
in its totality. Such implicit grasping for totality is the basis for the possibility of 
knowledge about spiritual reality. 
What is the role of beauty in this transcendental theory of perception? Beauty is 
the joy we experience when the world apparently conforms to our pre-apprehension 
of reality as a harmonious and intelligible whole: 
 
Objectively, beauty is the order of reason in things, their truth and goodness, their 
“rightness” – that is, their intelligibility, their accord with the dynamism of the 
human person toward being and being-well.74 
 
Beauty is the joy of experiencing the world as corresponding to the well being 
of our psyche. In this theory, order and harmony are also the criteria for discerning 
beauty. In Thomistic theory, harmony is an indication of the simplicity of the 
undivided Cause of all things. The reason here is that our intellect, in its desire to 
grasp the world through reason, naturally desires the world to be orderly and 
harmonious. When the world corresponds to the dynamism of our psyche, we 
experience the joy of existence or the joy of being part of this world. 
How is beauty a mediation of divine reality? For Viladesau, God is regarded as 
an asymptote of finite experience of beauty. All our sense of beauty is accompanied 
by a sense of tragedy: 
 
… the rejoicing in existence (or in “form”) that characterizes it is simultaneously 
tied to an acute awareness of finitude: the gratuitous joy of beauty and its delight in 
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form arise precisely out of contrast with the abyss of nonbeing experienced in the 
fragile, threatened character of human existence, for which it is possible not to be.75 
 
Our experience of beauty is always marked by the awareness that it could have 
been otherwise. The world is not inherently harmonious, and it is often marked by 
the most grotesque disharmony. In our panting for the infinitude, we are implicitly 
affirming the existence of ultimate Beauty, ‘a reality the apprehension of which 
would be unmixed and unlimited joy in existence, and which in itself – that is, as 
self-apprehending – is self-conscious Beauty or infinite Bliss.’76 This self-conscious 
and infinite Beauty is God. 
In both the accounts of Balthasar and Viladesau, being as experienced by us is 
found to be lacking in completeness. It requires an absolute ground to sustain and 
affirm it. In the approach, beauty is the perception of this affirmation and the joy 
accompanying this perception. 
Edwards’ theological aesthetics represents a different approach. Edwards is not 
interested in presenting God as the completion of our finite beauty. It is not the 
finitude of our experience that points to the infinitude of God. The starting point of 
our experience of divine beauty in Edwards is the theology of revelation. God reveals 
God’s own beauty through the imparting of the Spirit in us. Therefore, our 
experience of divine beauty is a participation in the intra-Trinitarian life of God. 
Divine beauty is not perceived through a mystical view of the world; it is the 
perception of divine beauty that leads to our altered sense of reality.77 
Edwards’ aesthetics is an idealistic reinterpretation of Calvin’s dogma of the 
world as theatre of God’s glory. For Calvin, the world truly proclaims the glory of 
God, though sin hinders us from appreciating the true nature of earthly beauty. Yet 
Calvin does not provide an epistemology of sin and regeneration. In Edwards’ 
scheme, sensibility and affections provide the epistemological connection. Only with 
sensible knowledge of divine beauty can our affections be changed. Only with 
renewed affections can we have sensible knowledge of the true earthly beauty. 
Shall we start our aesthetics with a general theory of being or cognition, and 
discern how our experience of finite earthly beauty is correlated with the infinite 
ground of beauty? Shall we start with explicit Christian doctrines and ask how they 
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77 Thus Miller and Elmwood have misread Edwards by equating the altered view of the world as the 
essence of divine beauty in Edwards. See Introduction, pp. 17-20. 
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are mirrored in our earthly experience?78 For us, the evaluation of the merits and the 
pitfalls of these two approaches would seem to be a major question of theological 
aesthetics. This is work for another study. 
Finally we come to the question of how Christian aesthetics may contribute to 
the general culture mandate.79 If we ask what Edwards’ aesthetics may say to the 
culture of arts in general, the answer will be pretty short. Since non-Christians cannot 
have sensible knowledge of divine beauty, they will pursue a different kind of beauty 
in their fine arts. That does not mean Christian and non-Christian art have no 
commonalities. As we have indicated in the last section, both a Kantian artist and a 
Christian artist may have aesthetic experience of free lawfulness and sublimity. To 
that extent, their fine arts may both engage in these themes. Yet they will interpret 
these aesthetic experiences differently. The Kantian artist may even understand 
rationally the Christian artist’s worldview, but such notional knowledge will not lead 
to a change in the affections of Kantian artist. The Christian understanding of arts 
will have no persuasive force for the Kantian artist. For both the Kantian and the 
Christian artists, their arts will present in a sensible form their understanding of 
reality. The Christian artist has no right, even within his own theology, to demand the 
Kantian artist to present reality as he does. 
Is that a problem? I do not think so. By now it is a cliché to claim that the 
Enlightenment project is bankrupt. There is no self-evident and universal structure of 
human consciousness. The postmodern paradigm teaches us that reality actually 
appears differently to different people. We construct our worlds with our 
presuppositions, language and culture. The postmodern paradigm can be regarded as 
an indirect verification of the Edwardsian understanding of sensibility. We are not 
sensible of the world in the same way. Moreover, the ways we are sensible of the 
world are often pre-critical and meta-cognitive. If the postmodern paradigm is 
correct, then we should not expect a Christian paradigm, or any particular paradigm, 
to become the general culture mandate. 
Does that mean that Christian artists cannot contribute meaningfully to the 
cultural of fine arts in general? Of course not. The fact that different artists begin 
with different sensibilities of the world does not mean that their sensibilities are 
incommensurable. Both a Christian and a Kantian may enjoy the beauty and pathos 
of Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, though the Christian will presumably identify with 
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the libretto in a more literal way. The Christian artists contribute to the general 
culture precisely by presenting their sensibility of the world in their work. They do 
not need to insist that their arts are the only legitimate arts. Theologically, if the 
Christian God is indeed the Creator of the world, then they can trust that their arts 
will create echoes in other people’s heart. God will not cease to reveal his beauty. 
The theological aesthetics of Edwards may indeed provide important resources 
for a Christian in dialogue with postmodernity. The reason is not that Edwards is a 
postmodern theologian disguised in seventeenth century theology.80 The reason is 
that the postmodernism has taught us that our construction of reality is often 
motivated by pre-apprehensions of reality. These pre-apprehensions cannot be 
defined or subsumed under the roles of reason. Our perception of reality cannot be 
reduced to mere rules. The theological aesthetics of Edwards is based on the sensible 
encounter of unique entities – between God and human beings, between different 
human beings. The material world is a sensible metaphor of such encounters. Based 
on this understanding, fine arts can be regarded as deliberate and sensible metaphors 
of such encounters. It may persuade where reason fails to reach. It may conjure up 
divine realities for the postmodern mind that is weary of the tyranny of universal 
reason. Such an aesthetic vision focuses on the unique encounter of the subject and 
her world. The postmodern celebrates such unique encounter. This suggests a new 
imperative for theologians and Christian artists to work together in the postmodern 
era. 
With this tentative note on Edwards and postmodernism we shall conclude our 
study. 
                                                 
80 For us, Daniel, Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, presents the kind of distortion of Edwards. 
